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I. INTRODUCTION
Affirmative action policy is even more divisive and unsettled today than at
its inception more than thirty years ago. This is a remarkable socio-political
fact. I know of no other public policy since the rise of the administrative state
during the New Deal that has remained so intensely unpopular yet has survived
so long.' Equally remarkable, its current unpopularity coincides with strong
support for ethnic diversity in all areas of public and private life and with un-
precedented social progress by blacks 2 and other minorities. 3 This Article ana-
lyzes the true nature of this conflict, how it arose, why it endures, and the role
that law has played in fomenting and perpetuating it-often and increasingly in
the name of diversity.
I set the stage by defining affirmative action, distinguishing it from non-
discrimination, and identifying the most important forms and policy domains
where it appears. I then discuss the importance of context to a normative as-
sessment of affirmative action and emphasize several developments that create
a new context: immigration and intermarriage patterns, more fluid notions of
identity, greater socioeconomic convergence of minorities with whites, and re-
cent studies revealing the actual magnitude of college and professional school
1. Legalized abortion under Roe v. Wade is a possible exception, but there are some important dif-
ferences. Roe's foundation is judicial, not political. Roe, decided in 1973, has not been in place quite as
long as affirmative action. Public opinion about abortion is not as sharply divided, though in both cases
the precise division depends on the formulation and context of the questions. Finally, Roe's legal status
is reasonably secure for now. President Bush and his Attorney General, John Ashcroft, have disclaimed
any serious effort to reverse it. In contrast, affirmative action is beleaguered as never before both in
politics, where several states have limited it, and in the courts, where it is under intense challenge.
2. My reasons for using the unsatisfactory term "blacks" rather than the even more unsatisfactory
term "African-Americans" are set forth in Peter H. Schuck, Reflections on the Effects of Immigrants on
African Americans-and Vice-Versa, in HELP OR HINDRANCE? THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF
IMMIGRATION FOR AFRICAN AMERICANS 361, 361-63 (D.S. Hamermesh & F.D. Bean eds., 1998).
3. The data are presented and analyzed at length in ORLANDO PATTERSON, THE ORDEAL OF
INTEGRATION: PROGRESS AND RESENTMENT IN AMERICA'S "RACIAL" CRISIS 15-82 (1997). See infra
text accompanying notes 324-331, 445-450 for further discussion.
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admission preferences. In this new context, I argue, the ethno-racial categories
on which affirmative action relies are losing whatever coherence and normative
appeal they may once have had. Next, I develop the principal rationales and
normative justifications offered by affirmative action's advocates, as well as the
counter-arguments. I focus here on the diversity rationale, particularly in the
domain of higher education, where it now assumes the central justificatory role.
In an effort to understand how so unpopular a policy could have survived for so
long, I describe the policy's political and regulatory past and how the public
views it today. After reviewing what is known about the actual consequences of
affirmative action, I consider two vital issues: what an America without it
would look like, and whether attractive alternatives exist.
I conclude the analysis by explaining why race is a singularly and increas-
ingly problematic principle of distributive justice in America. My own view, as
will emerge, is that affirmative action, although well-intended, is hard to square
with liberal ideals in general and the diversity ideal (properly understood) in
particular. The benefits it confers are too small, too arbitrarily and narrowly
targeted, and too widely resented to justify the costs that it imposes-its unfair-
ness to other individuals, its propensity to corrupt and debase public discourse,
its incoherent programmatic categories, and its reinforcement of the pernicious
and increasingly meaningless use of race as a central principle of distributive
justice rather than the other distributive principles, particularly merit, with
which most Americans, whites and minorities alike, strongly identify. (Below, I
analyze the highly contested ideal of merit as one of affirmative action's ration-
ales.)
4
My chief concern here is not with the constitutionality of ethno-racial af-
firmative action, but with its wisdom as public policy. In my view-much too
briefly stated-the Constitution should be interpreted to permit Congress to
adopt a law preferring blacks so long as it does not violate the heightened con-
stitutional protection that other racial minorities enjoy. At the time of the Four-
teenth Amendment, after all, Congress did just that.5 Congress enacts laws
every day that favor one group over another, laws that if rational are constitu-
tional. That being so, Congress has the power to favor blacks at the expense of
the white majority if it believes that this would be sound policy. Whether it can
favor blacks over other disadvantaged ethno-racial minorities, as affirmative
action sometimes does, is less clear.
Be that as it may, the question I address here is whether, assuming such a
4. Infra text accompanying notes 22-24 and Part V, Section B.
5. Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment,
71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985). This claim is sharply disputed by Paul Moreno, Racial Classifications and
Reconstruction Legislation, 61 J. SOUTHERN HIST. 271 (1995) (relying on legislative history and the
administration of the law). Moreno's position is buttressed by evidence of Frederick Douglass's strong
opposition to affirmative action during Reconstruction. Seymour Martin Lipset, Two Americas, Two
Value Systems: Blacks and Whites, 13 TOCQUEVILLE REV. 137, 170 (1992).
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law would be constitutional, Congress (or a state legislature) should enact it. In
explaining why my answer to this question is no, I pay special attention to the
diversity rationale for affirmative action both because of my larger interest in
how law manages diversity, 6 and because diversity is the only broad rationale
that the Supreme Court has not yet rejected. This rationale, I find, is too flimsy
and poorly tailored to the relevant social facts to satisfy the constitutional stan-
dard for affirmative action now applied by the Court. But my larger point is that
even if an ethno-racial preference could meet the Court's standard, it should not
be adopted and that most proposals for reform would be impractical, ineffec-
tive, or make matters even worse.
Accordingly, I would bar government from using or mandating affirmative
action, except perhaps 7 as a carefully-tailored, time-limited remedy for the con-
tinuing effects of past bias in the kinds of situations where the Supreme Court
has long permitted it.8 On the other hand, I believe that private institutions that
want to use affirmative action for diversity or other purposes should be gener-
ally free to do so. In my vision of a diverse liberal polity, private entities or-
ganized primarily for purposes of fellowship or the promotion of group values
should be able to implement those goals through membership or other policies
so long as they do not violate the larger community's most fundamental nor-
mative commitments, including non-discrimination against racial minorities.
Specifically, I would permit private affirmative action if the entity engaging in
it publicly discloses the nature and magnitude of its preferences and does not
discriminate against blacks and other minorities entitled to the highest level of
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
No sensible person who carefully considers the evidence and arguments I
marshal here can be wholly satisfied with either the status quo or the position I
espouse. The cruel legacy of 250 years of slavery in America has proved more
stubborn than even Frederick Douglass, a former slave and consummate realist,
imagined. Affirmative action, for all its problems, promises to do something to
repair this incalculable damage. This explains why thoughtful individuals like
Orlando Patterson, Sanford Levinson, David Hollinger, Nathan Glazer, Derek
Bok, and many others continue to support it even though, as I shall show, the
empirical and normative premises of their own arguments have become harder
and harder to sustain. Reasonable people can and obviously do differ about
these premises and about the tradeoffs that any reformed policy would entail.
My ambitions here are to dispel some of the misunderstandings that plague the
debate, to clarify what is actually at stake, and to propose a better reconciliation
6. PETER H. SCHUCK, DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE (Har-
vard University Press, forthcoming 2003).
7. I say "perhaps" because deciding whether it is wise and just to do so would depend on a number
of considerations that will appear in my analysis.
8. E.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-98 (1989) (discussing judicial
requirements for remedially-based preferences); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987) (same).
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of the conflicting social values.
II. DEFINITIONS, DESIGNS, AND DOMAINS
A. Definitions
By affirmative action, I mean a program in which people who control ac-
cess to important social resources offer preferential access to those resources
for particular groups that they think need special treatment. 9 In this context,
then, I use the terms "affirmative action" and "preferences" interchangeably. 10
By affirmative action, I also refer to its typical programmatic forms-more or
less systematic, continuous, bureaucratized, rule- or routine-governed, and of-
ten outcome-determinative." I also focus on ethno-racial preferences rather
than those based on income, age, gender, or disability, although some of my ar-
guments also apply to them. Unless the context indicates otherwise, I use race
to include the ethnicities favored by affirmative action.
As the adjective "affirmative" suggests, I mean to distinguish affirmative
action from a more passive practice, non-discrimination, in which the norma-
tive principle is simply to refrain from treating people differently on the basis
of their race or other protected characteristics.12 The distinction between af-
firmative action and non-discrimination is clear and important both in politics
and in principle, though not always in practice.' 3 In sharp contrast to affirma-
tive action, non-discrimination is no longer a controversial norm in American
society except among bigots and some extreme libertarians. 14 The punctilio of
public discourse severely condemns any hint of anti-black or anti-minority at-
titudes. As Alan Wolfe observes, "No credible public figure-literally none-
seeks to bind white Americans closer together by means of rhetoric that sets
them against blacks."' 5 The public associates non-discrimination with the uni-
9. For a more extended description, see JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 6-8 (1996) [hereinafter IRONIES]. For discussion of competing definitions, including
Skrentny's, see Deborah C. Malamud, Race, Culture, and the Law: Values, Symbols, and Facts in the
Affirmative Action Debate, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1668, 1691-94 (1997).
10. This equivalence is endorsed by some affirmative action enthusiasts like Stephen Steinberg,
not just by opponents. David A. Hollinger, Group Preferences, Cultural Diversity, and Social Democ-
racy: Notes Toward a Theory of Affirmative Action, in RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 97 (Robert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 1998).
11. On its outcome-determinativeness, see, for example, Samuel Issacharoff, Can Affirmative Ac-
tion Be Defended?, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 669, 671-72 (1998).
12. In the race context, this is sometimes called "color-blindness." SKRENTNY, IRONIES, supra note
9, at 7-8. See generally ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992).
13. Its psychological contours are doubtless complex and opaque. E.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger,
Civil Rights Perestroika: Intergroup Relations After Affirmative Action, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1251, 1329
(1998) ("When a person is color-blind, there is simply much he will not see.").
14. PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 15-16 ("Viewed from the perspective of comparative history and
sociology, it can be said, unconditionally, that the changes that have taken place in the United States
over the last fifty years are unparalleled in the history of minority-majority relations.").
15. Alan Wolfe, Strangled by Roots, NEW REPUBLIC, May 28, 2001, at 33 (review of GARY
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versally-praised norm of equal opportunity, while it generally disparages pref-
erences as a demand for equal outcomes or special treatment. Some strong
egalitarians favor affirmative action precisely because they think it will equal-
ize results, but most affirmative action proponents make a more limited argu-
ment-that it is essential to achieve genuine equal opportunity.
Both proponents and opponents of affirmative action define non-
discrimination in ways they hope will draw on its greater legitimacy. 16 Propo-
nents claim that affirmative action, by leveling the playing field, is simply an-
other form of non-discrimination. Opponents define non-discrimination to in-
clude greater outreach to minority communities in hopes of going beyond "old
boy" networks and enlarging the pool of minority applicants who will then
have an equal opportunity to compete for the prize on the basis of merit. Out-
reach, in this view, includes more minorities, vindicates the non-discrimination,
equal opportunity, and merit principles, and leaves no one with a legitimate
claim to the prize worse off-whereas preferences, quotas, and goals subject to
sanctions violate all of these principles. This makes it easy, then, for affirmative
action critics to support outreach. 17
Not so fast. In fact, greater outreach is neither cost-free nor neutral. In order
to reach out, one must expend additional resources, targeting them on some
groups and not on others and, as with affirmative action, increasing the prob-
ability that members of the target group will win the prize. If we dismiss this
problem as de minimis because only limited resources are involved, we should
nonetheless recognize that we are now on a slippery slope that could move us
toward preferences of a more robust sort. 18
Evidentiary problems also propel us from non-discrimination toward pref-
erences, especially when proof of intentional bias is required. Anti-
discrimination enforcers need baselines or other indicia of bias to help them
gauge its extent, the need for remedial measures, and the measures' effects.
They naturally prefer numerical benchmarks-in employment, for example, a
group's share of the working age population in the relevant labor pool-as a
basis for inferring whether the employer discriminated against the group. In
anti-discrimination programs, and also in voluntary affirmative action pro-
grams, these benchmarks may take the form and rhetoric of mere "goals" to-
ward which firms should strive but that do not necessarily trigger sanctions if
GERSTLE, AMERICAN CRUCIBLE: RACE AND NATION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2001)).
16. Malamud, supra note 9, at 1691; see also infra Part V, Section B.
17. E.g., Hollinger, supra note 10, at 101.
18. Even a rule merely requiring regulated companies to report the number of minorities who apply
and who are hired is not impact-neutral, as it makes it more likely that the agency will investigate and
impose sanctions. E.g., Stephen Labaton, Court Rules Agency Erred on Mandate for Minorities, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2001, at A16. By the same token, giving dyslexic test-takers advantages such as addi-
tional time and spell-check programs may do more than merely equalize opportunity. E.g., Daniel
Golden, Disabled Students Gain More Aid on Tests, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2001, at B2 (settlement of
lawsuit demanding accommodation for special education students).
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they are not met. The "not necessarily" is what pushes the anti-discrimination
program down the slippery slope toward preferences. For legal and psychologi-
cal reasons, soft, tentative goals tend to become harder, more rigid standards
that raise a presumption of bias if not reached. The strength of the presumption,
the kind of evidence that can rebut it, the effect of rebuttal on the burden of
proof, and other technical issues are the province of an increasingly arcane anti-
discrimination law. Goals that at their inception were merely precatory become
more binding and consequential; they either mark "safe harbors" where firms
meeting them can expect protection, or condemn those that do not meet them as
at least prima facie illegal.
19
Although the government does not impose specific goals on private univer-
sities but exhorts them to set their own, admissions officers nonetheless feel
external pressure and internal compunction to use preferences to meet the goals
they set.20 Under these various pressures, three related distinctions-between
non-discrimination and affirmative action, equality of opportunity and equality
of result, and goals and preferences-blur at the edges. Some affirmative action
advocates use this blurring to deny that the distinctions exist; others recognize
the distinctions but define non-discrimination, equal opportunity, and goals in
ways that imply greater normative and programmatic scope for affirmative ac-
21tion. In contrast, I view these distinctions as foundational (though again,
blurry at the borders) and believe that they condemn affirmative action. Ameri-
cans overwhelmingly agree, and they have organized a philosophy around these
22three distinctions. Public convictions, of course, may still be false; our history
is replete with collective delusions-norms favoring racism and subordination
of women, for example. All I claim here is that these distinctions matter to al-
most all of us.
Another principle, merit, is central to the foundational character of these
23distinctions. Although I discuss the merit principle at length below, I do not
provide a categorical definition of it for one simple reason: decisionmakers
who allocate a job, admission slot, or any other scarce resource on the basis of
merit properly define it in their own ways. Merit's content is wholly contextual;
24it derives meaning only from one's particular conditions and purposes. We
may criticize particular conceptions of merit in context; these critiques some-
19. E.g., David Neumark & Wendy A. Stock, The Effects of Race and Sex Discrimination Laws,
NBER Working Paper No. 8215, at 39 (April 2001) (numerical guidelines now affect both Title VII and
affirmative action program enforcement); Eric Schnapper, The Varieties of Numerical Remedies, 39
STAN. L. REv. 851 (1987).
20. Conversation with Derek Bok, former president of Harvard University (Aug. 11,2001).
21. E.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 193-98 (1990).
22. See Part VI, Section B, infra.
23. It is also central to Americans' views of procedural faimess. E.g., E. ALLEN LIND & TOM R.
TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS
WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975).
24. Krieger, supra note 13, at 1291-1302.
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times persuade the decision-maker to change its conception. This is why some
colleges decided to recruit women and why others are abandoning standardized
tests.25 Rather than dispute the prevailing definition of merit in a particular
context, we may instead argue that the applicant satisfies it. To assess affirma-
tive action, then, we must begin with the definition of merit on which it implic-
itly rests and proceed to analyze how well this definition serves the policy's
purported rationales. This will be my approach.
B. Designs
Affirmative action programs are structured differently, depending on how
they combine a number of distinct features. I note five of them here.
Favored groups. The standard favored groups, which David Hollinger calls
the "ethno-racial pentagon, 26 track the major Census categories: blacks, His-
panics, Native Americans, Asian and Pacific Islanders, and women. Other
groups (e.g., Arabs and others of Middle Eastern descent) have demanded in-
clusion,27 and particular programs may include fewer or more groups. Some
preferences cover the disabled and the economically disadvantaged; homosexu-
als, however, are seldom if ever covered even when non-discrimination laws
protect them.28 Which groups should be covered and how they should be de-
fined are highly controversial issues. Blacks and to a lesser extent Native
Americans are always covered but consensus ends there. Even some propo-
nents of preferences doubt that immigrants should be included.
Kind of actions. The program may direct or permit decision-makers to re-
port data on the composition of their populations; engage in outreach and dis-
semination of information to the general public and members of the favored
groups in particular; set goals and timetables; impose numerical quotas-or
other things in between.
Mandatory, voluntary, or prohibited. Compliance with affirmative action
may be voluntary, legally mandated, or legally prohibited. I use the term "vol-
untary" loosely here to mean an absence of legal sanctions for non-compliance,
such as ineligibility for participation in public programs or subsidies. Programs
mandated by legislation or regulation raise the most difficult legal and policy
issues, of course, 29 but voluntary programs like those in private higher educa-
25. E.g., Jacques Steinberg, Usefulness of SAT Test Is Debated in California, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
17, 2001, at AlIl (some schools dropping main SAT requirement); Jodi Wilgoren, Mount Holyoke
Drops SAT Requirement, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2000, at A28.
26. DAVID A. HOLLINGER, POSTETHNIC AMERICA: BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM 8 (1995).
27. Eduardo Porter, Even 126 Sizes Don't Fit All, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2001, at B 1.
28. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (rejecting claim that Colorado's Amendment 2 merely
barred "special rights" for homosexuals).
29. Even a law that prohibits most affirmative action may leave some limited space for using it.
But see Hi-Voltage Wire Works, Inc. v. City of San Jose, 24 Cal. 4th 537, 562-68 (2000) (Proposition
209 bars "targeted outreach").
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tion also raise some of them..
Kind and weight of preference. Preferences may affect individuals' eligi-
bility for employment or housing, bids for contracts, college admission, or
many other public and private advantages. Preferences may add weight to any
beneficiary's claim or may instead function only as a tie-breaker when com-
peting claimants are otherwise equally qualified.
Methodology, exemptions, and duration. Programs differ in how they
measure membership in favored groups, rank claimants according to various
eligibility or performance criteria, and so forth. Programs may exempt small
businesses, permit religious institutions to employ only co-religionists, or in-
clude other special provisions. Most are open-ended, but some can be time-
limited, becoming inapplicable once certain conditions are met (e.g., when a
firm's minority employees reach a level equal to their share of the relevant
population).
C. Domains
Federally-mandated affirmative action was first established in the employ-
ment area, and the scope of affirmative action in both public and private em-
ployment vastly expanded thereafter, as detailed below. It now covers much of
the nation's workforce in both public and private employment, protects not
only the ethno-racial pentagon but women and the disabled as well, and extends
beyond recruitment and hiring decisions to include promotions, terminations,
in-service training, and other workplace practices. The U.S. military establish-
ment is the work setting where affirmative action has been particularly perva-
sive and arguably most successful.3 ° In public and private contracting, federal,
state, and local law often imposes set-asides, quotas, and other preferences for
minority contractors and sub-contractors.
31
Affirmative action operates in all parts of the educational system; no other
domain practices and supports it so enthusiastically. 32 Public education systems
often mandate it to assign pupils to different schools and school districts and to
30. The authoritative study is CHARLES MOSKOS & JOHN SIBLEY BUTLER, ALL THAT WE CAN BE:
BLACK LEADERSHIP AND RACIAL INTEGRATION THE ARMY WAY (1996). See also DAVID K. SHIPLER, A
COUNTRY OF STRANGERS: BLACKS AND WHITES IN AMERICA 532-59 (1997).
31. E.g., Aileen Cho, Uneasy Path for Diversity Effort in Building Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8,
2001, at B6. For a detailed account of how these programs actually operated in New York, Detroit, and
Atlanta during the 1990s, see TAMAR JACOBY, SOMEONE ELSE'S HOUSE: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
STRUGGLE FOR INTEGRATION (1998).
32. This enthusiasm, however, appears to conceal much faculty opposition. Stephen H. Balch,
What Professors Really Think of Preferences, NAS UPDATE, Dec. 1996 (indicating widespread opposi-
tion); Carl Auerbach, The Silent Opposition of Professors and Graduate Students to Preferential Af-
firmative Action Programs: 1969 and 1975, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1233 (1988). Auerbach notes that law
professors were strongly opposed to potent affirmative action for minorities in 1969 and 1975 responses
to a survey by the Carnegie Commission. Only 9% of them favored strict goals and timetables for ad-
missions, and only 7% favored such a program for faculty hiring. Id. at 1237 & n.10. A further 30%
favored a less restrictive program of preferences in admissions. Id. at 1238 & n. 14.
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structure their programs in order to achieve and then maintain some ideal of ra-
cial or ethnic balance in the face of enrollment changes that might "tip" this
carefully-engineered balance and precipitate white flight. These assignment
policies have generated bitter political and legal conflicts in Boston, San Fran-
cisco, and many other cities. 33 Colleges and universities with selective admis-
sions criteria-a minority of institutions, but exercising disproportionate social
influence-use affirmative action to select students, balance residential units,
award financial aid, employ administrators, recruit and promote faculty, run
athletic programs, staff student organizations, award contracts, and conduct
other aspects of their institutional lives. A few states bar affirmative action in
college admissions, as we shall see, and others mandate it only for public in-
stitutions. Nevertheless, selective private institutions, including their alumni,
are among its most committed advocates. Affirmative action even extends to
shaping how university scientists conduct their research; a 1993 law requires
the National Institutes of Health to ensure that women and minorities are in-
volved in clinical studies as researchers and as subjects of research.34
Banks and other lenders are required to use affirmative action in their pro-
grams, including mortgages, construction and auto loans, and the like. Under
the Community Reinvestment Act, financial institutions must, on pain of losing
their public charters, assure that their facilities and investments are located in
minority and low-income communities. Public housing projects are subject to
affirmative action requirements, and private developers receiving public credit,
funds, or other public assistance must assure that members of favored groups
enjoy equal access to their projects, sometimes including set-asides and quo-
tas. 35 The law's efforts to diversify housing racially and economically is the
subject of a chapter in a forthcoming book.36
Electoral districting is another affirmative action venue.37 Federal courts
have interpreted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its 1982 amendments to re-
quire the states to draw electoral lines for legislative districts and other deci-
33. E.g., Amy Dockser Marcus, The New Battleground over Race and Schools. Younger Students,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 1999, at BI; Latin Lesson, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 14, 1998, at 7 (Boston Latin
case).
34. Sally L. Satel, Science by Quota, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 27, 1995, at 14. Satel cites an NiH es-
timate that the new law would necessitate multiplying the size of treatment studies by "a factor of 5 to
10 with a stultifying effect on budget... and, paradoxically, could hamper planned investigations of
racial/ethnic differences." Id.
35. For an account of why affirmative action got off to a slow start in federal housing programs,
see Chris Bonastia, Why Did Affirmative Action in Housing Fail During the Nixon Era? Exploring the
"Institutional Homes" of Social Policies, 47 SOC. PROBLEMS 523 (2000) (detailing bureaucratic poli-
tics as impediment).
36. SCHUCK, supra note 6.
37. This is affirmative action, but with a difference. Here, unlike in most other affirmative action
domains, there is no "natural" or normatively compelling standard like merit to which one can compare
the preference. Line-drawers must use some more or less arbitrary criteria to do so; the question is how
much weight they may (or must) give to race. Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and
Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505 (1997).
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sion-making bodies so as to maximize the number of "majority-minority" dis-
tricts, those with a sufficient concentration of the favored minority group that
one of its members is very likely to win.38 Since 1993, however, Supreme
Court decisions have cast doubt on the extent to which districting may take race
into account.39 The situation is complicated by the fact that the Court seems
willing to permit the line drawers to use partisanship, which for blacks has been
a strong predictor of race. Growing evidence, however, suggests that at least
20% of whites vote for black candidates even in some Deep South states
(which weakens any justification for packing so many blacks into majority-
minority districts) and that packing them in this way has undercut their inter-
ests.4° In the redistricting cycle that began in 2001, the Court's mixed signals
have sowed enormous uncertainty and confusion.41
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has affirmative action
programs governing the agency's award of TV and radio broadcasting licenses.
The agency extends its diversity requirements to programming content, the em-
ployment and investment practices of potential and existing licensees, and the
financing of auction bids by potential licensees. Although the federal courts
42have sometimes invalidated FCC programs not authorized by Congress, the
agency, citing the need for more diversity in broadcasting, has pressed ahead
with them anyway-with little success. 3 Indeed, on the very day that the FCC
suffered a major defeat in: court,44 the U.S. Department of Commerce reported
that the number of TV stations owned by minorities had dipped to the lowest
level in more than a decade, while minority ownership of radio stations had
risen marginally in the preceding two years, with industry consolidation and de-
regulation making further minority ownership gains more difficult.45 The
FCC's programs, moreover, face rough sledding under the new agency leader-
ship installed by President Bush.46
38. E.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 582 (1998).
39. The Court's latest word on this subject is Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001) (upholding
redistricting despite lower court finding that "race, not politics" determined boundaries).
40. Charles S. Bullock, III & Richard E. Dunn, The Demise of Racial Districting and the Future of
Black Representation, 48 EMORY L.J. 1209 (1999).
41. E.g., Robert Hanley, Judges Uphold New Districts in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2001, at
BI (upholding dismantling of majority-minority districts); Robert Pear, Race Takes Back Seat as States
Prepare to Redistrict, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2001, at 17. Such racial gerrymandering of legislative dis-
tricts in the name of affirmative action has led some states to do likewise for jury districts. Randall
Kennedy, The Racial Rigging of Juries, AM. EXPERIMENT, Fall 1994, at I.
42. In contrast, the Supreme Court, applying less than strict scrutiny, upheld an FCC preference
program authorized by statute. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (overruling the level-of-scrutiny point).
43. Stephen Labaton & Simon Romero, A Flawed Wireless Auction, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2001, at
A30 (reporting that despite bidding subsidies, auction failed to attract small firms).
44. MD/DC/DE Broadcasters Ass'n v. FCC, 236 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
45. Labaton, supra note 18; Stephen Labaton, Deregulation Called Blow to Minorities, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at C I (summarizing studies).
46. Stephen Labaton, Bush Appoints Powell's Son to Lead F.C.C., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2001, at
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The magnitude of FCC preferences is huge. By awarding licenses for the
spectrum it controls, it confers enormously valuable economic rights on a very
small number of individuals and firms. In recent years, it has awarded much of
the spectrum by auctioning off licenses to the highest qualified bidder, and it
has created programs to subsidize minority groups so that they can compete in
the auctions as "designated bidders." This status gives them bidding credits
such that they need pay the government only a fraction of the winning bid and
can pay in installments over a long period at favorable interest rates. Combin-
ing both of these advantages enables the designated bidder to pay the govern-
ment only 50% of its winning bid. Given the economic value of the licenses,
these advantages are worth scores of millions of dollars to those who can use
them.4 7
Because the programming diversity rationale for preferences is so poorly
48supported by the evidence, even some who defend affirmative action in gen-
eral have excoriated the FCC's preferences in particular. For example, Michael
Kinsley, editor of Slate magazine, an avowed liberal, and supporter of some af-
firmative action programs, views the FCC's as
especially farcical. Members of favored groups who get valuable licenses, for
nothing or at a discount, are more or less free to resell them, at market rates, to
white males or anyone else. The policy amounts to the simple anointment of black
millionaires. And, because black-millionaire businessmen are such an obvious ex-
ception to the generalization that "black equals disadvantaged," these policies help
to discredit affirmative action even in situations where the generalization makes
49more sense.
These abuses, moreover, extend beyond race-based affirmative action.to FCC
programs that give extremely valuable preferences to small minority-owned
firms. Many large companies have helped to organize small ones with token
minority leadership to front for them in bidding at auctions of wireless frequen-
cies for which the large ones are legally disadvantaged or ineligible. 50
C I (reporting Powell is skeptical about a link between ownership diversity and programming diversity).
47. IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER
DISCRIMINATION 315-95 (2001). According to Ayres, the designated bidders in the set of auctions he
studied (for regional narrowband licenses in 1994) agreed to pay the government, net of the bid subsidy,
$151.9 million over time at sub-market interest rates. The subsidy's value, then, is probably $60-75
million. Ayres argues, interestingly and counter-intuitively, that designated bidders actually increase
government auction revenue by fostering bidding competition, and that the fiscal effects of bidding sub-
sidies could be extended to government procurement. Id. His overall efficiency analysis, however,
seems too complicated, contextual, and ultimately indeterminate to support firm policy conclusions.
48. Jonathan Rauch, Color TV, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 19, 1994, at 9, 10.
49. Michael Kinsley, The Spoils of Victimhood, NEW YORKER, Mar. 27, 1995, at 62, 69.
50. Stephen Labaton & Simon Romero, F.C.C. Auction Hit with Claim of Unfair Bids, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 2001, at A l (legal challenges to this practice). The FCC auctions have also encountered
other problems. NextWave Personal Communications, Inc. v. FCC, Nos. 00-1402 & 00-1403, 2001 WL
702069 (D.C. Cir.) (invalidating FCC cancellation of auctioned licenses for non-payment of install-
ments by a bankrupt licensee); Yochi J. Dreazen & Andrea Petersen, The Fate of NextWave's Licenses
for Wireless Spectrum Is Unclear, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2001, at C1 (decision creating grave uncer-
tainties and risks for other auction winners).
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Finally, the law requires many private groups that receive government
grants or contracts to engage in affirmative action. Much litigation has chal-
lenged the implementation of these programs. Courts, for example, have or-
dered labor unions to undertake affirmative action, sometimes even appointing
special masters to supervise compliance. 51 Private groups often press for af-
firmative action even when the law does not require it. The American Bar As-
sociation, for example, seeks to increase the number of minority judicial law
clerks-surely among the most privileged young people in America.
52
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT
Should all of these domains (and others not mentioned here) be governed
by the same principles, or should those principles instead differ depending on
the particular domain at issue? This "meta-question" relates closely to the
question of merit, which I discuss below. In his well-known book Spheres of
Justice, philosopher Michael Walzer persuasively argues that a liberal society
should aspire to a "complex equality" in which different domains ("spheres" in
his parlance) are governed by different principles of justice depending on the
social meanings and competing values implicated in each domain and the dif-
ferent balances that may be struck there among those values.53 Few affirmative
action advocates, for example, would suggest that morality requires us to prac-
tice it in our own families, homes, or friendships. Parents looking for babysit-
ters or people seeking professional services are seldom equal opportunity em-
ployers. On the other side, few opponents of affirmative action object on moral
grounds to the traditional practice of ethnic ticket-balancing by political parties
or to special efforts by urban police departments to recruit minority and female
officers. People who take these views are not necessarily moral hypocrites or
even logically inconsistent. They recognize that different principles are appro-
priate in different public and private domains by virtue of the distinct values
that are morally relevant there.
54
Certain preferences engender little public controversy. Veterans' prefer-
ences for civil service jobs, for example, have been in place for many decades
and remain politically and legally secure despite the fact that they greatly dis-
advantage women who could not serve in the armed forces in significant num-
bers until very recently, but who wish to compete for those jobs.55 Many col-
51. E.g., Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 481-83 (1986);
Pennsylvania v. Local 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 619 F. Supp. 1273, 1275 & n.4 (E.D. Pa.),
aff'd, 770 F.2d 1068 (3d Cir. 1985).
52. James Podgers, New Diversity Initiatives, A.B.A. I., April 2000, at 97.
53. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 3-33 (1983).
54. For an exploration of this point in the context of affirmative action in higher education, see
Akhil R. Amar & Neal Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745 (1996).
55. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to this system. Personnel
Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (upholding a Massachusetts law considering veterans for
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leges and universities give admission preferences to athletes, alumni children,
56and those from remote areas . However one views the merits of these practices
(I am quite dubious about the first two), each is rationalized on the basis of
particular contextual facts-veterans' sacrifices and interrupted careers, the ca-
pacity of college athletics and kinship to cement alumni loyalty,57 and the sup-
posed value of geographic diversity-that have some normative weight relevant
to one's overall evaluation of the practices.
In assessing (and re-assessing) affirmative action, then, context matters. In
reality, its policy context is being transformed in ways that greatly weaken its
empirical, conceptual, and normative underpinnings. First, new patterns of im-
migration, intermarriage, and identity are completing the process that science
long ago began-rendering affirmative action's ethno-racial categories ever
more meaningless. Second, recent studies show that the preferences, at least in
higher education admissions, have grown very large. Third, only a tenuous
connection exists between being in a favored category and being socially dis-
advantaged enough to need preferential treatment at the expense of others with
their own justice-based claims. Fourth, mounting evidence suggests that many
of the policy's supposed benefits are exaggerated, imaginary, or even socially
harmful, while its social costs are substantial. This section discusses the first of
these changes; the others are considered subsequently.
Scientists have long discredited the notion of race that underlies affirmative
action policy, and the latest DNA research provides further evidence, if any
were needed, of its artificiality and incoherence. Science aside, centuries of
immigration and miscegenation, and the recent rise in intermarriage rates by all
58groups, render the conventional racial categories ever more arbitrary. Indeed,
the number of Americans who now consider themselves multi-racial and who
wish to be identified as such (if they must be racially identified at all) is already
so large-seven million in the 2000 Census, including nearly two million
blacks (5% of the black population) and 37% of all Native Americans 9--that
advocacy groups desperate to retain the demographic status quo mounted a
state civil service ahead of nonveterans because its purpose was not to exclude women). President Roo-
sevelt apparently opposed the preference as well but could not defeat it politically. SKRENTNY, IRONIES,
supra note 9, at 41-42.
56. E.g., JAMES L. SHULMAN & WILLIAM G. BOWEN, THE GAME OF LIFE (2001). The authors cal-
culate that in 1999 at one school in their sample, legacies had even more of an advantage than "minori-
ties" with the same SAT scores. Id. at 40-41. This was not generally true in the years covered by the
Bowen-Bok study discussed infra at text accompanying note 80.
57. Including capital costs, inter-collegiate sport is seldom a money maker, and Shulman and Bo-
wen find that large donors generally prefer to reduce emphasis on athletics. Andrew Hacker, The Big
College Try, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 12, 2001, at 52 (citing sources, including Shulman and Bowen).
58. See also Jim Chen, Is Affirmative Action Fair? Diversity in a Different Dimension: Evolution-
ary Theory and Affirmative Action's Destiny, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 811, 893-94 (1998).
59. Russell Thornton, What the Census Doesn't Count, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2001, at A 19 (Native
Americans); Eric Schmitt, Multiracial Identification Might Affect Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14,
2001, at A20; Eric Schmitt, For 7 Million People in Census, One Race Category Isn't Enough, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2001, at Al.
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fierce political campaign to pre-empt a multi-racial Census category.60
Although these mono-racial groups did not decisively win that battle-the
Census allowed people to indicate more than one race but did not include a
'multi-racial" category 61 -they seem to be winning the war. In a grimly ironic
aspect of the new demographic dispensation, the government adopted some-
thing like the one-drop rule that helped enslave so many mulattos and self-
identifying whites before Emancipation. (As Malcolm X quipped, "That must
be mighty powerful blood., 62) In March 2000, the Office of Management and
Budget issued rules providing that for civil rights enforcement purposes, 63 any
response combining one minority race and the white race must be allocated to
the minority race.64 This, despite evidence that 25% of those in the United
States who describe themselves as both black and white consider themselves
white. Indeed, 48% of Hispanic respondents to the Census self-identified as
white; another 42% said "some other race." In a survey by highly-trained Cen-
sus enumerators of Hispanic households that had failed to respond to the mail
questionnaire, 63% considered themselves white and 29% said "some other
race. ' 65 Almost half of Asian-white people and more than 80% of Indian-white
66
people self-identified as white. This is the racial equivalent of an enduring so-
ciological reality: almost 95% of Americans, including many who are poor by
standard "objective" measures, consider themselves solidly working- or mid-
dle-class. 67 Just as class warriors prefer to brush by this fact, administrators of
affirmative action programs, who desperately need to race- and ethnic-code in
order to meet their targets or quotas, choose to ignore the "whitening" and
"multi-racializing" of those whom we insist on treating as minorities. 68
No allocation rule can be neutral, of course; OMB's rule effectively maxi-
mizes the size of minority groups and minimizes that of the white group. But
where multi-racial individuals chose their own racial identities, the govern-
ment's allocation rules now decide this matter for them in order to preserve ra-
cial preferences. The new rules introduce other changes that will further com-
60. PETER SKERRY, COUNTING ON THE CENSUS? 51-54 (2000).
61. For a full explanation, see U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF: OVERVIEW OF RACE
AND HISPANIC ORIGIN (2001).
62. Quoted in AMITAI ETZIONI, THE MONOCHROME SOCIETY 30 (2001).
63. The Census has issued different allocation rules for purposes of legislative districting and other
government decisions using such demographic categories. Nathaniel Persily, Color by Numbers: Race,
Redistricting, and the 2000 Census, 85 MINN. L. REV. 899, 932 n. 127 (2001) (brief discussion).
64. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BULLETIN NO. 00-02, rule #2 (March 2000). Re-
sponses including two or more minority races are allocated to the race on which a complainant claims
discrimination was based. Id. It is not clear whether the Bush administration will retain these rules.
65. Eric Schmitt, Census Data Show a Sharp Increase in Living Standard, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,
2001, at Al.
66. Steven A. Holmes, The Confusion Over Who We Are, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2001, at WKI (dis-
cussing National Health Interview Survey data).
67. Gallup poll (Sept. 1, 2000), available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/fromtheed/ed0009.asp.
68. For an exploration of the implications of multi-racialism, see RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL
INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE 154-78 (2001).
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plicate future race-coding by the government and hence by the many others
who rely on these racial data for affirmative action and other purposes. By rec-
ognizing no fewer than 126 group combinations under the Census 2000 system,
these rules encourage many other eager groups (Arab-Americans, for example)
to demand their own specific listing in the Census form. The government will
now find it harder to resist these demands than when the ethno-racial pentagon
was its exclusive taxonomy.69
The number of actual and self-designating multi-racial individuals will
surely grow rapidly in the future due both to intermarriage and to younger re-
spondents' greater propensity to intermarry and to self-identify as multi-racial.
Sociologist Amitai Etzioni predicts that even if current trends do not accelerate,
14% of the population will identify as multi-racial by 2050. 70 Forcing them into
the increasingly arbitrary categories to which traditional racial classifiers tena-
ciously cling will spur them to seek even more fundamental changes in the
ethno-racial pentagon, including a separate multi-racial category or perhaps
even eliminating racial categories altogether, as a proposed initiative in Cali-
fornia hopes to do. The government's insistent pigeonholing, which clashes
with the robust and, for Americans, compelling rhetoric and ideology of free-
dom of choice, will further erode the already weak public support for prefer-
ences. Some analysts wishfully think that the multi-racial phenomenon does not
threaten the viability of the traditional civil rights programs that rely on racial
data, both because the cohort of self-reporting multi-racials is relatively small
and because OMB's allocation rules further reduce their numerical signifi-
cance.7 1 Although this may well be true for the immediate future, advocates of
the ethno-racial pentagon have only a temporary reprieve. New demographics
and identities mean that as time goes on, the government's use of the standard
racial categories as a pivot of social policy will become ever harder to justify
logically and sustain politically.
The effort to control racial profiling by the police through the gathering of
race-coded identity information, while aimed at discrimination and not affirma-
tive action, reveals an important irony about the latter as well. Just when the
accuracy, coherence, and social value of racial information are rapidly declin-
ing, the law is demanding more of it and using it more intrusively. State and
69. Kenneth Prewitt, Director of 2000 Census, Remarks at Brookings Press Briefing (Mar. 15,
2000) at http://www.brook.edu/comm/transcripts/20000315.htm. The color coding in Brazil, which is
proposing to create racial quotas for universities, civil service jobs, and other areas, is likely to be far
more complex and perhaps unworkable. Larry Rohter, Multiracial Brazil Planning Quotas for Blacks,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2001, at A3 (over 300 terms for different skin colors and more elastic racial catego-
ries).
70. ETZIONI, supra note 62, at 26-27.
71. E.g., Persily, supra note 63. But see Joshua R. Goldstein & Ann J. Morning, Back in the Box:
The Dilemma of Using Multiple-Race Data for Single-Race Laws (Mar. 9, 2001) (unpublished manu-
script, Office of Population Research, Princeton University) (on file with author) (noting that allocation
rule will disadvantage Asian-Americans and reassign many who traditionally self-identified as white).
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city police departments must now collect data on the race, ethnicity, or national
origin of all drivers or other individuals whom they stop. In order to do so, the
officer must decide what the motorists' race, ethnicity, or national origin are
and then record the data for the profiling monitor-without asking them, much
less allowing them, to self-identify. To a lament by the president of the Los
Angeles Board of Police Commissioners (himself multi-racial) that "[w]ith all
the racially mixed people in L.A., and Latinos coming in all shades, the data
will be garbage in, garbage out," a Harvard law professor responds that
"[w]e're not trying to get at truth, we're trying to get at bias."72 But the legiti-
macy of the search for bias has everything to do with what information the
naturally confused police will record and how accurate it is. Of the other tech-
niques that may be used to obtain the racial data, the least chilling is already in
place: New Jersey taxpayers paid for all 2700 state troopers to receive manda-
tory "instruction on how to classify a motorist's race by judging 'skin color'
and 'facial characteristics."' '73 In the name of racial justice, one supposes, every
bad idea must be taken seriously and even subsidized, at least until the inevita-
ble political backlash against this new policy erupts-perhaps in the form of a
voter referendum that will ratchet up the political rhetoric, racial bitterness, and
group alienation. In this way, we are told, America will somehow "get beyond
racism"' 74 and enhance racial equality.
V. THE SIZE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PREFERENCES
When competing claims for scarce resources-jobs, admission to higher
education, financial aid, public and private contracts, broadcast or other spec-
trum licenses, credit, housing, and the like-are weighed, how heavy is the
thumb that affirmative action actually places on the scales? This question is
important for at least two reasons. First, the larger the preference, the greater is
its tension with the merit principle-and this is so however one conceives of
merit. Indeed, a preference may be large enough to flatly contradict certain
conceptions of merit, in which case preference advocates must invoke other ra-
tionales such as diversity that either reject or redefine those conceptions. It is
one thing to use a preference merely as a tie-breaker between two equally quali-
fied candidates, another to use it to enable a relatively unqualified one to win.
(The tie-breaking case is very rare, as candid advocates of preferences will
concede.75) Some might oppose the preference in both of these situations, of
course, but most will view the tie-breaker case more favorably just as most will
72. Gregory Rodriguez, When Perception Is Reality, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2001, at WKI (quoting
Margo J. Schlanger).
73. Id.
74. The phrase was popularized by Justice Blackmun. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).
75. E.g., Issacharoff, supra note 11, at 690.
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support greater outreach and candidate pool-enlarging efforts more than they
favor more demanding forms of affirmative action.
76
A second reason why the size of a preference matters is that the larger it is,
the harder it is to deny or disguise the competing interests and values being sac-
rificed. This can be a decisive factor in the highly politicized environment of
affirmative action debates. 77 In fact, as we shall see, the preferences received by
minority applicants in higher education are so large that their defenders have
reached and passed a rhetorical tipping point. Rather than deny the preferences'
size, they use this fact to argue that eliminating the preferences would re-
segregate the institutions. 78 1 closely examine later this important argument for
preferences later in the Article.79
Measuring the size of a preference is more difficult in some domains than
in others. I have already discussed the quantification of minority bidders' dis-
counts in some FCC spectrum auctions, and I shall discuss later in the Article
the efforts to determine what efficiency losses, if any, affirmative action im-
poses in particular work settings. The most extensive studies, however, have
focused on higher education admissions where schools have traditionally used
standardized tests to measure students' aptitude, preparation, and achievement.
In 1998, William Bowen and Derek Bok, the former presidents of Princeton
and Harvard, published a book-length study based on the academic records of
more than 80,000 students who entered twenty-eight highly selective institu-
tions (large public universities, private universities, co-ed liberal arts colleges,
and women's colleges) in 1951, 1976, and 1989, augmented by some other
data. Affirmative action, Bowen and Bok say, has little or no relevance out-
side of such institutions because the vast majority of undergraduate institutions
accept all qualified candidates and thus have no need to prefer any group of ap-
plicants.81 On the other hand, a recent study suggests that the practice may be
much more widespread, including some second and third-tier schools.
82
A large literature reviewing the Bowen-Bok analysis now exists. There is
76. E.g., PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & EDWARD G. CARMINES, REACHING BEYOND RACE 23-27 (1997)
(discussing "Two Meanings Experiment"). But see Martin Gilens, Paul M. Sniderman, & James H.
Kuklinski, Affirmative Action and the Politics of Realignment, 28 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 159, 167 (1998)
(finding that over 37% oppose it even in its milder, extra outreach forms).
77. Issacharoff, supra note 11, at 675-76 (discussing effect on debate at University of Texas).
78. This point has been made by a number of commentators, including Malamud, supra note 9.
79. Infra Part VIII.
80. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES
OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998).
81. Id. at 15; see also Thomas J. Kane, Racial and Ethnic Preferences in College Admissions, in
THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 431, 436 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips eds., 1998) (in
a sample of 36,000 high school students from 1000 high schools, over 90% who applied to colleges in
the bottom three-fifths were admitted).
82. ROBERT LERNER & ALTHEA K. NAGAI, CENTER FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, PERVASIVE
PREFERENCES: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION IN UNDERGRADUATE ADMISSIONS ACROSS THE
NATION (2001) (study of 47 public colleges and universities).
Vol. 20:1, 2002
Affirmative Action
little disagreement about the actual magnitude of the preferences enjoyed by
black applicants (the authors did not break out other minorities): by any objec-
tive standard, the preference is very large-one might say immense-although
its precise magnitude probably cannot be determined. 3 Bowen and Bok, who
strongly support affirmative action, find a difference of almost 200 points in the
average SAT total test scores of the black and white applicant groups in these
schools. But the difference between the two applicant groups is even starker.
First, the deficit for black applicants with respect to high school grade point av-
erage (GPA), the other major admission criterion, is even larger than for SAT
scores. Thomas Kane, a researcher in this field, finds that black applicants to
selective schools "enjoy an advantage equivalent to an increase of two-thirds of
a point in [GPA]--on a four-point scale--or [the equivalent of] 400 points on
the SAT."84 Second, at every SAT score level, the test, which has long been
criticized as being culturally biased against blacks, in fact over-predicts their
actual academic performance in college. The same is true of GPA scores.85
Another way to characterize the difference between the two groups is to
compare their prospects for admission to the schools in the Bowen-Bok sample.
Terrance Sandalow, a professor and former dean at the University of Michigan
Law School, summarizes the Bowen-Bok data this way:
Thus, a black applicant with a score between 1400 and 1449 had nearly a 75%
chance of admission, while a white with a comparable score had approximately a
40% chance. In the 1250-1299 range, the odds that a black applicant would be ad-
mitted remained at the 75% level, while the odds for white applicants dropped be-
low 25%. The comparable percentages for applicants with scores between 1100 and
1149 were approximately 15% for whites and just under 50% for blacks. Viewing
the same data from a slightly different perspective, the odds were approximately
even that black applicants with scores between 1100 and 1199 would be admitted.
The odds for whites did not reach that level until they had scores in the 1450-1499
86
range.
Sandalow does not mention a further finding-that with a score of 1500 or
above, more than a third of whites were rejected while every single black
gained admission.87 The University of Michigan, whose affirmative action pro-
gram is detailed in a pending lawsuit,88 weighs race even more heavily than the
83. For one thing, we do not know the test scores of the white and Asian-American students in the
Bowen-Bok sample who would have been admitted in place of the blacks who were admitted because of
preferences. For another, Bowen and Bok only had adequate test score data for five of the twenty-eight
institutions, though they believe that these are roughly representative of the larger group.
84. Kane, supra note 81, at 431-32.
85. For discussion and citations, see Terrance Sandalow, Minority Preferences Reconsidered, 97
MICH. L. REV. 1874, 1877 & n.4 (1997). This fact is also acknowledged by Nathan Glazer, The Case
for Racial Preferences, PUBLIC INTEREST, Spring 1999, at 45, 57, who is a prominent advocate of af-
firmative action for blacks.
86. Sandalow, supra note 85, at 1880-81 (citing to BOWEN & BOK).
87. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 80, at 27.
88. Gratz v. Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
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average school in the Bowen-Bok sample. At Michigan, the advantage of being
black, Hispanic, or Native American is even larger than Kane's estimate; they
receive the equivalent of a full point of GPA, and permits minority status to
override any SAT score deficit 89. A recent study of forty-seven public institu-
tions, moreover, found that the odds of a black student being admitted com-
pared to a white student with the same SAT and GPA were 173 to 1 at Michi-
gan, and 177 to 1 at North Carolina State.
90
These preferences continue, broadly speaking, at the graduate and profes-
sional school levels. Bowen and Bok document the encouraging fact that an
identical percentage (56%) of black and white graduates of the institutions in
their sample earned graduate degrees, and the percentage of blacks earning pro-
fessional or doctoral degrees was actually slightly higher than for whites (40%
vs. 37%). But because the black students' college grades and graduate- and
professional-level admissions test scores are usually much lower, preferences
strongly affect their admission to programs, especially at top-tier institutions.
For similar methodological reasons, including the greater significance of finan-
cial aid factors, we cannot know the exact size of their preferences at this level
with certainty, but it is surely very large.
91
The leading study of law school admissions in the early 1990s found that
only a few dozen of the 420 blacks admitted to the eighteen most selective law
schools would have been admitted to those schools absent affirmative action.
92
And although a high percentage of blacks who graduate from these law schools
eventually pass the bar examination, only 61% of black law graduates pass it
the first time (compared to 92% of whites) and 78% pass it on the second or
subsequent attempt (compared to 97% for whites). In short, over 20% of the
blacks who take it never pass, almost seven times higher than the failure rate
for whites.
93
It is true, of course, that institutions, especially selective ones, take other
factors into account besides race, that some whites who are admitted have aca-
demic credentials that are no better or even worse than the blacks admitted un-
89. Elizabeth Anderson, From Normative to Empirical Sociology in the Affirmative Action De-
bate: Bowen and Bok's The Shape of the River, 50 J. LEGAL ED. 284, 287 (2000).
90. LERNER & NAGAI, supra note 82, at Figure 5.
91. For discussion of these issues, compare Richard 0. Lempert et al., Michigan's Minority
Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law School, 25 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 395 (2000)
[hereinafter Law School], with Richard Sander, The Tributaries to the River, 25 LAW & SOCIAL
INQUIRY 557 (2000), and Richard 0. Lempert et al., Michigan's Minority Graduates in Practice: An-
swers to Methodological Queries, 25 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 585 (2000) [hereinafter Methodological
Queries].
92. Sandalow, supra note 85, at 1891-94 (reviewing Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity
in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in
Law SchoolAdmissions Decisions, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1997)).
93. Sandalow, supra note 85, at 1895-96 (reviewing Linda F. Wightman, LSAC National Longitu-
dinal Bar Passage Study, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL RES. REP. SERIES (1998)).
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der preferences, 94 and that if one compared the credentials of the blacks who
were just barely admitted with those of the whites who were next in line for
those slots, the credentials gap, while still significant, would be much smaller.
95
It is also true that minority graduates of the selective institutions whose alumni
have been studied, like the University of Michigan Law School, achieve high
professional status, income, civic participation and leadership, and career satis-
faction.
96
These studies, however, do not examine how these schools' preferences af-
fect the institutions and students that are lower down the academic food chain.
The less selective institutions must admit many minorities who will have aca-
demic difficulty, are likely to fail the bar examination (some of them repeat-
edly), and may be marginal professionally. Because there simply are not
enough academically qualified minorities to go around, Richard Sander notes,
"the success of affirmative action at Michigan comes at the cost of making in-
tegrated education more problematic at weaker law schools.' 97 This also means
that any school that opts out of the preferences competition-for any reason-
ends up with few or no black students, which of course just reduces racial diver-
sity at those schools.
These large disparities in high school and college academic records and
professional entry rates are profoundly disturbing and tragic measures of the
persisting social disadvantages of blacks in American society. They reveal the
inferiority of their earlier schooling, their desperate need to be better matched
with or better prepared for the academic programs in which they enroll, and the
deceptiveness of preferences' ostensible inclusiveness. To many affirmative
action supporters, these disparities, far from weakening the case for prefer-
ences, constitute the strongest argument in their favor by indicating how lily-
white and Asian the student bodies at elite campuses would be without prefer-
ences. 98 This "re-segregation" argument is certainly troubling-indeed, there is
no wholly satisfying rebuttal to it-and I discuss it below.
99
My purpose at this point is not to make an overall assessment of affirmative
action, but only to establish that the preferences it confers tend to be very large
and thus are extremely valuable to the recipients and disadvantageous to their
competitors. I discuss the magnitude of this disadvantage below when I con-
sider how preferences affect those who do not receive them. To say, as
Stanley Fish does, that a preference simply allows a decision-maker to "take
94. E.g., Anderson, supra note 89, at 286-87; Lempert et al., Methodological Queries, supra note
91, at 586.
95. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 80, at 37 (citing Wightman study of law school admissions).
96. Lempert et al., Law School, supra note 91, at 401.
97. Sander, supra note 91, at 562; see also id. at 561.
98. E.g., Issacharoff, supra note 11, at 675-76.
99. Infra Part VII.
100. Infra Part VII, Section C.
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minority status into consideration" within a pool of "qualified applicants"' 01 is
to beg the key question: how far one can stretch the meaning of "qualified" and
"consideration" before they lose their notional integrity.
V. RATIONALES AND COUNTER-RATIONALES
Affirmative action's supporters have advanced many different rationales for
preference programs in light of a changing mix of ideological, tactical, and le-
gal considerations over the course of more than three decades of public debate.
Perhaps the most candid, powerful, and comprehensive defense of affirmative
action is that by sociologist Orlando Patterson, who advances almost all of the
rationales in one form or another. 102 These rationales overlap to some extent,
and any given advocate is likely to invoke more than one of them. Still, it is
useful to distinguish among them according to their different claims. Because
their opponents often counter these claims, I can consider both sets of argu-
ments together. Some of the arguments against affirmative action, however, do
not line up quite so neatly; they are more usefully discussed in Part VII on con-
sequences. Because the case for affirmative action is strongest for blacks,
103
though by no means limited to them, I shall discuss the rationales for race-
based programs, unless otherwise indicated.
A. Restitution
Affirmative action is often justified as a means of compensating groups that
have been victimized in the past by persecution and discrimination inflicted by
the dominant majority. This rationale looks backward and is an argument for
reparations. It is to be distinguished from another rationale, which I call "anti-
caste" and discuss in Part V, Section C, that emphasizes the consequences to-
day and in the future of past injustices. In this view, what connects past, pres-
ent, and future is the bitter irony, if not arrant hypocrisy, of ruling out the use of
race now when it is used to rectify egregious wrongs that were perpetrated in
the past on that very basis. It is easy to understand why affirmative action advo-
cates see opposition to this use of race as the cruelest kind of Catch-22. Their
morally grounded skepticism deserves a serious answer, but it cannot be a sim-
ple one. It will take me the rest of this Article to provide it.
The restitution rationale applies with special force, of course, to blacks
whose ancestors were brought to the United States in chains and suffered un-
speakable degradation over many generations, including the era of Jim Crow
that ended as recently as the 1950s and 1960s.1"4 Although these monstrous
101. STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE 32 (1999).
102. PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 147-69.
103. Nathan Glazer, In Defense of Preference, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 6, 1998, at 18.
104. E.g., BORIS 1. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1993).
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wrongs can never be truly or precisely rectified, the argument runs, the simple
but compelling imperative of compensatory or corrective justice requires soci-
ety to do what it can to restore the victims' descendants to the positions they
would have occupied had the wrongs not been committed. Although this rem-
edy is not really feasible as a practical matter, a program of affirmative action
is. Distributive justice considerations, moreover, also justify such a restitution-
oriented program both because blacks as a group are especially needy 10 5 and
because government has often been an active agent or a passive participant in
their subordination.l°6
Opponents of the restitution rationale counter with several arguments. First,
the history of human communities is replete with great wrongs. Were we to
take the project of restitution seriously, we could not stop with slavery but must
also rectify the violence and destruction inflicted on Native Americans, their
lands, and their cultures; the harsh subordination of the Chinese, Japanese,
Irish, Jews, and many other immigrant groups; and the discrimination against
women that severely limited their opportunities outside the home and their
freedom within it.
Second, affirmative action programs cannot rectify past wrongs because
their beneficiaries are not the victims; indeed, preferences can only commit
new wrongs because the cost-bearers are innocent. Some program advocates
insist that the notion of "innocent victim" that underlies such concerns is itself
problematic and that today's whites are the unwitting, continuing beneficiaries
of the crimes committed by white slaveholders and their segregationist succes-
sors. 107 Opponents respond that it would be impossible to conduct the kind of
complex causal analysis necessary to support any fair calculation of historical
advantages and disadvantages, 108 that attributing them to broad racial groups
would be egregiously crude, and that so gross an assessment could not satisfy
even the most minimal demands of a very rough justice.
Third, even if these objections could somehow be met, some opponents say,
the restitution rationale could at most justify affirmative action for the descen-
dants of American slaves and perhaps Native Americans. It could never justify
extending protection to immigrants, linguistic minorities like Hispanics, or
105. For an exploration of the need principle, see WALZER, supra note 53, at 25-26.
106. Gratz v. Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790, 796-801 (E.D. Mich. 2001). Although the University
seemed to concede that it was "a passive participant," id. at 801, the court found no evidence of this.
107. E.g., STEPHANIE WILDMAN ET AL., PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE
UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996); Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of
Civil Rights Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1005-23 (1989); cf Thomas Ross, Innocence and
Affirmative Action, 43 VAN. L. REV. 297 (1990) (describing "rhetoric of innocence" used by whites
claiming to be victims of affirmative action).
108. To cite just one of many complications, evidence suggests that discrimination against a group,
while damaging in the short run, often strengthens their economic and perhaps social positions in the
long run. PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS, STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS: ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP 273-75 (1998) (reviewing evidence cited by Thomas Sowell).
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geographic origin groups like Asians and Pacific Islanders. Yet tens of millions
of immigrants become automatically eligible for preferences the moment they
set foot in the United States, competing for preferences with blacks whose
families have been in America since ante-bellum times. For example, a Univer-
sity of Michigan faculty study found that almost 20% of black faculty and more
than half of Asian-Pacific Islander faculty were immigrants.
0 9
The U.S. Supreme Court has accepted a limited version of the restitution
rationale, permitting or mandating affirmative action as a constitutional matter
where it is shown that the actor has specifically engaged in identifiable past
discrimination against a favored group, this discrimination continues to affect
individual victims, and the preference is carefully tailored to remedy this par-
ticular wrong." In the context of elite professional schools that draw from a
national, indeed international, pool of candidates, the required nexus between
discrimination and preference can become quite attenuated and far-fetched. l1
B. Merit
Most affirmative action advocates challenge the fundamental assumption of
its opponents that merit selection-as conventionally understood and as imple-
mented-is a valid and compelling principle of distributive justice with respect
to certain kinds of social goods. This challenge takes at least three forms; some
advocates use all of them." 2 First, they contend that accepted understandings of
merit are arbitrary, unduly narrow, and unjustly disadvantage minorities.
"Merit," Nicholas Lemann writes, "is various, not unidimensional. Intelligence
tests, and also education itself, can't be counted on to find every form of merit.
They don't find wisdom, or originality, or humor, or toughness, or empathy, or
common sense, or independence, or determination-let alone moral worth."
'1 13
Stanley Fish adds that when disputes arise over merit, "the dispute is between
different versions of merit and not between merit and something base and inde-
fensible."114
109. HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, COLLISION COURSE: THE STRANGE CONVERGENCE OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND IMMIGRATION POLICY IN AMERICA 2 (forthcoming 2002) (drawing on JAMES S. ROBB,
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR IMMIGRANTS: THE ENTITLEMENT NOBODY WANTED (1995)). Peter Schrag
estimated that more than 75% of the post-1965 immigrants immediately qualified for affirmative action
benefits. Peter Schrag, So You Want to Be Color-Blind: Alternative Principles for Affirmative Action,
AMERICAN PROSPECT, Summer 1995, at 41.
110. E.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747, 777 (1976) (when effectuating a properly tailored remedy to cure effects of prior discrimination, "a
sharing of the burden" by innocent parties is permissible). For more recent decisions by the Court that
strictly limit the scope and nature of the discrimination that affirmative action may remedy, see Ada-
rand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469 (1989); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
111. E.g., Issacharoff, supra note 11, at 681-82.
112. E.g., YOUNG, supra note 21, especially 192-225.
113. NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE BIG TEST 345 (1999).
114. FISH, supra note 101, at 30.
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Like Lemann and Fish, defenders of preferences particularly object to no-
tions of merit that rely heavily or exclusively on certain kinds of mental and
physical tests or that demand certain academic, experiential, and other tradi-
tional credentials. This argument for redefining merit may invoke efficiency as
well as fairness values. The claim is that those who administer conventional
merit standards ignore or reject many individuals who, were merit properly de-
fined, would be found to possess it and thus would perform the task perfectly
well. 115 By excluding them, more radical advocates say, the supposedly race-
neutral merit standard in fact operates as a "white-people's affirmative action"
116
program.
Second, some argue that what we conventionally think of as merit is actu-
ally a composite of different ingredients, some of which have little or nothing
to do with the kinds of virtues that society should reward with material or status
advantage. Ronald Dworkin, for example, condemns the notion that what he
calls "wealth-talents" (which would include scholastic aptitude or achievement)
should be rewarded because they are praiseworthy attributes. "What counts as a
wealth-talent," Dworkin writes, "is contingent in a hundred dimensions ....
Luck is, anyway, by far the most important wealth-talent in this catalogue-
being in the right place is often more important than being anything else at
all .... ,,17Even apart from luck, he argues, it is hard to justify conferring such
social advantages on those whom such contingencies happen to favor. In short,
merit is not an appropriate principle of distributive justice for the social rewards
that wealth-talent receives.
Third, advocates of racial preferences maintain that conventional merit
standards are routinely violated by other preference practices that bear little or
no relation to any defensible conception of merit and that exhibit few if any of
affirmative action's virtues. I have already noted some examples in higher edu-
cation-lower admissions standards for athletes, legacies, and geographic di-
versity-but exceptions to the merit principle also abound in other areas like
employment, where governments and private firms often recruit, hire, and pro-
mote through veterans' preferences, old boy networks, nepotism, and favorit-
ism. 18 And as journalist Michael Kinsley has noted (with barely-disguised
glee), the Republicans endorse even race-based affirmative action when it suits
115. E.g., PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 155-65.
116. Sandalow, supra note 85, at 1914 (quoting Richard Delgado). Some critics of this radical
challenge to the merit principle view it as thinly-veiled anti-Semitism. E.g., DANIEL A. FARBER &
SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH 1N AMERICAN LAW 52-71
(1997). For a thoughtful review of this position, see Edward L. Rubin, Jews, Truth and Critical Race
Theory, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 525 (1999).
117. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 327
(2000).
118. E.g., GLENN C. LOURY, ONE BY ONE FROM THE INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS AND REVIEWS ON RACE
AND RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICA (1995); SHIPLER, supra note 30, at 506.
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their purposes."9
Finally, some defenders of preferences do not so much challenge traditional
notions of merit as they argue pragmatically that the likely alternatives to pref-
erences would be even worse. In Jeffrey Rosen's view, for example, state uni-
versities' programmatic responses to the ending of preferences coupled with
continuing political pressures to keep minorities on flagship campuses threatens
to "turn the leading state universities into remedial academies ....
[A]ffirmative action represents a lesser compromise of meritocratic standards
than the alternatives that are almost certain to follow its elimination ... ." 120 I
discuss alternatives below in Part IX.
A willingness to disregard or redefine the merit principle, then, knows no
ideological and partisan boundaries. Does this bespeak a context-sensitive
flexibility in the notion of merit, as Fish maintains, or is it just hypocrisy? The
answer is-it depends. Universities, employers, and other decision-makers are
in the best position to define and measure merit in whatever terms they deem
most relevant to their own institutions because they must bear most if not all of
any efficiency losses and other costs arising from any errors in definition or
measurement. Thus, what outsiders may view as arbitrary and hypocritical ex-
ceptions to the merit principle presumably advance the institutions' broader in-
terests. In this sense, these "exceptions" can be seen as part of a defensible, in-
stitution-specific conception of merit. A preference for legacies and athletes,
for example, may maximize the alumni contributions and loyalty that in turn
support the institution's academic mission. By the same token, a preference for
racial minorities may reflect the institution's belief that their presence will
somehow enrich campus life. If so, the merit principle remains inviolate, al-
though its precise definition depends on the particular social context in which it
is invoked and the mix of values that the institution seeks to promote.
This conception of merit is more than just window-dressing. A university
president may well believe that admitting athletes, legacies, and minorities who
do not meet the school's highest academic standards would nonetheless ad-
vance its overriding academic and social missions. Indeed, many university
presidents do take this view. For myself, I could not reach this conclusion with-
out strong evidence that admitting them was both necessary and sufficient to
advance that mission without eroding those standards. My sense-based partly
on the academic and fiscal success of elite schools that abandoned single-sex
admissions over initial alumni opposition, and partly on the scandalously low
academic standards for athletes on many campuses 121-is that such evidence
119. Kinsley, supra note 49, at 65 ("Republicans, who were slow to approach the C.B.E.O. [color-
blind equal opportunity principle] in the 1960s, have often charged past it in the years since. If color
blindness is a virtue, hypocrisy is in this case the tribute virtue pays to vice.").
120. Jeffrey Rosen, Without Merit, NEW REPUBLIC, May 14, 2001, at 20.
121. E.g., JOHN FEINSTEIN, THE LAST AMATEURS: PLAYING FOR GLORY AND HONOR IN DIVISION I
COLLEGE BASKETBALL (2000) (neglect of academics in college basketball programs); SHULMAN &
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does not exist and that most of the special treatment for athletes and legacies
bears no relation to a defensible conception of merit. Evidence of the contribu-
tion of minorities to campus life does exist, however, and I discuss it below in
Section G of this Part.
In defining the academic mission, I personally place a very, very high
weight on intellectual achievement. I say "very, very high," not exclusive; I
might also give points to applicants who play in the school orchestra, come
from rural backgrounds or foreign countries, or exhibit unusual leadership
abilities. Doubtless others, mindful of their own institutions' distinctive goals
and traditions, would strike these balances somewhat differently, and variations
of this kind are to be encouraged. An institution's choice should only be con-
sidered hypocritical (as opposed to arguably misguided) when it violates the
institution's proclaimed values or when the institution does not demand hard
evidence to justify departures from those values, as may well be the case with
some universities' athletic programs. The important point is not merely that, as
Lemann and Fish rightly argue, different institutions (and the people within
them) can plausibly define merit in different ways, but also that the integrity of
those definitions depends partly on the underlying facts. In Part IX, Section G, I
combine this point and my defense of diverse institutional identities to justify
allowing private entities, but not public ones, to adopt ethno-racial preferences
under certain defined conditions and in certain contexts.
Defenders of traditional merit make several dignity-based and consequen-
tialist arguments against preferences. One of them counters Dworkin's contin-
gency argument, contending that it assigns insufficient importance to the role
that individual efforts play in academic and other success. Such efforts should
be rewarded both on efficiency and fairness grounds; those rewards send so-
cially desirable signals to others in the community. If society deems the rewards
excessive, it can best reduce them by taxing the excess, not by disparaging a
principle that helps motivate socially valuable activity. Once this merit princi-
ple is abandoned or discredited, it cannot readily be restored or replaced. No
alternative principle, in this view, is as socially functional or morally attractive
as merit.
Another argument against preferences holds that departures from traditional
merit tend to demean and stigmatize the program's beneficiaries-including
those who would have qualified under the traditional merit standard. 122 Since
preferences' categorical nature prevents others from telling which members of
the favored group were hired or admitted on the basis of merit and which on the
BOWEN, supra note 56; Robert Lipsyte, Backtalk: The Devil and an Angel Envision a Revolution in
College Sports, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 4, 2001, at II (effort of beleaguered female professor at University of
Tennessee to curb academic abuses by scholar-athletes and athletic department).
122. E.g., JOHN H. MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE: SELF-SABOTAGE N BLACK AMERICA (2000)
(recounting personal experiences).
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basis of the preference, observers assume the worst. (This assumption, of
course, might itself be considered discriminatory but it may instead reflect a
non-discriminatory aversion to risk.) In a reverse twist on the economic theory
explaining why "lemons" are hard to detect in the market, 23 a preference tends
to reduce the returns to true merit. A similar argument of this kind notes that
many who take advantage of preferences will perform poorly or fail, further
stigmatizing the group and demoralizing the individuals.1 24 Stanley Fish's ri-
poste to the stigma argument is worth quoting:
Some beneficiaries of affirmative action will question their achievements; others
will be quite secure in them; and many more will manage to have low self-esteem
no matter what their history. Affirmative action is a weak predictor of low self-
esteem, and even if there were a strong correlation, you might prefer the low self-
esteem that comes along with wondering if your success is really earned to the low
self-esteem that comes from never having been in a position to succeed in the first
place. At any rate, low self-esteem is at least in part the product of speculation
about it. 
125
I consider these and some other consequentialist arguments in more detail in
Part VII.
C. Anti-Caste
Most advocates of affirmative action seek to justify it as a powerful tool for
dismantling what they view as a racial caste system in which blacks continue to
be subordinated not just by individual racist attitudes, but also and more im-
portantly by intractable hierarchical and institutional structures that a more pas-
sive, slow-moving non-discrimination principle cannot effectively dislodge.
26
In contrast to the backward-looking restitution rationale, the emphasis on
eliminating tenacious caste structures is more forward-looking and remedial.
However labeled, this rationale aims at promoting integration with the goal of
genuine democratic participation on the basis of equality. 127
Indeed, even today when defenders of affirmative action use diversity
rhetoric in order to avoid legal pitfalls, the heart of the case for affirmative ac-
tion is unquestionably its capacity to remedy the current effects of past dis-
crimination. One advocate, the former chancellor of the University of Califor-
123. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons ": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mecha-
nism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
124. E.g., Sander, supra note 91, at 561 (example of law graduates).
125. FISH, supra note 101, at 32-33.
126. E.g., PHILIP A. KLINKNER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA (1999); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY 177-
82 (2001); Bryan K. Fair, Review Essay: America's Equality Promise: Where Do We Go From Here?,
19 J. AMER. ETHNIC HIST. 94, 96 (2000); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5
PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 107 (1976); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427,456 (1997).




nia at Berkeley, likens a university without affirmative action to a form of edu-
cational apartheid "almost as pervasive and insidious as the strictest segregation
in South Africa." 128 Others, less hyperbolic, believe that affirmative action on
campus "may well be ... the best long-term remedy for the private beliefs and
behavior that perpetuate the effects of racial caste."'
29
Somewhat subtler is Orlando Patterson's argument for affirmative action,
based on the small number of blacks in the workplace relative to whites. Since
there are on average more than six white employees for every black one, Patter-
son contends, even non-racist employers will likely promote whites more often
than blacks, especially if they think that whites will "fit in" better with a pre-
dominantly white work force. When one adds to this "the fact that Euro-
American workers have a hard time taking orders from Afro-American supervi-
sors," affirmative action is the only way to break the statistically-driven and
sometimes vicious circle.'
30
Advocates who rely on the anti-caste rationale contend that the intractabil-
ity of these social structures-what Martin Duberman calls racism's "terrifying
agility"13 1-- demands special and energetic interventions to dismantle them.
Perhaps conceding that affirmative action is problematic in certain respects,
they nonetheless insist-in the spirit of Justice Harry Blackmun's claim that
"[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race"I 32-- that
the imperative of true integration and the prospect of genuine equality are over-
riding ends and that affirmative action is the only practical way to achieve
them. For constitutional support, they point to Reconstruction-era legislation,
contemporaneous with the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption, that seemed to
establish racial preferences for the freedmen.'
33
The political leaders of minority groups clearly view affirmative action as a
rallying point, a basis for group solidarity, that can galvanize the ethnically-
defined organization of minorities into an effective political force.134 This tactic
succeeded in extending the scope of affirmative action from public sector to
private sector, from hiring to promotion, from college admissions to graduate
and professional school admissions, and in other dimensions, 35 while institu-
tionalizing it more firmly than its supporters could possibly have predicted at its
128. Chang-Lin Tien, Diversity and Excellence in Higher Education, in DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 237, 239 (Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994).
129. Amar & Katyal, supra note 54, at 1779 (quoting Kenneth Karst).
130. PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 161-62.
131. MARTIN DUBERMAN, The "New" (1997) Scholarship on Race Relations, in LEFT OUT:
POLITICS OF EXCLUSIONS/ESSAYS/1964-1999, at 369, 385 (1999).
132. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in judgment and dissenting in part).
133. Supra note 5.
134. PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 65-66.
135. Jack Citrin, Affirmative Action in the People's Court, PUBLIC INTEREST 39, 48 (Winter 1996).
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inauspicious inception. 136 Indeed, some use these anti-caste arguments to justify
giving preferences even to middle-class blacks.' 
37
Opponents counter with several arguments. None of these counter-
arguments denies America's dark history of racial caste. All of them, however,
emphasize changes that cast doubt on the merits of affirmative action today.
Some, for example, point to the stunning political, economic, and social ad-
vances by blacks both individually and as a group, concluding that special pref-
erences are no longer warranted (if they ever were), especially in light of their
social costs.' 38 Some cite the historical experience of immigrant groups that
also suffered harsh racial and other discrimination but still managed to advance
without the benefit of these kinds of affirmative action programs. 139 Others ar-
gue that any caste effects today are based more on class or cultural practices
than on race, 140 or more on spiritual than economic deprivation. 141 Still others,
like Cass Sunstein, who strongly supports the struggle against caste, concede
that racial preferences often fail and prefer "race-neutral alternatives.' 42
Affirmative action advocates do not concede these points. They note, cor-
rectly, that many substantive inequalities remain 143 and contend that affirmative
action's social costs are minimal. Immigrants, they say, came to America vol-
untarily and optimistically, not in chains and in trauma, and they insist that
slavery's acids continue to corrode the foundations of the black family and of
black culture even six or seven generations after Emancipation.
144
D. Leadership Cadre
A variant of the anti-caste rationale is the claim that affirmative action is ef-
fective in producing a cadre of black professionals who can form a nucleus of
group leaders and serve as role models for other members of the group, espe-
cially the young who need to have high aspirations and confidence that others
1
136. Affirmative action's political origins are discussed infra in Part VI, Section A.
137. E.g., Deborah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 68 U.
COLO. L. REV. 939, 953 (1997).
138. Patterson details this progress, supra note 3, at 17-51, although he still favors continuing af-
firmative action for fifteen years, then to be transformed into class-based programs, id. at 147-69. 1 dis-
cuss this further in Part IX, Section E. See also STEPHAN THERNSTROM & ABIGAIL THERNSTROM,
AMERICA IN BLACK AND WHITE: ONE NATION, INDIVISIBLE 183-202 (1997) [hereinafter BLACK AND
WHITE].
139. E.g., THOMAS SOWELL, MIGRATIONS AND CULTURES: A WORLD VIEW (1996). I have ex-
plored some of the complexities of this comparison. Schuck, supra note 2.
140. E.g., PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 147-203.
141. ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, THE FOURTH GREAT AWAKENING & THE FUTURE OF
EGALITARIANISM (2000).
142. SUNSTEIN, supra note 126, at 181.
143. For a recent review of these inequalities, see ANGELA GLOVER-BLACKWELL, STEWART
KWOH, & MANUEL PASTOR, SEARCHING FOR THE UNCOMMON GROUND: NEW DIMENSIONS ON RACE IN
AMERICA (forthcoming 2002).
144. See, for example, text accompanying notes 102-106, 126-131 supra.
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have succeeded despite their common legacy of group disadvantage. This ra-
tionale, which has its skeptics,1 45 applies most strongly to the domain of higher
education, which of course is an important training ground for leaders. Studies
on how well such programs perform this function have been chewed over by
proponents and opponents of affirmative action alike.
Proponents point to the Bowen-Bok data on the career achievements of
blacks admitted to the selective schools in their sample during the affirmative-
action era, graduates whom the authors characterize as "the backbone of the
emergent black... middle class."' 14 6 The Bowen-Bok data clearly establish that
the vast majority of the individuals who graduate from baccalaureate and post-
baccalaureate programs to which they were admitted through affirmative action
do enter the middle class, participate in community life, and presumably func-
tion as role models for young blacks. 147 A further argument in this vein is that
the presence of minority group members in visible roles of leadership and in-
fluence is conducive, if not essential, to the legitimacy of social and political
institutions. For minorities to accept their outcomes as minimally just or at least
acceptable, they must view these institutions as inclusive and procedurally fair.
Being tried by minority judges, for example, may advance that goal. They must
perceive that they are not merely invisible servants of the regime but are, along
with their fellow citizens, its masters as well. A related, though slightly differ-
ent, argument, which is particularly applicable to affirmative action in public
universities and other public programs, is that minorities pay taxes for these
mobility-enhancing public services, entitling them to fair representation in
those programs.148
This, then, is the core of the leadership cadre rationale for affirmative ac-
tion. There are at least three reasons, however, to doubt how much of this mo-
bility and participation are due to affirmative action. First, the propensity to
participate and lead in the civic sphere reflects factors that are usually evident
in high school and that therefore presumably increase the chances that indi-
viduals will be admitted to the selective institutions in the first place, with or
145. Christopher Lasch, for example, opposes affirmative action because, among other reasons, it
would strengthen the dominant position of the middle class, further estranging it from lower-income
people. CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES AND THE BETRAYAL OF DEMOCRACY 79, 137
(1995).
146. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 80, at 116.
147. The Bowen-Bok data do reveal a substantial, persistent, and unexplained earnings gap be-
tween white and black male graduates of the sampled institutions, though not for females. See also
Sandalow, supra note 85, at 1908-10 (discussing possible explanations). And some studies do find per-
formance differentials. E.g., John R. Lott, Does a Helping Hand Put Others at Risk?: Affirmative Ac-
tion, Police Departments, and Crime, 38 ECON. INQUIRY 239 (2000). On the other hand, a study of
Michigan Law School's white and minority graduates shows their earnings, arguably a proxy for per-
formance, to be quite comparable. Lempert et al., Law School, supra note 91, at 447-53. But see
Sander, supra note 91 (discussing response rate, cohort, aggregation, and other methodological consid-
erations).
148. Issacharoff, supra note 11, at 684-88.
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without the boost of affirmative action.' 49 Second, the vast majority of the
black students admitted to these institutions (86%) are already from middle-
and upper-class families (although they are still poorer than their white
peers), 150 a background that correlates with both participation and leadership.
Third, absent affirmative action, these students would presumably have at-
tended other institutions that graduate many more blacks than the ones in the
Bowen-Bok sample do, blacks who succeed both professionally and civi-
cally. '51 Indeed, a striking fact is that historically black colleges, which account
for only a sixth of total black college enrollment, produced 43% of the 1995
Congressional Black Caucus, 39% of black officers in the U.S. Army, and a
quarter of black MacArthur "genius" grantees in the last two decades. 52 Al-
though these successful graduates were educated some time ago, their alma
maters are now more intensively recruiting and often enrolling the most out-
standing black students, many of whom could gain admission to predominantly
white institutions through affirmative action programs.' 53 The same is true of
the non-flagship campuses of public university systems, where most of the di-
rect affirmative action beneficiaries would end up, absent affirmative action.
154
In short, the vast majority of those admitted to select institutions would proba-
bly have succeeded, participated, and been leaders anyway even without the
preferences.
E. Market Failure
Some analysts of an economistic bent emphasize that affirmative action can
be justified as a response to a defect in the markets for labor, college admis-
sions, credit, and other goods. Their argument is that a decisionmaker who ra-
tionally relies on group stereotypes-because the savings in search and other
149. As Sandalow puts it, "It is entirely predictable ... that African-American students at those
institutions will, in their later lives, be actively involved in civic organizations. The importance of at-
tending a selective college lies elsewhere, not in leading students to engage in civic activities, but in
enhancing the quality of their efforts." Sandalow, supra note 85, at 1909-10.
150. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 80, at 48-49. Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom question the causal
assumption of the leadership cadre rationale. Rather than these schools creating a black middle class,
they say, the black middle class sends its children to these schools. THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM,
BLACK AND WHITE, supra note 138; see also Stephan Themstrom & Abigail Themstrom, Racial Pref-
erences: What We Now Know, 107 COMMENTARY 44, 44-50 (1999) [hereinafter Racial Preferences]
(reviewing the Bowen-Bok study).
151. LERNER & NAGAI, supra note 82. Some of these other institutions, it now appears, also use
preferences. Id.
152. Thernstrom & Thernstrom, Racial Preferences, supra note 150, at 49. These colleges educate
15% of black college students and produce 30% of all black graduates. DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER, THE
END OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 150 (1996). For an argument that these institutions may now be uncon-
stitutional, see Mark Strasser, Plessy, Brown and HBCUs: On the Imposition of Stigma and the Court's
Mechanical Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 48 (2000).
153. Diana Jean Schemo, Black Colleges Lobby Hard to Lure the Best and Brightest, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 2001, at A10.
154. E.g., Jack Citrin, Scores Do Measure Talent, Berkeley Professor Insists, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Mar. 4, 2001; see infra text accompanying note 383.
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information costs in doing so exceed the costs of missing some qualified mem-
bers of the stereotyped group (false negatives, as it were)-is not internalizing
the full social costs of her discrimination. Those costs include the demoraliza-
tion of excluded, but qualified, group members, underinvestment by stereo-
typed group members in education and other qualifications that would dispro-
portionately benefit them and society, and so forth. Affirmative action, in this
view, is a way of obliging decisionmakers to bear the full costs of these exter-
nalities and thus to make economically efficient choices. 155 But even if some
externality adjustment were desirable, the one effected by affirmative action is,
as we shall see, far too crude, costly, and inefficient in its own right to rectify
the problem.
F. Institutional Pragmatism
Some have defended affirmative action as a necessary, prudent resolution
of the competing values to which certain institutions are committed. Focusing
on elite universities, for example, law professor Samuel Issacharoff, echoing
Nathan Glazer, argues that
affirmative action represents a point of compromise in the contradictory missions of
the elite universities. They serve as both the guardians of a meritocratic vision of
achievement and as the guarantors of opportunity so that the elites of the society
may be replenished from the diverse groups that have built this country. Affirmative
action grows out of the frustration with the apparent intractability of this country's
inability to achieve these twin objectives with regard to black Americans. It is a
pragmatic and oftentimes messy accommodation of two of the central values of
higher education. 
156
Issacharoff's plea for granting institutions some discretion in deciding how to
balance competing considerations that are peculiar to them is convincing, at
least for private institutions. 157 And his description of the moral and political
impulses motivating many proponents of affirmative action is surely correct.
But as we shall see, it is not an accurate account of how most Americans and
even most racial minorities view affirmative action; their opposition to it as a
matter of principle thus discredits the compromise he defends. Furthermore, his
pragmatic judgment rests on certain premises: that affirmative action is neces-
sary to create black mobility, that the preferences are "modest," that they only
"operate on the margin of established selection criteria," that they have "an
end-point that will prevent affirmative action programs from becoming institu-
tionalized as a racial spoils system," and that they do not have other negative
consequences that might affect the prudential balance. 158 My analysis casts se-
155. E.g., Stewart Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 228
(1986).
156. Issacharoff, supra note 11, at 682.
157. See discussion infra in Part IX, Section F.
158. Issacharoff, supra note 11, at 690-92.
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rious doubt on all of these premises.
G. Diversity
The institutional pragmatist will often seize on diversity as a more satisfy-
ing, more substantive rationale for affirmative action. Its appeal is readily ap-
parent. Even more obvious, however, are its flaws-so obvious, in fact, that
many of affirmative action's more forthright defenders readily concede that di-
versity is merely the current rationale of convenience for a policy that they pre-
fer to justify on other grounds.
1 59
Until the late 1990s, when federal courts began striking down affirmative
action programs in public institutions of higher education as unconstitutional
reverse discrimination, advocates had focused their arguments more on the res-
titution, anti-caste, merit, leadership cadre, market failure, and institutional
pragmatism rationales for such programs than on diversity. These other ration-
ales were more attractive to the advocates because they seemed morally com-
pelling, remedial, and based on the demands of justice. Diversity, in contrast,
was essentially a functional rationale whose force depended on a number of
plausible but controvertible empirical propositions. Equally problematic, this
functional account of diversity was geared less to how affirmative action bene-
fited the victims of past discrimination than to how it benefited other institu-
tions or people (e.g., students and faculty), including many who may have ei-
ther participated in that discrimination or been advantaged by it.16 Functional
arguments for diversity suffer not only from this distasteful aspect, but also
from the distinct possibility, which I develop below, that these arguments fail
according to their own functional criteria. Arguments supporting preferences
because of diversity's supposed effects may turn out to discredit them if and
when those effects do not materialize.1
61
In fact, the diversity rationale should be seen as little more than a rhetorical
Hail Mary pass, an argument made in desperation when all other arguments for
preferences have failed. It is no secret that proponents turned to this rationale in
earnest only when a series of adverse court rulings beginning in 1989 cast seri-
ous constitutional doubt on other legal arguments for preferences. By 1998,
voters in California and Washington State had adopted laws barring affirmative
action in state programs. 162 Casting about for a safe harbor, defenders of pref-
159. E.g., Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 573, 577-78 (2000); Rubenfeld, su-
pra note 126, at 471.
160. For this reason, some have seen the diversity rationale as a diversion from the anti-caste proj-
ect. E.g., Barbara Phillips Sullivan, The Gift of Hopwood: Diversity and the Fife and Drum March
back to the Nineteenth Century, 34 GA. L. REv. 291, 298 (1999).
161. Samuel Issacharoff, Law and Misdirection in the Debate Over Affirmative Action, 2002 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. (forthcoming).
162. California's Proposition 209, passed in the November 1996 election, dismantled affirmative
action in public education and public employment; Washington State's Proposition 200, passed in the
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erences seized upon the diversity justification offered by Justice Powell in 1978
in his plurality opinion for the Supreme Court in the Bakke case. 163 There he
stated that "a diverse student body ... clearly is a constitutionally permissible
goal for an institution of higher education" and observed that "[the atmosphere
of 'speculation, experiment and creation'-so essential to the quality of higher
education-is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body."
1 64
Today, Michael Selmi explains, "diversity has quite clearly become the
most heralded of all justifications for affirmative action."' 65 In large part, this is
because
relying on diversity rather than discrimination places affirmative action programs
on more solid legal and perhaps political grounds. It is the rare case in which a uni-
versity will have engaged in systematic discrimination against a particular group re-
cently enough and in other particulars that a court may accept as sufficient to justify
a race-conscious measure. It is rarer still that a university defending a plan will be
willi* 6 to assert its own past discrimination as justification for affirmative meas-
ures.
The diversity rationale, in contrast, entails a fresher, more "future-oriented vi-
sion."' 167 As law professor Eugene Volokh says, "it ascribes no guilt, calls for
no arguments about compensation. It seems to ask simply for rational, unbig-
oted judgment...6 Judge Alex Kozinski adds that "everyone likes diversity,
so long as it falls within a fairly narrow ideological range."' 69 And depending
November 1998 election, yielded a similar outcome.
163. Terrance Sandalow observes that "the importance of racial diversity in the educational proc-
ess has become something of a mantra in higher education circles in the years since Justice Powell's
pivotal opinion in Bakke." Sandalow, supra note 85, at 1905. Sanford Levinson likens this to a game of
"Simon Says" in which the Court tells the players that "Simon says, 'Start talking about diversity-and
downplay any talk about rectification of past social injustice...'." Levinson, supra note 159, at 578.
164. Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-13 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in re-
sult) (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)). As Issacharoff points out, Pow-
ell's discussion of diversity was abstract, as it was not an issue in Bakke. Issacharoff, supra note 11, at
677. The Supreme Court had alluded to the benefits of diversity in higher education long before Bakke,
though not in so many words, not as a rationale for affirmative action, and only as to how blacks would
benefit from being with whites, not the reverse. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950); McLaurin
v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 641 (1950). For an argument that Powell's diversity rationale did
not command majority support among the Justices, see Thomas E. Wood & Malcolm J. Sherman, Race
and Higher Education: Why Justice Powell's Diversity Rationale for Racial Preferences in Higher
Education Must Be Rejected, Part I, at http://www.nas.org/rhe.pdf (May 2001).
165. Michael Selmi, The Facts of Affirmative Action, 85 VA. L. REV. 697, 729 (1999) (reviewing
BOWEN & BOK, supra note 80).
166. Id. at 733; see also id. at 729 nn.152-153 (citing sources). As the successful lawyer in Hop-
wood points out, "if the [University of Texas] Law School with its notorious past cannot rely on histori-
cal discrimination as a predicate for preferential admissions, then no institution of higher leaming...
can rely on a remedial rationale for affirmative action." Michael S. Greve, Hopwood and its Conse-
quences, 17 PACE L. REV. 1, 6 (1996).
167. E.g., Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of "Diver-
sity," 1993 WisC. L. REV. 105, 107; Ronald Dworkin, Race and the Uses of Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13,
2001, at A17.
168. Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race as Proxy, and Religion as Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REV. 2059,
2060 (1996).
169. Quoted in Chen, supra note 58, at 815.
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on how diversity is defined, preferences for middle-class minorities might fall
within the rationale, possibly facilitating public acceptance of the policy.
170
The diversity rationale attracts supporters, especially in higher education,
for another reason. Whether or not professors agree with Kenneth Karst that the
conventional affirmative action categories are good proxies for the kinds of di-
versity that enrich teaching, learning, and social interactions in and outside the
classroom, and whether or not they are persuaded by the non-diversity argu-
ments for affirmative action, most of them are profoundly uncomfortable at the
thought of teaching a class or being on a faculty containing only whites and
Asians. (Whether this also troubled professors in the days before preferences
helped put racial minorities in their classrooms is less clear.) As we shall see in
Part VIII, this "re-segregation" nightmare might well occur at the more elite
private institutions absent preferences. I am such a teacher at such an institution
and experience the same anticipatory discomfort.
What is the source of this discomfort? Here, I enter the realm of speculation
(or more precisely, introspection), although survey evidence does shed some
light. College and university professors tend to be ideologically and politically
far more liberal, Democratic, statist, and secular than other Americans. 172 More
to the point, professors tend to be knowledgeable about and sensitive to the
historical injustices inflicted on blacks by slavery, Jim Crow, and the legacy of
racism in America, and to support affirmative action and other remedial and
egalitarian policies.' 73 It is not cynical, I think, to add that tenured professors
have little or nothing to fear personally from affirmative action for students or
faculty. Indeed, it benefits them by eliminating the discomfort they would feel
in classes and faculty meetings without non-Asian minorities, and they bear
few of the program's costs. 174 Many genuinely believe that the benefits of
170. Malamud, supra note 137, at 953 ("[The] diversity rationale makes it unnecessary to answer
the hardest question about.. . affirmative action: the question of when it is time to stop.").
171. KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S ExPRESSION: VISIONS OF POWER IN THE
POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION 105-07 (1993) (emphasizing "enacted narrative" of "doing
things together over a period of time").
172. Based on a 1993-94 survey of 710 law faculty at the top 100 law schools and the AALS data
from the 1996-97, 80% of law faculty are Democratic or lean Democratic (compared with 46% of the
working population). Although about 15% of full-time working women are Republicans, only 0.5% of
women law professors are Republicans. James Lindgren, Measuring Diversity, tbl.2 (January 1, 1999)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
173. Rachel Moran cites two recent surveys finding that "university faculty in general, and law
faculty in particular, express high levels of support for diversity and affirmative action." Symposium on
Law in the Twentieth Century: Diversity and its Discontents: The End of Affirmative Action at Boalt
Hall, 8 CALIF. L. REV. 2241, 2267 n.137 (2000). She cites AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION AND
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, DOES DIVERSITY MAKE A DIFFERENCE? THREE
RESEARCH STUDIES ON DIVERSITY IN COLLEGE CLASSROOMS (2000) (on file with author); and RICHARD
A. WHITE, PRELIMINARY REPORT: LAW SCHOOL FACULTY VIEWS ON DIVERSITY ON THE CLASSROOM
AND THE LAW SCHOOL COMMUNITY (May 2000) (on file with author). But see Balch, supra note 32
(indicating opposition).
174. I say few of the costs, not none. Some of their students who receive preferences are less well-
prepared academically and thus harder to teach. Institutions may pressure faculty not to fail minority
Vol. 20:1, 2002
Affirmative Action
ethno-racial diversity justify preferential admissions. Their reactions are per-
fectly predictable and understandable, and I share some of them.
What independent weight should these professorial feelings carry in the af-
firmative action debate? Not much, in my view. For the diversity rationale to
justify affirmative action in higher education, it must do so because of the
genuine diversity benefits that flow to students and faculty, especially those in
the favored groups. The diversity rationale means that the benefits relevant to a
diversity assessment must be the educational and social advantages that inter-
actions among diverse students and faculty supposedly produce. The benefits
from allaying the anxieties of white faculty members who are already highly
privileged in so many respects should not count heavily (or perhaps at all) be-
cause such benefits bear only the most tenuous relation to the values that un-
derlie the diversity rationale, properly understood.
What, then, are the benefits-from a diversity perspective-that should
count in favor of preferences in higher education admissions? To answer this
question, we must first address three other closely-related ones. What does di-
versity mean in this context? What is it about a group that accounts for its di-
versity-value? 175 (Groups, after all, are what diversity-based affirmative action
programs are all about.) And what diversity-value do the groups favored by af-
firmative action create?
1. Diversity's Meaning
Diversity, like equality, is an idea that is at once complex and empty until it
is given descriptive and normative content and context. 176 Unfortunately, most
discussions of diversity and the diversity rationale for affirmative action do not
explain what it actually means, much less which groups with what kinds of at-
tributes create diversity-value.17 7 Nevertheless, the ways that affirmative action
programs are designed and defended leave little doubt that program advocates
almost always mean racial diversity, with little regard to the many anomalies,
evasions, and confusions that attend most race discourse in America.178
students. In addition, affirmative action in faculty hiring and promotion introduces more conflict and
tension, acknowledged or not, into relations with colleagues and students. Sandalow, supra note 85, at
1902-05. It also bears noting that a diversity rationale for admission preferences would not necessarily
justify them for faculty hiring and promotion. Indeed, Derek Bok, a supporter of admission preferences,
opposed them in hiring and tenure decisions while Harvard University's President and in his writing. Id.
175. "Diversity-value" is the sum of any of the social values associated with diversity. Diversity-
value should be distinguished from "value-diversity," which is a domain of diversity-for example, a
classroom in which students possess different values-that may best be thought of as "cultural-
ideological." These concepts and distinctions are developed in SCHUCK, supra note 6.
176. SCHUCK, supra note 6; see also Martha Minow's discussion of the "dilemma of difference" in
her The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword. Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 12
(1987). On equality, see Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1982).
177. Foster, supra note 167, at 109. For an unusually thoughtful exception, see Guido Calabresi,
Diversity in Faculty Hiring (July 31, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
178. Including, but by no means limited to, these: race is a spurious category; miscegenation has
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This preoccupation with race by proponents of the diversity rationale is also
anomalous because other attributes are also predictive of one's experiences,
outlooks, and ideas. According to a still-unpublished study by lawyer-
sociologist James Lindgren of the demographic correlates of viewpoint differ-
ences, political affiliation accounts for the largest cleavages, with religion and
race producing cleavages of similar magnitude. 179 The failure of diversity-
based affirmative action programs to base preferences on religion is among the
most revealing facts about them. 80 (Alas, this immense failing extends as well• - 181
to most of the other debates over multi-culturalism. ) The programs' lack of
interest in our rapidly-growing religious diversity' 82 casts some doubt on the
bona fides, or at least the coherence, of the diversity rationale as now imple-
mented, 1 3 and may reflect the unusual religious composition of university fac-
ulties.1 84 A priori (which is how programs select the groups to be preferred),
doesn't the perspective of a Muslim or fundamentalist Christian applicant have
at least as much diversity-value as that of a middle-class black or Hispanic?
85
Sanford Levinson, an affirmative action supporter, puts this point another way:
"One sometimes gets the feeling that ostensible defenders of 'diversity' and
occurred since colonial times and is common today, producing a very large number of mixed-race indi-
viduals; even recent immigrants are included; Hispanics are not a racial group and Asians are a com-
posite of many ethnic, religious, linguistic, and national-origin groups with little or nothing in common
with one another, and indeed histories of deep conflict.
This last, however, is not the reason why pressures are growing to exclude Asians from diversity
programs. The usual grounds for doing so are that Asians are already well represented on university
campuses, their average family income is relatively high, they would qualify for admission on a race-
neutral basis, and giving them preferences would leave few slots left for more deserving minorities, no-
tably blacks. Not surprisingly, these grounds are disputed by Asian groups complaining that such
"model minority" stereotypes overlook the many disadvantages these groups face. E.g., Chris Hedges,
Fighting a Happy Image of Self-Sufficiency, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2001, at B2 (Asian Americans for
Equality group in New York City).
179. James Lindgren, What Groups Think: Viewpoint Diversity Among Demographic Groups
(Aug. 1, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
180. Volokh argues that religious preferences under a diversity rationale would be unconstitutional
for the same reason that he thinks racial preferences are-even though the lack of religious diversity at
many schools is "at least as severe as the lack of racial diversity." Volokh, supra note 168, at 2072.
181. HOLLINGER, supra note 26, at 120.
182. SCHUCK, supra note 6.
183. Indeed, Volokh contends that affirmative action that covers race while not covering religion
casts doubt on the integrity of this use of the diversity rationale and thus would also be unconstitutional.
Noting this conflict between the core principles of anti-discrimination law and of affirmative action law,
he asks the law, "How exactly does what you praise differ from what you damn?" Volokh, supra note
168, at 2076.
184. James Lindgren's survey of law professors during the 1990s indicates that nearly 27% were
Jewish, and another 26% profess no religion, compared with 2% and 8%, respectively, in the full-time
working population. Protestants accounted for 32% and Catholics for 14%, compared with 60% and
26%, respectively, in the full-time working population. James Lindgren (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
185. Some argue that because test score differences between religious groups are not as great as
between racial ones, affirmative action for the former are unnecessary to assure diversity; it will take
care of itself. E-mail from Nathan Glazer (Aug. 24, 2001) (on file with author). But even if this were
true as to students, it cannot explain why university employment preferences, particularly in faculty
hiring, show no interest in religious diversity.
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'multiculturalism' have no real idea of how truly diverse and multicultural the
United States has become, fixated as they are on the 'traditional' racial and
ethnic cleavages within this country." Levinson's use of scare quotes around
"traditional" reminds us how much more complex and numerous these cleav-
ages are than those presupposed by diversity-based affirmative action pro-186
grams. This complexity also underlies David Hollinger's critique of the offi-
cial ethno-racial pentagon.187 And if we want to stick with simple but
perspective-relevant cleavages, why not diversify the student body through
preferences according to political party affiliation?
2. Diversity-Value in General
Just how many blacks or members of other favored groups must be present
in order to establish the requisite diversity? Because the value of diversity
surely depends on various factors, any sensible answer must be context-
specific.' 88 Unfortunately, law and practice offer a wholly reductionist answer
to the question. They simply count the number of group members in the rele-
vant community (or their percentage of the community total) and demand pro-
portional representation, at least as a default but often, in effect, as the final an-
swer. 189 Defining the relevant community-that which will be used in making
the proportionality assessment on which the legal obligation will directly
turn-almost always entails highly controversial judgments, if not arbitrary
empirical and normative ones. The relevant baseline for judging proportional-
ity, for example, can only be defined in terms of a number of elusive, hard-to-
measure, and internally competing parameters including group definition, geog-
raphy, qualifications, attitudes, applicant pool, and others. Rhetoric aside, the
task of actually administering affirmative action requires, ironically, that a pro-
gram first combine many complex determinations that as a practical matter it• • •190
can only make through almost comically arbitrary judgments, and then come
up with a bottom-line number that is certain to be breathtaking in its simplicity
and abstraction from context.
This, emphatically, is not what Justice Powell had in mind in his Bakke
opinion, although in other respects it is not altogether clear what he did have in
mind' 91 or how binding his opinion is as precedent.192 In Bakke, he insisted that
186. Levinson, supra note 159, at 603 n.120.
187. HOLLINGER, supra note 26, at 177-78.
188. Amar and Katyal see the need for a "critical mass." Supra note 54, at 1777. See also Chen,
supra note 58, at 883-84 (justification of "comfort level" for minority students "conflates diversity with
the distinct and doctrinally unsound role model rationale").
189. E.g., Chen, supra note 58, at 825-26 (reviewing the caselaw).
190. E.g., Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in Race-
Conscious Law, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 1231 (1994); Levinson, supra note 159, at 599-601.
191. Compare, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d (E.D. Mich. 2001), with Gratz v. Bollin-
ger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (sharp split between district courts over diversity rationale).
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simple numerical quotas could not be used to achieve diversity; institutions
must instead look at the individual as a whole and her potential to contribute
effectively to educational diversity.1 93 Institutions that invoke diversity, Powell
added, must also pursue non-racial diversity. 194 Both factors led him to con-
demn the Davis system that precluded whites from competing for the set-aside
slots and to praise Harvard's because race was only a tie-breaking factor.,
95
More recently, the Supreme Court held, as Powell had argued in Bakke, 196 that
all race-based preferences are subject to strict scrutiny, the most demanding
constitutional test. 
197
The diversity that Powell seemed to have in mind was not the pure ethno-
racial diversity that affirmative action programs now prize.198 The fact that af-
firmative action programs have bureaucratized diversity does not mean that it is
a hollow ideal unworthy of society's aspiration. It does mean, however, that
these programs may in fact be pursuing a spurious or formalistic kind of diver-
sity. Indeed, for institutions that must process thousands of applications for
relatively few slots in a very limited period of time, it could hardly be other-
wise. 199 As a practical matter, diversity admissions can mean little more than
color-coding and color-counting in service of a pre-determined color-
200targeting.
3. Diversity- Value in Particular
How, then, does a favored group in fact confer diversity-value on a com-
munity? A group can only create diversity-value if it possesses certain desired
qualities qua group. It seems to follow that a group can only do this if those
qualities inhere in all members of the group (else the group should be re-
192. This issue is analyzed in Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University of Georgia, Nos. 00-
14340 & 00-14382, 2001 WL 967756, at *9-12 (1 1th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001).
193. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315-18 (1978). This emphasis on "the
whole person," with race merely one consideration among many, is echoed by some commentators
sympathetic to affirmative action. E.g., Amar & Katyal, supra note 54, at 1772-73.
194. Some programs purport to do so. Tien, supra note 128, at 243-44 (stating that Berkeley's ad-
missions policy "assures that our doors are open to low-income, older, immigrant, disabled, special tal-
ent," and geographically diverse students).
195. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-17, 322-23.
196. For a careful-but for the reasons presented here and others, unconvincing-argument that
affirmative action in higher education meets this test, see Goodwin Liu, The Diversity Rationale as a
Compelling Interest, 33 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 381 (1998).
197. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (overruling Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547 (1990), for failing to apply strict scrutiny). Some commentators doubt that this decision,
which dealt with minority set-asides in government contracting, should apply to higher education. E.g.,
Amar & Katyal, supra note 54, at 1746-49.
198. Kirk Kennedy, Race-Exclusive Scholarships: Constitutional Vel Non, 30 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 759, 774 (1995); see also MCWHIRTER, supra note 152, at 152.
199. E.g., Issacharoff, supra note 11, at 678-79 (describing the process at the University of Texas).
200. Not everywhere. According to Bowen and Bok, America's most selective institutions reject





defined to exclude those who lack them). To affirm that a quality inheres in a
racial group, however, is to "essentialize" race in a way that is not true when
one selects for, say, rural background, which is not a proxy for anything but it-
self. Racial essentialization utterly contradicts liberal, egalitarian, legal, scien-
tific, and religious values (at least in the "Abrahamic" (i.e., Jewish, Christian,
and Muslim) traditions). These religious values hold that all individuals are
unique and formally equal regardless of genetic heritage, and that their race
causally determines little or nothing about their character, intelligence, experi-
ence, or anything else that is relevant to their diversity-value. Indeed, for em-
ployers to use racial stereotypes in this way would be flatly illegal--even if the
assumptions underlying the stereotypes were true. (As Eugene Volokh says,
"It's hard enough to persuade people to give up their irrational prejudices; it's
harder still to persuade them to give up their rational ones. 20 2 ) The best that
can be said of advocates' using diversity in this way is that they have "repro-
duced the most gross and invidious of popular images of what makes human
beings different from one another" for a putatively benign purpose. °3 They are
propagating a socially inflammatory stereotype that, even when fairly accurate,
invites decision-makers to violate people's claims to be judged as individuals,
not as members of ascribed groups. On a parity of reasoning, legitimating the
use of this proxy might equally justify racial profiling by police if it were in-
tended to fight crime and were tolerably accurate.
20 4
This, then, brings us to the third question: what diversity-value does a fa-
vored group actually confer? Affirmative action programs attempt to finesse the
essentialism difficulty by assuming certain facts that might make the use of race
as a proxy more defensible. They assume, first, that black students bring to
campus histories and viewpoints that are unique to and universal among black
students even though those histories and viewpoints are not racially or geneti-
cally hard-wired into them. They then assume that all of these students have the
common experience of growing up black in America and the special perspec-
tives that go with that experience-what Yale Law School dean Anthony• ,. ._ 205
Kronman calls value-diversity. Educational institutions and their black mem-
bers, they further assume, should help non-blacks to comprehend this experi-
ence, and campus diversity can strengthen the foundations of good citizenship
201. "All" may be too strong. If only a small percentage of a group's members lack the desired
quality, it may still be worthwhile to confer the benefit on all members in order to avoid the administra-
tive costs of identifying the few who lack it.
202. Volokh, supra note 168, at 2062.
203. HOLLINGER, supra note 26, at 32. For a lively and passionate development of this idea, see
JIM SLEEPER, LIBERAL RACISM 1-21 (1997).
204. E. John Gregory, Dunwoody Commentary: Diversity Is a Value in American Higher Educa-
tion, But It Is Not a Legal Justification for Affirmative Action, 52 FLA. L. REV. 929, 950 (2000). For
my views on profiling, see Peter H. Schuck, The Case for Profiling, AM. LAWYER (Jan. 2002).
205. Anthony T. Kronman, Is Diversity a Value in American Higher Education?, 52 FLA. L. REV.
861 (2000).
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in a pluralist democracy. Finally, they assume that race can serve under these
circumstances as a rough but serviceable proxy for both diversity-value and
value-diversity. Although Sanford Levinson doubts that anyone "is so stupid as
to believe that all (or even most) members of any given group necessarily have
similar opinions on a variety of important issues," 20 7 most defenses of prefer-
ences based on viewpoint diversity seem to reflect precisely this belief. Levin-
son makes a more limited claim-that the presence of blacks and other groups
on campus fosters some educational values in certain contexts while having
less effect in others.2 °8
The Bowen-Bok study strongly defends these assumptions. Using broad-
question surveys conducted in 1995-97, it asked these cohorts of former stu-
dents how they assessed their experiences on racially diverse campuses. Large
majorities--especially among blacks and in the more recent cohorts-thought
that it was important or very important in life "to work effectively and get along
well with people from different races and cultures," and that their college edu-
cations helped to cultivate this ability to a significant degree. Bowen and Bok
also found that the more blacks in an entering class, the more likely that white
students in that class would know two or more blacks well; that 56% of white
students said that they knew two or more blacks well; and that the percentage
who did so increased with the school's selectivity. These interactions occurred,
moreover, even though black students represented fewer than 10% of the stu-
dents in the schools studied.209 Relying on a "contact theory" holding that in-
creased contact among racial groups should decrease prejudice, a theory with
uncertain empirical support, 2 1° Bowen and Bok develop a model to predict how
this would change if admissions were instead race-neutral. Finding that the
56% figure would fall by several percentage points, they conclude that "the
drop in interactions would certainly be substantial., 211 These findings ostensi-
bly support the notion that affirmative action cultivates interracial socialization
skills that both white and black students value and that they enhance by at-
tending racially diverse institutions.
2 12
This conclusion, which is also supported by a study done to support the
213University of Michigan's legal defense, has been challenged from at least six
206. E.g., Amar & Katyal, supra note 54, at 1773-76 (but insisting that programs meet certain
other criteria); Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REv. 855,
862 (1995).
207. Levinson, supra note 159, at 577.
208. Id. at 592-608.
209. Selmi, supra note 165, at 725.
210. The evidence is summarized id. at 724 n.141.
211. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 80, at 236; see also id. at 220-27, 231-40.
212. For a development of this argument with respect to workers, see Cynthia L. Estlund, The
Workplace in a Racially Diverse Society: Preliminary Thoughts on the Role of Labor and Employment
Law, I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 49 (1998).
213. Expert Report of Patricia Gurin, at http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/expert/
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directions. The first is empirical; a recent review of existing survey data shows
that most students and faculty place little weight on ethnic diversity as a cause
of positive educational outcomes, and its regression analysis of peer group ra-
cial composition effects finds no positive effect on any of the eighty-two out-
come variables used by the American Council on Education.21 4
The second challenge is comparative. Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom,
prominent critics of the Bowen-Bok study and authors of an earlier analysis of
215American race relations that strongly opposed affirmative action, point to a
1997 national survey in which 86% of white adults reported having black
friends, and to a 1994 survey in which 73% said they had "good friends" who
were black. 21 6 To the Thernstroms, the Bowen-Bok findings justify a different
inference: "By these standards, the elite schools are hardly in the proud van-
guard of progress. To the contrary, they are lagging woefully behind.",217 Inter-
estingly, the Bowen-Bok and Thernstrom data on college-age and adult friend-
ships both overlook the increasing interracial friendships among youngsters
even before they reach college,218 which would suggest that the college experi-
ence may be less central to such friendships than either camp supposes.
A third challenge examines how the education process actually works on
campuses. Sandalow maintains that any experiential differences between white
and black students "are simply irrelevant to most of what students study in the
course of their undergraduate careers. The irrelevance of those differences is
perhaps most obvious in the study of mathematics and the natural sciences, but
it is rro less true of most of the humanities and the social sciences. 21 9 Sandalow
goes on to consider the argument, crucial to the diversity rationale, that blacks
are likely to advance different ideas unfamiliar to whites. His reply accords
precisely with my own experience:
gurintoc.html (last updated October 2001).
214. Wood & Sherman, supra note 164, at Part IV.
215. THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, BLACK AND WHITE, supra note 138, at 386-492.
216. Themstrom & Thernstrom, Racial Preferences, supra note 150, at 47; see also PATrERSON,
supra note 3, at 45 (57% of blacks claimed to have a good Euro-American friend "to whom they felt
they could really say anything they thought"). Patterson emphasizes that workplace contacts matter
more to friendships than neighborhood ones, noting a recent study in "hypersegregated Detroit" finding
"a level of personal friendships with people from the other group that was wholly inconsistent with the
dismal accounts of hypersegregation being reported by spatially oriented scholars." Id. at 44-46.
217. Themstrom & Thernstrom, Racial Preferences, supra note 150, at 47.
218. E.g., D'Vera Cohn & Ellen Nakashima, Crossing Racial Lines, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 1995,
at A1 (newspaper poll indicating that more than three-quarters of Washington-area 12- to 17-year olds
say they have a close friend of another race); Corey Takahashi, Selling to Gen Y: A Far Cry from Betty
Crocker, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at WK3 (in 1997, 57% of teens who dated said they had dated
interracially and another 30% had no objection to doing so). But see Gary Orfield & Dean Whitla, The
Civil Rights Project, Harvard Univ., Diversity and Legal Education: Student Experiences in Leading
Law Schools, at http://www.law.harvard.edu/groups/civilrights/publications/lawsurvey.htm (Aug.
1999) (blacks and Hispanics admitted to elite colleges had more interracial contacts in high school than
whites did).
219. Here Sandalow cites to none other than Derek Bok, when president of Harvard University.
Sandalow, supra note 85, 1906 & n.78.
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[E]ven though the subjects I teach deal extensively with racial issues, I cannot recall
an instance in which, for example, ideas were expressed by a black student that
have not also been expressed by white students. Black students do, at times, call at-
tention to the racial implications of issues that are not facially concerned with race,
but white and Asian-American students are in my experience no less likely to do
220
SO.
To some scholars, however, Sandalow's empirical observation is beside the
point because only racial preferences can secure minority students their "free
exercise of race.",221 Mary Anne Case even suggests that barring racial prefer-
ences "may work a denial of equal protection to some [students] for whom race
is a particularly salient characteristic. '2 2 But although race is surely quite sali-
ent for some students, the admissions office almost never asks about their ideas
or points of view, much less how salient race is to them, so this rationale seems
223
even weaker and, insofar as it is based on a gross stereotype, pernicious.
Outside the classroom, of course, race-based experiential differences might en-
courage empathy and openness to diversity of all kinds.224 On the other hand,
those differences might promote greater conflict.225
The diversity rationale, as deployed by some of its advocates, masks a
deeper confusion about the diversity-value arising out of social interactions. In
this view, which Justice Stevens has avowed, diversity demonstrates to people
226that despite our superficial differences, we are really all alike under the skin.
This proposition is clearly true in many respects-recall, for example, the DNA
evidence on the similarity of our genetic endowments-but the diversity-value
that the diversity rationale invokes is supposed to grow out of decidedly differ-
ent viewpoints that diverse people are said to bring to these interactions. If we
take the rationale seriously, then similarity under the skin may confer negative,
not positive, diversity-value. The very logic of this rationale dictates that we
should seek differences under the skin since those differences constitute the
payoff to diversity. At the very least, those who espouse pieties like Justice
220. Id. at 1906-07. If I may indulge in a personal anecdote, I once stated in a seminar discussion
of affirmative action that any experienced, conscientious teacher, regardless of her race, could and
would get on the table any of the arguments that ought to be there, including ideas normally associated
with racism or other analogous experiences not personally experienced by the teacher. One of my best
students responded, "Yes, but you wouldn't say it with the same conviction or affect as one who had
experienced it personally." This is a point I had to concede, as Sandalow does: "At times, the impor-
tance of what is said depends less upon the idea expressed than upon the identity of the speaker and the
manner of expression." Id. at 1907; see also Levinson, supra note 159, at 596-97 (race and ethnicity
may be good proxies for probability of interest and knowledge about an issue).
221. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind, " 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 64-68
(1991).
222. Mary Ann Case, Lessons for the Future of Affirmative Action from the Past of the Religion
Clauses?, 2000 Sup. CT. REv. 325, 337 n.48.
223. MCWHIRTER, supra note 152, at 151.
224. Sandalow, supra note 85, at 1906-07; see also Orfield & Whitla, supra note 218.
225. Issacharoff, supra note 161 (manuscript at 24, on file with author) (citing studies of effects of
workplace diversity).
226. E.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 315-17 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Vol. 20:1, 2002
Affirmative Action
Stevens' should be clearer about what they mean.
Two other challenges contend that the schools with diverse student bodies
are not fully realizing the pedagogical possibilities this diversity creates,227 and
that students admitted on diversity grounds may suffer special burdens from
having to serve in a "representative" capacity 228-although Bowen and Bok
find that low-scoring students admitted to elite schools later express great satis-
faction with their college experiences.229 Finally, the dismaying evidence of
persistent racial self-isolation on campuses, including those with affirmative
action, also raises questions about the interracial socialization thesis. Orlando
Patterson, who supports affirmative action, ruefully concedes that "no group of
people now seems more committed to segregation than Afro-American students
and young professionals." 230 Jack Citrin, an opponent, believes that the 250-
point gap in SAT scores created "a caste system" at Berkeley:
Intellectual Balkanization with large ethnic differences in majors and grades was the
outcome of Berkeley's version of affirmative action. Underrepresented minorities
did not often major in subjects such as philosophy, mathematics and chemistry,
while they were heavily clustered in such areas as sociology and ethnic studies.
Of the Berkeley freshman admitted in fall 2000 [without affirmative action], by
contrast, 14.9 percent were members of underrepresented minority groups, but the
ethnic gap in test scores was slashed by more than one-third. The smaller number of
minority students admitted are more competitive with their peers than previously, a
necessary start to ending the academic caste system.
23 1
After carefully interrogating the diversity rationale for racial preferences,
then, one is left with serious doubts about its coherence and persuasiveness.
There is something to it, surely, but not much. Recognizing this problem, some
advocates seek to re-conceptualize diversity as something else. In philosopher
Elizabeth Anderson's view, for example, diversity is really "another way of
talking about integration," a way that can link diversity to the advocates' "core
social justice and democratic concerns. 232 In the same spirit, Robert Post sees
227. Rachel F. Moran, Diversity and its Discontents: The End of Affirmative Action at Boalt Hall,
88 CAL. L. REV. 2245, 2331-42 (2000) (large classes, focus on abstract concepts and universal princi-
ples, intense competition, and hierarchy prevent schools from capitalizing on diversity).
228. Malamud makes the point in the workplace context:
The diverse candidates must do their jobs, be role models, and teach the rest of the workforce
how the world looks from their diverse perspectives. They can never be at peace in the same
way as those whose right to be on the job is socially constructed as based on their pure indi-
vidual merit.
Supra note 9, at 1709. But as Derek Bok points out, we don't worry about this as to musicians, students
from rural areas, and other "diversity" admissions. Personal communication (Aug. 11, 2001).
229. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 80, at 193-98.
230. PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 157.
231. Citrin, supra note 154. This emphasis on differences in academic preparation, program, and
performance, however, neglects the psychological and other factors that surely contribute to this sepa-
ration.
232. Anderson, supra note 127 (manuscript at 24). Anderson imaginatively argues that diversity,
so re-conceived, can satisfy the Supreme Court's "compelling interest" and "narrowly tailored" tests for
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diversity as the seedbed of "a democratic public culture."233 But this discursive
move is really an effort to change the subject; it defends racial preferences not
as a way to enrich the experiences of students and teachers but as a remedy for
social inequalities and generalized discrimination. That the Supreme Court has
expressly and repeatedly prohibited this justification, of course, is not a conclu-
sive argument against it; the Court, after all, is notoriously fallible.234 My point,
rather, is that the diversity rationale is weak even in its own terms.
VI. THE POLITICS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
The political dynamics of affirmative action policy have been much studied
235in recent years. Like any other policy domain, the competition of interests
and ideas that swirl around it is complex, often opaque, and issue- and pro-
gram-specific. The politics of affirmative action, moreover, have evolved in the
four decades since President John F. Kennedy first mandated it. The issue be-
came particularly volatile in the mid- 1 990s when Republicans gained control of
Congress and the more individualistic jurisprudence of Reagan- and Bush-
appointed judges took hold. In this section, I very briefly sketch this tangled
history, review the evidence on public attitudes toward affirmative action, and
then seek to explain what is an intriguing political puzzle: the policy's long
survival in the face of persistent opposition by both the general public and
many leading politicians.
A. Political History
Affirmative action as a policy directive first appeared in the 1935 National
Labor Relations Act. There, Congress authorized the National Labor Relations
Board to redress an unfair labor practice by ordering the offending party to
"cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative
action . . . as will effectuate the policies of this Act.' 236 Although Congress
used this phrase to describe efforts to enforce fairness in the present, it came a
quarter-century later to refer to pro-active government programs seeking to
strict scrutiny, which she also re-conceives.
233. Robert Post, Introduction to RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 21-24 (Rob-
ert Post & Michael Rogin eds., 1998).
234. In a notorious recent example, Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997), events proved that the
majority had vastly underestimated the potential burden on the President of private litigation.
235. E.g., LEMANN, supra note 113, at 161-65, 200-11, 277-83; MCWHIRTER, supra note 152
(1996); SUNITA PARIKH, THE POLITICS OF PREFERENCE: DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA (1997); JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS: How
PUBLIC LAW DISTORTS PUBLIC POLICY (1989); COLOR LINES: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, IMMIGRATION,
AND CIVIL RIGHTS OPTIONS FOR AMERICA (John D. Skrentny ed., 2001); SKRENTNY, IRONIES, supra
note 9; JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE MINOPrIY RIGHTS REVOLUTION (forthcoming 2002) [hereinafter
MINORITY RIGHTS]; BOB ZELNICK, BACKFIRE: A REPORTER'S LOOK AT AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996).
236. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2000) (emphasis added). For another account of the origin of the term,
this in 1961, see LEMANN, supra note 113, at 162.
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remedy past discrimination. President Kennedy's Executive Order 10925 cre-
ated the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity (PCEEO)
in 1961, mandating federal contractors to "take affirmative action to ensure that
the applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employ-
ment, without regard to race, creed, color, or national origin." 237 Because of
Kennedy's well-known deference to conservative southern Democrats, his af-
firmative action programs remained voluntary and ambiguous.
Less than a year after Kennedy's death, President Lyndon B. Johnson
signed into law the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which over southern opposition es-
tablished the Equal Opportunity Commission (EEOC) under Title VII to en-
force the Act's employment provisions. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, the bill's
floor manager, argued that nothing in Title VII would allow the EEOC or any
court to order "a racial 'quota,' 238 and southern Democrats in Congress further
ensured that the Act did not codify racial preferences. Shortly after Johnson's
landslide victory, he issued Executive Order 11246 which terminated the
PCEEO and gave the Department of Labor primary responsibility for enforcing
affirmative action. The Labor Department created the Office of Federal Con-
tract Compliance (OFCC) to assure that all federal contractors took affirmative,
pre-contract steps to hire and promote more minority employees, and use more
minority-owned subcontractors. 239 Johnson invoked the anti-caste rationale for
his order: "you do not take a person who for years has been hobbled by chains
and liberate him, bring him up to the starting line of a race and then say,
'You're free to compete with others,' and still justly believe that you have been
completely fair." 240 Johnson's decision to issue his order and administer af-
firmative action programs through the new OFCC attracted little media or con-
gres'sional attention and no serious public debate, and the OFCC quickly estab-
lished a pre-award program requiring construction contractors to prove their
readiness to meet affirmative action obligations. In 1967, Johnson added
women to the list of favored groups, and in 1968 the OFCC mandated a written
affirmative action compliance program including "specific goals and timetables
for the prompt achievement of full and equal employment opportunity." In all
of this, however, Johnson emphasized recruitment efforts and development
241
programs designed to help workers in relatively low-wage jobs.
Affirmative action began to assume its contemporary form with the election
237. Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 8, 1961).
238. Euel Elliott & Andrew I.E. Ewoh, The Evolution of an Issue: The Rise and Decline of Af-
firmative Action, 17 POL'Y STUD. REV. 212, 215 (2000) (quoting Donald Altschiller, Introduction to
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 8 (Donald Altschiller ed., 1991)).
239. ALBERT G. MOSLEY & NICHOLAS CAPALDI, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: SOCIAL JUSTICE OR
UNFAIR PREFERENCE? 5 (1996).
240. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Address at Howard University Commencement (June 4, 1965),
quoted in JACOBY, supra note 3 1, at 76.
241. Elliot & Ewoh, supra note 238, at 215.
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of President Richard M. Nixon, who moved the OFCC into the business of
mandating preferences. 242 Nixon had a number of motives. Concerned about
growing urban unrest and determined to avoid the riots of the Johnson years, he
hoped that reducing the joblessness of young black men would provide an ef-
fective antidote. Public opinion about affirmative action had not yet coa-
243lesced, so Nixon believed that he had some political leeway. He also hoped
that affirmative action would become "yet another wedge to drive between
white workers and blacks in the increasingly fractious Democratic party."2"
George Shultz, Nixon's moderate Labor Secretary, revived the Philadelphia
Plan, which Johnson had devised but then abandoned as politically untenable.
Shultz's version, which sought to compel Philadelphia's segregated construc-
tion companies to hire more minority workers, was stringent; it demanded
workforce percentages that gave contractors specific target ranges.245 In Febru-
ary 1970, Shultz extended this demand to all government contractors with fifty
or more employees and at least $50,000 in government business. Labor De-
partment Order No. 4 defined affirmative action as a set of result-oriented pro-
cedures, and used the term "under-utilization." Johnson's programs had defined
"under-utilization" to mean having fewer members of a minority group actually
employed than would reasonably be expected from their availability.246 The
Order further required "specific goals and timetables," and demanded that all
contractors covered by it submit an affirmative action plan to the OFCC within
120 days.
It is highly noteworthy that this program did not cover white ethnic and re-
ligious minorities even though affirmative action policymakers knew that these
247groups too were often victims of job discrimination. In December 1971,
OFCC published new proposed rules, explaining that
members of various religious groups, primarily Jews and Catholics, and members of
certain ethnic groups, primarily of Eastern, Middle, and Southern European ances-
try, such as Italians, Greeks, and Slavic groups, continue to be excluded from ex-
ecutive, middle-management, and other job levels because of discrimination based
on their religion and/or national origin. These guidelines are intended to remedy
such unfair treatment.
24 8
John David Skrentny, a leading chronicler of the history of affirmative action,
shows that although these rules provided far less protection to these groups
242. MCWHIRTER, supra note 152, at 35.
243. HowARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS
62-63, 68 (rev. ed. 1997).
244. Thomas Sugrue, The Tangled Roots of Affirmative Action, 41 AMER. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 886,
895 (1998).
245. Nicolaus Mills, Introduction to DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note 128, at 10.
246. CAROL LEE BACCHI, THE POLITICS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 32 (1996).
247. This paragraph draws heavily on SKRENTNY, MINORITY RIGHTS, supra note 235 (manuscript
at chapter 9).
248. Quoted in SKRENTNY, MINORITY RIGHTS, supra note 235 (manuscript at 442).
Vol. 20:1, 2002
Affirmative Action
than the OFCC afforded to racial minorities, they were further weakened until
they imposed no special obligations on employers at all. A number of justifica-
tions were offered for excluding non-racial groups from affirmative action but
these arguments fail to explain the different treatment. Skrentny summarizes
this episode:
[E]thnics had everything that one would assume would be necessary to gain some
rights-oriented, equal-opportunity granting, difference-conscious policy. They had a
Washington presence. They had advocates in Congress and in the White House.
The Nixon White House wanted their votes... and some in Congress considered
them to be an economically disadvantaged group. But ethnics came late, after the
affirmative action regulations had reached their carrying capacity. Their disadvan-
tages were seen as below some perceived threshold of victimization. And unlike
blacks, Latinos and-at least until the ERA debate in the 1970s-women, ethnics
were seen in a much fuller, more multi-faceted way, without reducing them to one
identity.
249
As affirmative action expanded in scope and scale, opponents turned for
relief to the federal courts. These critics quickly suffered two decisive setbacks
in their battle against racial preferences. First, in March 1970 a federal district
judge rejected a challenge to the Philadelphia Plan. A year later, a unanimous
U.S. Supreme Court decided Griggs v. Duke Power Co., a class action chal-
lenging a promotion requirement for a high school diploma or a passing score
on a standardized intelligence test. The Court held that the 1964 Act barred
"not only overt discrimination but also processes that are fair in form, but dis-
criminatory in operation.... Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the con-
sequences of employment practices, not simply their motivation. 250 Although
the Court did not mention the phrase "affirmative action," its focus on the dis-
parate "consequences" of job requirements seemed to parallel Order No. 4's
"result-oriented procedures. ' 251 After Griggs, the Labor Department revised
Order No. 4 to include women as a part of the "affected class."
In the wake of these developments, Congress passed the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, extending the EEOC's jurisdiction to employers and
unions with more than fifteen members, and to all state, local, and federal em-
ployees. It encouraged more class actions aimed at systematic bias rather than
individual cases, and it defeated the efforts of a southern Democrat-led minor-
ity to include clear anti-affirmative action language. In 1973, Labor and an in-
vigorated EEOC successfully challenged AT&T, the nation's largest private
employer; it won a consent decree awarding $15 million in back pay to 13,000
women and 2,000 minority men and setting out new affirmative action goals.
Columbia University also acceded to the EEOC's demands to develop a coher-
ent affirmative action framework.
249. Id. at 473-74.
250. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-432 (1971) (emphasis in original).
251. Mills, supra note 245, at 12.
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The election of a Democratic president, Jimmy Carter, moved affirmative
action to new areas. In 1977, Congress approved a 10 percent minority set-
aside program under the Public Works Employment Act by large majorities,
and in 1978 Carter's Labor Department adopted the Uniform Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures, which went beyond Revised Order No. 4 to
establish an adverse impact framework and a four-fifths rule. The first invali-
dated employer practices adversely impacting women or minorities unless the
employer could demonstrate a business necessity, while the second defined
"adverse impact" as a proportional job selection rate falling below four-fifths
that of the majority group. A supplement to the Guidelines, moreover, con-
doned the use of racial preferences to remedy past discrimination.
252
At the same time, the Supreme Court began to define its own view of racial
preferences. Three rulings played a particularly important role in shaping the
legal and political climate of the affirmative action debate. Bakke, discussed
above, created doubts about racial preferences in higher education and perhaps
elsewhere as well. But a year later, in United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber,253 the Court upheld an agreement between the employer and a union to
implement a training program allocating a certain number of slots to black
workers. Justice William Brennan's majority opinion held that the program was
sufficiently voluntary and temporary to pass muster, but according to one ana-
lyst and supporter of affirmative action, resorted to "esoteric doctrines of
statutory interpretation and strained readings of legislative history" in reaching
this conclusion in the face of "the facially colorblind Title VII. ' '254 In 1980, the
Court in Fullilove v. Klutznick255 took the bolder step of upholding Congress's
10% set-aside for minority contractors. Chief Justice Burger justified the
statutory quota partly as a remedy for past discrimination, but for the most part
the majority and concurring opinions relied on a theory of congressional power
to enforce civil rights through mandated preferences.
By the 1980 presidential election, the legal status of racial preferences was
murky. Everything seemed to turn on an ambiguous distinction between a goal
and a quota, on how voluntary a program was, on the nature of its rationale, on
whether the preferences had been mandated by Congress or by federal agencies
or other levels of government, on how clear the statute's factual findings of dis-
crimination were, and so forth. After Ronald Reagan's victory, his transition
team called for a fundamental policy shift, recommending that the new presi-
dent eliminate not only quotas but all race-conscious affirmative action. Several
political factors, however, frustrated this proposal. Polling data indicated wide-
spread opposition to racial preferences, to be sure, but it also indicated strong
252. Id. at 14.
253. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
254. Malamud, supra note 9, at 1676.
255. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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support for civil rights and for special recruitment and training programs for
minorities. In addition, the Supreme Court had upheld federally-mandated pref-
erences, making opposition to them seem vaguely lawless. Reagan could repeal
the executive orders providing for affirmative action, of course, but political
calculations dictated otherwise. The business community had come to accept
some racial preferences, and government contracting preferences might win
him some additional support.
256
Reagan nevertheless launched salvos against affirmative action. He ap-
pointed the conservative William Bradford Reynolds, an avowed opponent of
racial preferences, to head the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department,
and named Clarence Thomas, another anti-affirmative action conservative, to
head the EEOC. Between 1981 and 1983, Reagan cut the EEOC and OFCC
budgets by 10% and 24%, respectively, and their staff by 12% and 34%, but his
Labor Secretary, Ray Donovan, vigorously opposed efforts to amend or rescind
Executive Order 11246. The ideologically polarized viewpoints of his advisers
and the messages from business interests favoring goals and timetables appear
to have hamstrung Reagan; after his two terms in office, the executive order
257remained intact.
Reagan's challenge to affirmative action ultimately came through his judi-
cial appointments. At the Supreme Court level, he elevated William Rehnquist
to Chief Justice and appointed Justices opposed to preferences. From 1986 to
1988, the Court continued to uphold affirmative action programs even without
proof of past discriminatory intent, 8 but 1989 saw several important changes.
In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, the Court required minority workers
who alleged disparate-impact hiring violations to show not only a racial imbal-
ance but also that a specific employment practice created the disparate im-
pact.259 In City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,26° an especially important de-
cision, the Court struck down a 30% set-aside program for minority contractors
modeled on the one approved in Fullilove, holding that affirmative action set-
aside programs are "constitutionally suspect" and cannot be upheld without a
256. In another action, oddly detached from the politics swirling around affirmative action in other
areas, Reagan supported and signed the "Dole Compromise," part of the 1982 amendments to the Vot-
ing Rights Act in which Congress, while adding language seeming to say the opposite, approved of ra-
cial gerrymandering.
257. ROBERT K. DETLEFSEN, CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER REAGAN, at 136-38 (1991). Darien McWhirter
argues that Reagan ultimately declined to make dramatic changes in the civil rights regime because "big
business likes regulations. In a survey of 128 CEOs of major corporations, 122 said they would con-
tinue some kind of 'numerical objective' program even without government regulations." MCWHIRTER,
supra note 152, at 43-44.
258. E.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (holding that subjective or
discretionary employment practices can be analyzed under the disparate impact approach); Johnson v.
Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (upholding voluntary plan benefiting women); Local 28, Sheet
Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 481-83 (1986) (approving "race-conscious af-
firmative relief' to remedy "long-standing or egregious discrimination").
259. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
260. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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finding of intentional discrimination. It also held that future state and local
government preferences would be governed by the "strict scrutiny" standard,
which demands that the program be narrowly tailored and based on a compel-
ling state interest. In a 1990 detour from its campaign against affirmative ac-
tion, the Court in Metro Broadcasting v. FCC upheld two federal programs
creating preferences in order to increase minority ownership of broadcast li-
censes. 261 But Metro Broadcasting proved to be just that, a detour, and would
be overruled five years later.
Congress reacted decisively to the Supreme Court's 1989 decisions by
passing a civil rights bill in 1990 by relatively comfortable, largely partisan
margins. Among other things, the Act would overturn Wards Cove by reducing
employees' burden in proving discrimination and establishing new remedies for
intentional workplace discrimination. President George Bush, like Reagan a
skeptic about affirmative action, vetoed the legislation because he felt that it
encouraged quotas. When Congress sustained the veto, a new round of intense
legislative negotiations commenced. It culminated in the Civil Rights Act of
1991, which closely resembled the 1990 bill. Bush threatened to veto the law,
particularly after the Labor Department revealed instances of "race norming" in
which minority test scores are compared only to those of other minorities, and
after polling showed widespread public opposition to racial preferences. When
the Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill debacle strengthened Congress' threat to over-
ride a presidential veto, Bush ultimately signed the bill.
President Clinton took office in 1993 on a platform favoring limited af-
firmative action. He had strongly condemned quotas during the campaign in an
effort to woo Reagan Democrats and to mollify a broader public that had al-
ways opposed them, convinced that racial preferences contradicted the merit
principle. When Clinton nominated Lani Guinier, whom some opponents
dubbed the "quota queen," to head the Justice Department's Office of Civil
Rights, he came under intense criticism and eventually withdrew her nomina-
tion. In the 1994 midterm elections, the Republicans won the House of Repre-
sentatives and controlled Congress for the first time since 1952. With conser-
vatives now shaping legislation and with a federal judiciary dominated by
Reagan and Bush appointees, Clinton had little room for pro-preference initia-
tives despite his control of the executive branch.262
In June 1995, the Court hurled a thunderbolt. Overruling Metro Broad-
casting, it held in Adarand Constructors v. Pena that the strict scrutiny stan-
dard applied even to federal set-aside programs and that the program under
challenge could not meet this standard.263 A month later, Clinton delivered a
major address on affirmative action at the National Archives summarizing his
261. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
262. Elliott & Ewoh, supra note 238, at 220.
263. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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administration's five-month review of federal affirmative action programs,
which had been undertaken in anticipation of Adarand. He largely defended
existing affirmative action programs, promised to "mend it [not] end it," and
said that it was too soon to eliminate this temporary measure. 264 On the heels of
this review, Clinton issued a White House memorandum that set forth new
standards for such programs but failed to eliminate any; it was widely viewed
as a reaffirmation of the status quo. 2 65 Republican-sponsored legislation to pro-
hibit federally approved racial preferences never passed. In 1996, Clinton an-
nounced new restrictions on government procurement preferences that required
specific numbers for minority contractors, while still authorizing "race-
conscious" procurement where Justice Department studies could find credible
evidence of discrimination in particular industries. By the end of Clinton's two
terms, the Adarand restrictions had reduced the number of federal contracts
flowing to minority businesses.
The major action is now on two fronts: judicial decisions and state ballot
referenda. In 1994, the Fourth Circuit invalidated a University of Maryland
266scholarship program reserved for black students, but the most uncompro-
mising court ruling came in the 1996 Hopwood decision where another appeals
court held that Bakke notwithstanding, race could not be used even as a "plus"
267factor in university admissions. More recently, two federal district judges
reached opposite conclusions on the constitutionality of the University of
Michigan's race-preferential admissions policies, which had principally relied
on a diversity rationale. 268 And in August 2001, an appeals court invalidated
the University of Georgia's system of undergraduate admissions preferences
which had also invoked that rationale.269 On the other hand, another appeals
264. Holly Idelson, Clinton Comes to Defense of Affirmative Action, 53-2 C.Q. WEEKLY REPORT
2194 (1995).
265. Evaluation of Affirmative Action Programs, Memorandum from The White House to Heads
of Executive Departments and Agencies (July 19, 1995), reprinted in DAiLY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 147,
at S-45 (Aug. 1, 1995). For an argument that Clinton could and should have pushed affirmative action
more aggressively, see Girardeau A. Spann, Writing Off Race, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 467
(2000).
266. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
267. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). Issacharoff,
who helps to defend Texas's program in court, argues that opponents of race-based admission prefer-
ences could not mount effective court challenges before then, as they lacked standing to sue unless they
could prove that they were "next in line" (i.e., that they would actually have been admitted absent the
preferences) until Northeastern Fla. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993). E-mail
from Samuel Issacharoff (Apr. 26, 2001) (on file with author). On the other hand, a similar plaintiffs
standing had been upheld in Bakke, and some other non-education, pre-Jacksonville rulings had re-
quired only that the plaintiff wish to be considered. E.g., Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989); Turner
v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
268. The undergraduate college's preference system was upheld in Gratz v. Bollinger, 135 F.
Supp. 2d 790 (E.D. Mich. 2001), while the law school's was struck down in Grutter v. Bollinger, 137
F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
269. Johnson v. Board of Regents, Nos. 00-14340 & 00-14382, 2001 WL 967756 (11 th Cir. Aug.
27, 2001).
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court has upheld the University of Washington Law School's system.27 °
Ballot initiatives are also invalidating racial preferences. Proposition 209 in
California, which passed by a 54-46 margin in 1996, banned all racial prefer-
ences in public employment and public education programs. Voters in Wash-
ington State approved a nearly identical ballot measure two years later. The
success of those referenda has galvanized anti-affirmative action groups in
other states to promote similar measures; as of April 2001, however, Washing-
ton and California remain the only two states to adopt such sweeping repeals.
During the 2000 presidential campaign, George W. Bush attempted to walk
a tightrope on affirmative action. He voiced his opposition to preferences but
declined to endorse Proposition 209. Ward Connerly, a prominent supporter of
Proposition 209, observed that Bush "drag[ged] the red herring of already-
illegal 'quotas' across his statements on affirmative action" in order to curry
271
favor with the right while not offending the left. Prominent in commentary
on the current political status of affirmative action today are metaphors of dis-
avowal and disinheritance. Richard Kahlenberg, for example, argues that "af-
firmative action is a bastard: the true fathers of liberal race policy (King, Ken-
nedy, and Moynihan) deny paternity, and the true father of affirmative action
(Nixon) was a scoundrel,, 272 while John Skrentny calls it an "orphan" adopted
enthusiastically by the Left after it was abandoned by its original parents.
273
How did race-based preferences come to be orphaned? In one sense, the
question is easy to answer: the voters oppose them. But in another sense, this
simply raises a deeper puzzle. How has a policy this unpopular managed to
survive politically for four decades? The next two sections explore both mat-
ters.
B. Public Attitudes
Affirmative action has never had much public support,2 74 "with little evi-
dence of change over time. 275 The vast majority of Americans, including more
than a third of blacks and more than 70% of Hispanics, oppose racial prefer-
ences in hiring and promotion, with the level of this opposition rising some-
270. Smith v. Univ. of wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000).
271. Quoted in Bushwhacked?, 11 AMER. ENTERPRISE 8 (2000).
272. Cited in Malamud, supra note 9, at 1696.
273. SKRENTNY, IRONIES, supra note 9, at 242.
274. SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 243, at 182. These authors report that, depending on question
phrasing, "support has ranged from at most a third of the white public down to just a few percentage
points." See also BENJAMIN PAGE & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, THE RATIONAL PUBLIC: FIFTY YEARS OF
TRENDS tN AMERICANS' POLICY PREFERENCES 74 (1992) (public opinion stable over time).
275. SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 243, at 182; accord Charlotte Steeth & Maria Krysan, Affinna-
tive Action and the Public, 1970-1995, 60 PUB. OPIN. QTRLY. 128, 132 (1996) (decline in support
during mid-1990s) ("Attitudes about affirmative action policies for which we have continuous data
have not shifted dramatically for whites since 1965, and, even among African Americans, they remain




what over time. Interestingly, the percentage of black high school dropouts
who strongly oppose it was three times higher than among black college gradu-
ates. 2 7 7 This may reflect lower-class blacks' resentment about a policy that
seems to favor the middle class. This differential may also support the view that
middle-class blacks are more conscious of discrimination and angrier toward
whites than lower-class blacks are, in part because the former interact more
frequently with whites.278 When the issue is college admissions preferences, the
opposition is substantial even among blacks and other minorities.
279
A leading study of public attitudes toward affirmative action finds, consis-
tent with other studies, that "the most fundamental factor behind opposition toS•,,,280
affirmative action is one of principle. That is, the opponents view prefer-
ences, rightly or wrongly, as inconsistent with the ideals of individualism and
merit that almost all strongly endorse. Indeed, even affirmative action support-
ers feel obliged to honor, affirm, and somehow reconcile these principles with
their program-usually by blaming racism and suggesting that the merit and
equality of opportunity values can only be achieved through preferences.2 8' Re-
searchers on public attitudes toward affirmative action understand that the
phraseology of the question asked, as well as other contextual factors, can af-
fect survey results and that multiple interpretations of the data are possible.
282
More specifically, widespread agreement exists on the value of diversity in
276. Citrin, supra note 135, at 43-44 (reviewing American National Election Studies). Citrin cau-
tions against using data on Hispanic and Asian opinions due to the small number sampled in most sur-
veys. Id. at 43 n.2.
277. See Virginia Shapiro et al., National Election Studies, 1998 & 2000 [datasets]. Ann Arbor,
MI: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies [producer and distributor], 2001 at
http://www.umich.edu/-nes; Katherine Tate, National Black Election Study, 1996 [Computer file].
ICPSR version. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University [producer], 1997. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1998, Table 4b. See also
PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 149-52 (noting greater support for hiring preferences among black
women).
278. E.g., PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 51-52. There is a growing literature about middle-class
black rage. E.g., ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (1993); JOE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P.
SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK MIDDLE CLASS EXPERIENCE (1994); LAWRENCE OTIS
GRAHAM, MEMBER OF THE CLUB: REFLECTIONS ON LIFE IN A RACIALLY POLARIZED WORLD (1995);
MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON
RACIAL INEQUALITY (1995); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A
LAW PROFESSOR (199 1).
279. Shikha Dalmia & Henry Payne, Blacks Against Racial Preferences, REASON ONLINE, Dec. 3,
2001, at http://reason.com/hod/sdl20301.shtml (reporting recent studies).
280. SNIDERMAN & CARMINES, supra note 76, at 145.
281. Id. Not all researchers agree with this interpretation. E.g., David 0. Sears, Symbolic Racism,
in ELIMINATING RACISM: PROFILES IN CONTROVERSY, PERSPECTIVES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 53 (P.
Katz & D. Taylor eds., 1988) (emphasizing symbolic racism); Lawrence D. Bobo, Race, Interests, and
Beliefs About Affirmative Action: Unanswered Questions and New Directions, in COLOR LINES 91, su-
pra note 235 (emphasizing interest group conflict).
282. For thorough reviews of the methodological issues, see SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 243, at
58-98, and DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS AND
DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 163-195 (1996).
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school classrooms, but support for affirmative action declines the more the
question characterizes the remedy as "hard" (mandatory; explicit preferences;
numbers) rather than "soft" (voluntary; focused on enhancing opportunity en-
hancement, as with greater outreach or job training; confined to tie-breaking),
and the more it describes the rationale as redistribution or representation rather
than fairness or equal opportunity. For this reason, it is hard to know the precise
division of opinion. No researcher in this field doubts, however, that the pub-
284lic's opinion remains decidedly and intensely negative, pretty much regard-
less of how the questions are formulated, the state of the economy, or personal
285financial conditions. Indeed, simply mentioning affirmative action generates
286much less favorable responses to a range of other questions related to blacks.
Finally, politicians, who have a feel for these things, have long assumed that
the electorate staunchly opposes race-conscious programs.287
Public opinion researchers appreciate that the interpretation of survey re-
sults is as much art as science. Seymour Martin Lipset, for example, maintains
that most Americans hold both egalitarian and individualist values and that the
questions asked in polls draw more on the individualist strain;288 indeed, even
limited affirmative action can arouse intense opposition in societies more
289egalitarian than the United States. Analysts also recognize that the results
might be skewed by "social desirability" and "presentational" pressures caused
by respondents' concerns about appearing racist to the interviewer, and that
opposition to affirmative action might actually be even greater than the respon-
dent's answers would suggest on their face. Attempts to reduce this possible
distortion have focused on devising "unobtrusive" measures designed to un-
cover respondents' true feelings about affirmative action without requiring
them to reveal them to the interviewer, who remains blind to the respondents'
290racial views. Using unobtrusive measures, researchers find that three out of
283. Bowen and Bok found that less than half of whites who graduated from the elite schools fa-
vored placing "a great deal of emphasis on diversity" in admissions. Supra note 80, at 248.
284. Nor is the simple "angry white male" story a credible explanation for this opposition. E.g.,
SNIDERMAN & CARMNES, supra note 76, at 144-45 ("[Y]ounger men are less, not more, likely than
older men to oppose it, and women are overwhelmingly opposed to it as well. Opposition to affirmative
action is one-sided, intense, and remarkably invariant over time."); Gilens et al., supra note 76. Oddly,
Orlando Patterson seems to endorse this hypothesis even while emphasizing, correctly, that only 7% of
whites claim to have been personally injured in any way by affirmative action. Supra note 3, at 64.
Most uncharacteristically, Patterson here joins other affirmative action proponents in retreating to re-
ductionist explanations of complex phenomena.
285. SNIDERMAN & CARMINES, supra note 76, at 40-45; Sam Howe Verhovek, In Poll, Americans
Reject Means but not Ends of Racial Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1997, at Al.
286. PAUL SNIDERMAN & THOMAS PIAzzA, THE SCAR OF RACE 102-03 (1993).
287. Steeth & Krysan, supra note 275, at 128.
288. Seymour Martin Lipset, Equal Chances Versus Equal Results, 523 ANNALS OF AMER. ACAD.
OF POL. & SOC. Sci. 63 (1992). Steeth and Krysan report that when programs and their rationales are
defined more specifically, opinion is much more moderate. Supra note 275, at 140.
289. E.g., Suzanne Daley, Elite French College Tackles Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, May 4,
2001, at A4 (uproar and court challenge to program in elite Science Po).
290. For a detailed description of this method, see Gilens et al., supra note 76, at 163-67.
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four whites oppose reserving certain job openings for blacks, that almost two
out of five oppose giving qualified blacks preference in college admissions, and
that their opposition is intensely felt.
291
What is most interesting and surprising about these analyses, however, is
who opposes the preferences. When the researchers use the unobtrusive meas-
ures to control for presentation pressures, they find that "opposition to, and an-
ger over, affirmative action is pervasive among the white public and is just as
strong among whites on the political left as among those on the political
right"'-the former being the ones that have the most positive views of blacks
and the firmest commitment to racial equality. 292 Here are the conclusions of a
recent study by political scientists Paul Sniderman and Edward Carmines,
which employs a variety of survey-based experiments in order to tease out pub-
lic attitudes in a more nuanced way:
(1) The role of racial prejudice in promoting opposition to affirmative action is mi-
nor. (2) Rather than opposition to affirmative action signaling a refusal to acknowl-
edge the discrimination and exploitation that black Americans have suffered, a sub-
stantial majority of white Americans believe that an extra effort should be make to
see that blacks are treated fairly. (3) Opposition to affirmative action is not peculiar
to Americans. (4) Opposition to affirmative action does not hinge on the race of the
group who benefits but rather on whether the procedures involved are judged to be
fair. (5) In addition to dislike of blacks leading to dislike of affirmative action, dis-
like of affirmative action fosters dislike of blacks. (6) Opposition to and resentment
over affirmative action has burst conventional political channels-it is now as
prevalent on the left, amon, liberals and Democrats, as on the right, among conser-
vatives and Republicans.
29
The large size of racial preferences in certain domains, coupled with their
clear offense to principles in which the public fervently believes, means that
Americans in varying degrees-blacks and whites, liberals and conservatives,
men and women, rich and poor-regard affirmative action's methods to be not
merely misguided but morally wrong. Indeed, if the public knew how large af-
firmative action preferences in selective college admissions and some other ar-
eas actually are, opposition would probably be even more intense than it is.
This is bound to taint the diversity, real and spurious, that preferences produce
and to discredit the larger liberal project. 294 The value that Americans ascribe to
diversity surely depends, among other things, on how they evaluate the process
and criteria that produced it.
C. Affirmative Action's Political Survival
If public attitudes dictated policy outcomes in some straightforward fash-
291. Id. at 167.
292. Id. at 163; see also id. at 161.
293. SNIDERMAN & CARMINES, supra note 76, at 17-18.
294. Id. at 141-55.
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ion, race-based preferences would not have been adopted initially, much less
survived for four decades. How, then, can we account for their survival and
even, in many communities, their expansion?29 5 Twenty-five years after Nathan
Glazer first posed this question,296 there still is no simple answer.
Even in a robust democracy, of course, policy outcomes can diverge from
public opinion. The reasons for this divergence can transcend the specifics of
affirmative action politics. Interest groups intermediate in complex ways be-
tween a diffuse public and specific policy outcomes. Strong political leaders
can re-orient opinion or gain some leeway or independence from it.297 Judicial
decisions govern certain issues on the basis of constitutional or other legal
norms that may trump political ones. Implementation may transform a policy
into something quite different than what the politicians approved. Once in
place, policies enjoy political inertia that only sustained political efforts by
well-organized, highly-focused groups can overcome.
Even when we move from these general propositions to the specifics of af-
firmative action, its long survival remains something of a puzzle, albeit one to
which the political history recounted earlier provides helpful clues. First, af-
firmative action's early development was relatively invisible, resulting less
from minority group lobbying than from bureaucratic resourcefulness, espe-
cially by the EEOC. Stephen Steinberg, a strong affirmative action supporter,
concedes that it "was never formulated as a coherent policy, but evolved
through a series of presidential executive orders, administrative policies, and
court decisions. ' 298 Few public opinion polls on the issue were conducted until
the late 1970s when the Bakke decision gave the issue greater notoriety.
Affirmative action's enforcement strategy, its selection of favored groups,
and its emphasis on a kind of proportional representation in the workforce were
driven largely by an obscure form (Form 40, later EEO-]) originally designed
merely to gauge the racial composition of employers' workforces. 299 By the
time public opinion had hardened against it, the policy was sufficiently en-
trenched that the political cost of eliminating it daunted even strong opponents
like Reagan. In this account, its survival is a story of obscurity followed by in-
ertia.3 ° °
295. JACOBY, supra note 31, at 432-462 (expansion of Atlanta's set-asides before and after
Croson).
296. NATHAN GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION (1975).
297. LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO, POLITICIANS DON'T PANDER: POLITICAL
MANIPULATION AND THE Loss OF DEMOCRATIC RESPONSIVENESS (2000) (politicians taking more devi-
ant policy positions, using it to craft strategies for re-shaping public opinion).
298. STEPHEN STEINBERG, TURNING BACK: THE RETREAT FROM RACIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICAN
THOUGHT AND POLICY 165 (1995), quoted in Hollinger, supra note 10, at 99; see also SKRENTNY,
IRONIES, supra note 9, at 127-44; LEMANN, supra note 113, at 164.
299. SKRENTNY, IRONIES, supra note 9, at 127-28.
300. For variations on this theme, see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Reshaping Remedial Meas-
ures: The Importance of Political Deliberation and Race-Conscious Redistricting: Public Delibera-
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Discussions of affirmative action during the 1960s and early 1970s, moreo-
ver, commonly viewed it as a more or less logical or natural extension of mor-
ally and politically compelling non-discrimination laws protecting blacks. Sim-
ple morality entitled blacks to special solicitude and assistance, and goals and
timetables seemed like a limited, appropriate remedy. 301 Only later did these
soft measures ossify into programs resembling hard quotas. Initially, black
groups had urged the EEOC to enforce non-discrimination rules more effec-
tively rather than pressing the agency to count a workforce's minority group
members. Although no group made race-conscious hiring a priority, the EEOC
devised such a remedy based on numbers it had collected on its EEO-l form.
Nor was it clear in affirmative action's early years that it would expand to
cover groups other than American blacks. The EEOC began by focusing on
them almost entirely, devoting relatively few resources to other minorities and
almost none to women. Indeed, according to Skrentny, the agency viewed
women's rights "as a distraction at best,, 30 2 did not include them in the gov-
ernment's programs until the 1980s, and periodically dropped Asian-Americans
from the list of favored groups. 30 3 It was mainly elected officials, pursuing the
political logic of coalition-building and group mobilization in quest of new
voter blocs, who pushed to add more groups, as when President Nixon added
Latinos to his employment and minority capitalism programs. 304 The supply of
preferences created a demand to expand the programs.
30
5
The regulations, moreover, defined these new groups casually and very
broadly, thus concealing large intra-group variations. The black group includes
individuals from families who migrated to the United States more than a cen-
tury after slavery ended. The Asian group, which is more highly educated on
average than almost any white ethnicity, includes individuals whose families
come from 25 different countries spread over 6000 miles and who have little in
common with those from other Asian nations. The only commonality of the
large Hispanic group, most of whom consider themselves white, is an ancestral
language. The Native American category is muddied by very high rates of in-
termarriage; it also combines hundreds of tribal groups with highly disparate
cultures and languages. Indeed, the incoherence of affirmative action's catego-
ries so attenuates the moral basis of many claims for special treatment that it
may doom the policy legally if not politically.
30 6
tion, Affirmative Action, and the Supreme Court, 84 CALIF. L. REV 1179, 1192 (1996); Drew S. Days
111, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453 (1987); MCWHIRTER, supra note 152, at 30 ("stealth policy").
301. E.g., Charles Fried, Uneasy Preferences. Affirmative Action, in Retrospect, AM. PROSPECT,
September-October, 1998, at 51.
302. E-mail from John Skrentny (Nov. 4, 2001) (on file with author).
303. Hugh Davis Graham, Affirmative Action for Immigrants?, in COLOR LINES, supra note 235, at
62.
304. SKRENTNY, IRONIES, supra note 235, at 231-45.
305. Citrin, supra note 135, at 47 (citing Martin Weiner).
306. John D. Skrentny, Inventing Race, PUB. INTEREST 97, 111-12 (Winter 2002).
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Accounts of affirmative action's survival based on its initial lack of trans-
parency and its largely incremental and bureaucratic growth are certainly plau-
sible, but they can take us only so far. At some point, particularly after the 1978
Bakke decision, the earlier veil lifted. This alerted the public to how the policy
had evolved and expanded, and informed politicians of voters' opposition to it.
Why did the politicians not turn decisively against it at that point? More expla-
nation is needed. Interest group politics, analyzed in the light of public choice
theory, provides additional insights. Affirmative action may be a classic case of
what James Q. Wilson called clientist politics, in which a policy's benefits are
concentrated on a relatively small but intense group while its costs are spread
among a much larger but more diffuse, hard-to-organize group for which the
issue is less salient.30 7 We saw that the number of white workers, college appli-
cants, and others potentially disadvantaged by affirmative action is large, but
that relatively few report actual disadvantage, perhaps because the statistical
probability of such disadvantage to an individual white is quite small. (As we
shall also see, this statistical result is less true of Asians, which may make them
a more potent source of future opposition.308)
Powerful political interests have indeed supported affirmative action. Ac-
cording to Lemann, "[t]he new meritocratic elite didn't resist affirmative action
at all-in fact it voluntarily established affirmative action in every institution
under its control. 30 9 In time, liberal advocates for minority groups placed it
high on their policy agendas. As Orlando Patterson explains, black perceptions
of white racism are probably heightened (and distorted) by the proportion of the
two groups in the population, which increases the policy's salience to blacks.
The status quo has been sustained by strong support by ethnic organizations,
national media, leading educational institutions, large corporations, government
bureaucracies, 310 mainstream foundations, 31 and other opinion leaders. It has
been further fortified by the growing acquiescence (and in the districting area,
connivance) 312 of national Republican politicians and the inertial advantages of
307. PETER H. SCHUCK, THE LIMITS OF LAW: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, 91-138
(2000) (reviewing THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (James Q. Wilson, ed., 1980)); see also Citrin, supra
note 135, at 48 ("In the American political system, policies that distribute important material and psy-
chological benefits to intense, restricted constituencies can survive and flourish despite the opposition
of a majority of voters. The story of affirmative action fits this pattern.").
308. Infra paragraph accompanying note 350.
309. LEMANN, supra note 113, at 165.
310. Even the conservative George W. Bush administration is defending a federal affirmative ac-
tion program that the Supreme Court invalidated earlier as unconstitutional. Brief of Respondents Nor-
man Mineta, Secretary of Transportation, et al., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta, 121 S. Ct. 1401
(2001) (grant of certiorari), available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme-court/briefs/00-730/
2000-0730.mer.aa.pdf (accessed Oct. 14, 2001). The Supreme Court subsequently dismissed the writ of
certiorari as improvidently granted. 2001 WL 1488214 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2001) (per curiam).
311. E.g., Jodi Wilgoren, Michigan: Diversity Grant for University, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2001, at
Al 2 (Ford Foundation grants $600,000 to University of Michigan to finance research to support its de-
fense of affirmative action in the courts).




Large corporations' strong support for affirmative action might seem
counter-intuitive. After all, employers must bear most of the direct compliance
costs, and affirmative action often places them between contending employees
in an awkward damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don't position. Nevertheless,
some large companies support affirmative action even in non-business set-
tings. 313 Their leaders emphasize the benefits of ethno-racial diversity in a
314global market, and the programs are promoted by powerful internal and ex-
ternal constituencies, including some customers. 315 The programs also tend to
advantage large companies by imposing onerous reporting, staffing, and other
compliance costs on smaller competitors who cannot bear them as easily.
316
Firms also see affirmative action as a safe harbor sheltering them from Title VII
claims, helping them to "keep the peace" and avoid adverse publicity. Absent
allowable preferences, these claims would come not only from black workers,
but also from the vastly larger number of white workers who might allege re-,. • • .- 317
verse discrimination. In a notoriously uncertain system, firms favor almost
anything, even regulations, that can clarify their legal duties.
318
All of these corporate interests, taken together, surely help to explain the
failure of President Reagan and the first President Bush to move vigorously
against affirmative action---except through judicial appointments--despite nu-
merous opportunities to do So. 319 (Johnson, Nixon, Carter, and Clinton, we
have seen, supported it in varying degrees.) Today, most Republican politi-
cians, with their eyes on Hispanic and Asian voters (and money), are unwilling
to rock the affirmative action boat and risk being pilloried as racist or insensi-
320tive to minority interests. It is hardly surprising, then, that the battles against
E.g., Hanley, supra note 41.
313. A number of Fortune 500 firms have filed amicus briefs defending the programs in the pend-
ing University of Michigan cases. Jim Sleeper notes that Boeing, Microsoft, and other corporate giants
were the major defenders of preferences in Washington State's 1998 referendum, "a fact that made
some on the left wonder whether the color-coding of American identity is really so 'progressive' after
all, and some on the right to wonder whether private-sector bureaucrats can be just as stultifying as
public ones." Jim Sleeper, Yankee Doodle Dandy, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 2000 (reviewing NORMAN
PODHORETZ, MY LOVE AFFAIR WITH AMERICA (2000)).
314. E.g., BOWEN& BOK, supra note 80, at 11-13.
315. E.g., Nelson Lund, Reforming Affirmative Action in Employment: How to Restore the Law of
Equal Treatment, The Heritage Foundation Committee Brief No. 17, at 8 (1995).
316. Similar reasons may have motivated Philip Morris to advocate federal regulation of tobacco.
Gordon Fairclough, Philip Morris Pushes for FDA Tobacco Regulation, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2001, at
A2. In addition, the settlement of state suits over tobacco has created significant barriers to new compe-
tition over both price and safer cigarettes.
317. E.g., FREDERICK R. LYNCH, THE DIVERSITY MACHINE: THE DRIVE TO CHANGE THE "WHITE
MALE WORKPLACE" (1997); cf David E. Bemstein, Color Bind, REASON, at 69 (May 1996).
318. MCWHIRTER, supra note 152, at 14.
319. E.g., John D. Skrentny, Republican Efforts to End Affirmative Action: Walking a Fine Line,
in THE NEW POLITICS OF PUBLIC POLICY (Marc Landy et al. eds., 2001); see also DETLEFSEN, supra
note 257; LEMANN, supra note 113, at 278-79; MCWHIRTER, supra note 152, at 43-44.
320. Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary
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affirmative action (and bilingual education) in California and elsewhere have
been spearheaded primarily by private political entrepreneurs in ballot refer-
enda, not by elected politicians.
A final explanation of affirmative action's political survival transcends the
interests of particular groups and politicians and is undoubtedly important.
Many who might otherwise oppose preferences simply do not see any viable
alternative. Advocates of preferences have skillfully exploited a deep reservoir
of elite guilt about past discrimination. Many who might otherwise oppose
them do not see any viable alternative, and others see them as "easier than the
slow acculturation that would naturally prepare blacks to compete at school and
on the job. 321 Charles Fried notes this dilemma: "[w]ithout preferences, the
elite institutions of this country might rapidly be stripped of much of their Afri-
can-American presence ... [and] a society that is segmented by race, with all
the best jobs, places, honors, and titles going to whites (and Asian Americans)
is simply not an integrated society, whatever the reason for the segregation. It is
two societies, separated by race., 322 As we saw, this concern is especially acute
at the elite schools where the credentials gap makes the re-segregation scenario
seem quite plausible. 323 This issue is discussed further in Part VIII.
VII. THE CONSEQUENCES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
I have considered some of affirmative action's consequences, such as the
increase in black representation at selective undergraduate, graduate, and pro-
fessional institutions; the entry of their graduates into the black middle class;
and the public's views on race issues. But these hardly exhaust the conse-
quences; three others remain to be discussed: the rate of black progress, the
distribution of affirmative action's benefits, and the incidence and distribution
of its costs.
A. Rate of Black Progress
The improvement in American blacks' social and economic conditions has
been, in Orlando Patterson's words, "nothing short of astonishing" in almost
every respect. 324 The relevant question for present purposes is: how much of
this progress is due to affirmative action? Since affirmative action in some do-
mains has been in place as a national policy for more than three decades, this is
Analysis, 50 DuKE L.J. 1169, 1203-05 (2001); Skrentny, supra note 319. Indeed, President George W.
Bush has given preference advocates the government's support in defending an affirmative action pro-
gram the Supreme Court had held unconstitutional. Supra note 310.
321. JACOBY, supra note 31, at 541.
322. Fried, supra note 301, at 55.
323. See discussion supra at text accompanying notes 80-97.
324. PATrERSON, supra note 3, at 15. The major exception is the illegitimate birth rate, especially
to teenagers. Id. at 35-38. The teenage birth rate has declined slightly in recent years. Id. at 36.
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a difficult question to answer. Two ways to approach it is to compare the tra-
jectory of black progress before and after the policy was established, and to
analyze the backgrounds of those who benefited from it in order to draw infer-
ences about whether and to what extent they would have improved their posi-
tions without preferences. Both methods produce interesting but uncertain re-
sults.
Affirmative action, we saw, has unquestionably had a large effect on the
number of blacks admitted to selective institutions. The evidence is murkier in
the employment area. Economists John Donohue and James Heckman sought
to discover how much of blacks' economic gains since 1940 were due to fed-
eral civil rights policy and enforcement under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
particularly Title VII barring employment discrimination. They concluded that
this federal activity was "the major contributor to the sustained improvement in
black economic status that began in 1965," while noting the difficulty of con-
trolling for important contemporaneous developments such as black migration
to the north, selective attrition of older, less skilled blacks from the work force,
improvements in black education, the rise in wages resulting from Vietnam
War-related shortages, and underlying attitudinal changes among whites.325 A
recent study, using outcome variation among states passing anti-discrimination
laws instead of the time series methodology employed by Donohue and Heck-
man, finds smaller positive effects on blacks than they did; moreover, almost all
326of the gain was by black females. Some studies, comparing outcomes before• 327
and after Title VII, have found negative effects on blacks•.
An even greater challenge is to distinguish between gains attributable
merely to non-discrimination and those attributable instead to affirmative action
preferences. 328 In the South, where Donohue and Heckman found the major
gains, non-discrimination presumably was the major enforcement thrust; reme-
dies taking the form of numerical preferences were often upheld, but only to.. - - . 329
rectify specific instances of past discrimination. Another economic analyst
finds that affirmative action has not improved the employment prospects for the
most disadvantaged blacks but has instead redistributed black workers from
small and medium-sized firms to large employers and federal contractors most
aware of legal requirements, without increasing black employment rates over-
325. John J. Donohue m & James Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of
Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1603 (1991).
326. Neumark & Stock, supra note 19.
327. E.g., James P. Smith & Finis R. Welch, Black Economic Progress After Myrdal, 27 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 519 (1989) (black-white wage gap closed more rapidly before than after affirmative ac-
tion); THOMAS SOWELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALITY? (1984) (similar).
328. On the need to distinguish the contributions of non-discrimination and affirmative action, see
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS
245-62 (1992).
329. E.g., Schnapper, supra note 19 (classifying remedies cases).
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all. 330 The econometric studies of affirmative action find modest gains for fa-
vored groups in employment, government contracting, education, and entrepre-
neurship, with inconclusive evidence on efficiency effects.331 Again, however,
it may be impossible to disentangle the effects of non-discrimination and af-
firmative action policies.
B. Distribution of Benefits In and Outside the Favored Group
If we wish to know whom affirmative action directly benefits, we must first
disaggregate the broad favored group (e.g., blacks, Hispanics) in order to de-
termine which of its members are helped by the program. Disaggregation is es-
pecially necessary with respect to affirmative action. First, even its proponents
concede that only a very small fraction of the group can hope to take advantage
of it. This is most obvious with selective college admissions and FCC broadcast
licenses, discussed immediately below, but it is bound to be true as well for
employment that requires special job skills or a certain level of education. Sec-
ond, affirmative action effects a redistribution of opportunity and status within
the favored group; as discussed below, the program's mere existence makes
some members worse off-particularly those who, rightly or wrongly, are stig-
matized as needing special help when in fact they do not need it and can qualify
under conventional race-neutral standards. Again, the Bowen-Bok study shows
that affirmative action in admission to selective colleges and universities
332largely benefits students from middle- and upper-class families. This is
hardly surprising, as these students are best equipped to apply to such competi-
tive and costly schools. This pre-college advantage is then multiplied when
these students, now graduates of the selective schools, go on to apply to selec-
tive professional and graduate programs and then proceed with their careers. As
we saw, most of them graduate from these programs and do well, but a dispro-i- • 333
portionate number (at least in law) do not gain entry to the profession.
The skewed distribution of benefits from FCC licensing is even more dra-
matic, as they are enjoyed by a handful of black entrepreneurs who are already
sufficiently successful to be able to meet the complex bidding and licensing
standards. Indeed, the black bidders or licensees are sometimes little more than
fronts for white business interests seeking to exploit the economic value of af-
firmative action preferences. 334 Similar abuses have been documented in pref-
330. FARRELL BLOCH, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND MINORITY EMPLOYMENT (1994). Like
Donohue and Heckman, supra note 325, Bloch emphasizes that because existing employees are much
more likely to file civil rights complaints than people applying for jobs in the first instance, employers
have an incentive to avoid hiring potentially litigious minorities. BLOCH, supra, at 88-116.
331. Harry Holzer & David Neumark, Assessing Affirmative Action, 38 J. ECON. LIT. 483, 558-59
(2000) (summarizing literature).
332. See discussion supra at text accompanying note 150.
333. See discussion supra at text accompanying note 93.
334. E.g., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION: 8(A) IS VULNERABLE TO
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erences applying to tens of billions of dollars in federal, state, and local gov-
ernment contracts, 335 and to additional billions intended for minority-owned
small businesses under the scandal-ridden Section 8(a) and other set-aside pro-336
grams. Such programs are designed to help a relatively small number of peo-
ple who can only take advantage of them if they are already fairly sophisticated
and well-connected.337
A preference program, moreover, is a zero-sum game in two senses. It not
only pits favored groups against nonfavored groups as they compete for a fixed
set of resources or advantages-a competition that foments complaints of re-
verse discrimination-but it also pits each favored group against the other fa-
vored groups. Blacks' success in gaining a preference is at the expense, not
only of whites, but also of Hispanics, Asians, and other preference-eligible
groups-and vice-versa. This intergroup competition is most notorious in
338higher education and contract preference programs. Such rivalries exacerbate
the already-tense conflict over politically-distributed, racially-defined spoils.
339
Racial preferences' skewed benefits can also be seen in officially-
sanctioned or officially-required racial gerrymandering of legislative districts
that seeks to benefit blacks. Political analysts have long disagreed over whether
this form of affirmative action helps black voters by packing them into a small
number of majority-minority districts where they can easily elect black repre-
sentatives, or whether their interests would be better served as a substantive
matter by line-drawing that leaves them as a significant minority in a larger
number of white-majority districts. Those who favor this latter approach find
growing empirical support in studies showing that the majority-minority dis-
tricts benefit the few black politicians who occupy or aspire to the safe seats
PROGRAM & CONTRACTOR ABUSE (1995); Edmund L. Andrews & Geraldine Fabrikant, The Black En-
trepreneur at a Firestorm's Center, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1995, at D1 (tax benefits for sales of cable
properties to minority-owned company received by a company with significant nonminority invest-
ment); Paul M. Barrett, Foes of Affirmative Action Target SBA 's 8(a) Program, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18,
1996, at B2; see also Ian Ayres, Symposium on Affirmative Action: Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L.
REv. 1781, 1823 n.113 (1996) (minority-owned broadcasters hired higher proportions of minority
workers than non-minority ones; however, he found little information on this trend in other fields).
335. E.g., Cho, supra note 31 (preferences for female-owned construction and engineering firms).
336. E.g., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, supra note 334; Barrett, supra note 334; Steven A. Holmes,
What Is a Minority-Owned Business?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1999, at C4 (efforts to expand definition);
Dirk Johnson, Chicago Minority Program Aids Firm Run by White Men, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2000, at
A15; Jane Larson, Woes Plague Program for Minorities, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 20, 1997, at Dl.
337. But see MARiA E. ENCHAUTEGUI ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, DO MINORITY-OWNED
BUSINESSES GET A FAIR SHARE OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS? (December 1997), available at
http://www.urban.org/civil/civill .htm (reviewing post-Croson "disparity studies" and finding large dis-
parity, especially absent affirmative action programs, between share of minority-owned firms and share
of contracts received-but not testing for discrimination).
338. E.g., Cho, supra note 31 (contracts to female-headed firms send "alarm bells ringing in many
minority business communities").
339. Mary Anne Case's analogy of ethno-racial preferences to the free exercise of religion, criti-
cized above, also founders on her failure to recognize that the former are zero-sum and the latter is not.
Case, supra note 222, at 329.
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they yield, but not their black constituents who would be better represented
substantively by representatives, white or black, in districts where black voters
constitute a significant minority.340 Indeed, many analysts hold the majority-
minority strategy partly responsible for the unseating of a large number of lib-
eral Democratic members of the House by conservative Republicans in 1994.34
Another example of the conflict of interest between the few black politicians
(and others) who benefit from policies concentrating blacks geographically oc-
curs in affirmative action remedies that have the effect of keeping blacks in
their isolated neighborhoods rather than moving them to better, hopefully more
342
integrated ones.
This problem-the narrowness and relative affluence of those within the
broader preferred group who actually benefit from the preferences-is probably
endemic to all affirmative action programs rather than being confined to
American ones. Will Kymlicka, a Canadian proponent of preferences there
(and in the United States), reports that the same is true of Canada's pro-
grams.343 Studies of preferences in other countries, including less-developed
ones like India that target the most disadvantaged groups, find much the same
thing.344 Again, this is predictable; the supply of preference slots and the quali-
ties needed to gain access to and use them are in very limited supply relative to
demand.
C. Incidence and Distribution of Costs
I have been discussing affirmative action's beneficiaries. I now ask what
are its costs, and who bears them? This is a much more difficult question to an-
swer than on the benefits side. There is, first, a conceptual and normative diffi-
culty. Consider those applicants-the "losers"--who would have been hired or
340. E.g., CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE REPRESENTATION OF
AFRICAN-AMERICANS IN CONGRESS (1993); Charles Cameron et al., Do Majority-Minority Districts
Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 794 (1996); Bernard
Grofinan et al., Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some Empirical
Evidence, 79 N. CAR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2001). Indeed, as white voters increasingly support moder-
ate black candidates, such candidates are also being elected from majority-white districts. E.g., David
Grann, Close Races, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 9, 1998, at 11; Robert Hanley, Expert Backs New Districts
as Unbiased, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2001, at B5 (giving examples); Fred Siegel, Fair Philly, NEW
REPUBLIC, Nov. 1, 1999, at 13. For a contrary view, see, for example, Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and Re-
demption: Voting Rights at the Turn of the Century, 50 VAND. L. REV. 291 (1997).
341. DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION: RACIAL GERRYMANDERING AND
MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS (1997).
342. SCHUCK, supra note 6.
343. E.g., WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR: NATIONALISM, MULTICULTURALISM,
AND CITIZENSHIP 198 (2000).
344. E.g., MARC GALANTER, COMPETING EQUALITIES: LAW AND THE BACKWARD CLASSES IN
INDIA (1984); THOMAS SOWELL, PREFERENTIAL POLICIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1990);
MYRON WEINER, SONS OF THE SOIL: MIGRATION AND ETHNIC CONFLICT IN INDIA (1978); Sunita




admitted on the merits (however defined), but who are not hired or admitted
because of preferences given to others. Should (and do) the losers think of
themselves as members of a demographic group and assess their loss in terms
of that group's changed probability of admission, or should (and do) they view
themselves as individuals and assess their loss accordingly?
In thinking about these questions, two empirical factors might seem to sup-
port the argument for affirmative action. First, only 7% of whites surveyed in
1990 claimed to have experienced any form of reverse discrimination them-
selves, 16% knew of someone close who had, and fewer than 25% said it was
something they had witnessed or heard about in their workplaces.345 Some
analysts, however, attribute the low complaint rate of whites to the policy's in-
formality, their reluctance (common to other discrimination victims346) to get
embroiled with the law, and a dose of "you can't fight City Hall" fatalism.
347
Second, affirmative action only slightly reduces the ex ante statistical group
probability of elite school admission of whites: eliminating it would increase
their probability only from 25% to 26.5%.348 This increase is so small, of
course, because the white applicants and admittees vastly outnumber the black
ones. Affirmative action advocates correctly argue that when the program is
viewed in this ex ante, probabilistic, group-centered way, whites suffer a trivial
reduction in its chance of admission so that blacks can more than triple both
their ex ante group chance of admission and their representation on campus.349
Whites might still argue, of course, that this reduction is unfair to them because
at the margin and thus for some, it means the difference between admission and
rejection. But from the ex ante group perspective, no white can properly claim
an individual expectation of admission, much less a right to it, since the indi-
viduals who lose slots as a result of the preferences will never know whether
they would otherwise have been admitted. Given the loser's anonymity, the
most that any one of them can claim is that absent affirmative action, more
whites would have been admitted and she might (or might not) have been one
of them, depending on how her application compared to those of other disap-
pointed white applicants.
We must complicate this picture of group consciousness and competition in
several respects. First, the 1.5% decline in probability of admission seems triv-
ial, but when applied to the entire group of white applicants it means that a sig-
nificant number of people are affected 35°-and many more will think they were
345. PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 148-49.
346. KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY 99-100 (1988).
347. E.g., FREDERICK R. LYNCH, INVISIBLE VICTIMS: WHITE MALES AND THE CRISIS OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 51-91 (1989).
348. BOwEN & BOK, supra note 80, at 36.
349. Id. at 33-34 (without affirmative action, blacks' chance of admission would decline from 42%
to 13%; their percentage of the student body would decline from 7.1% to 2.1%).
350. Extrapolating from Bowen and Bok's figures, almost 2000 more white students in the 1976
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affected (the flip side of the "anonymous loser" factor). Second, substituting
Asians for whites makes the picture look very different and more troubling. In-
deed, relatively high-achieving Asians are probably the group most unfairly
treated by preferences for blacks. During most of the nineteenth century, many
Asian laborers endured a kind of servitude and subordination that was only a
cut above slavery.351 The Chinese Exclusion Case, sometimes called the Dred
Scott decision for Asians, rivals the Japanese internment cases for harshness• • 352
and injustice. Until 1952 (for the Chinese, 1943), Asians could not naturalize
as American citizens. Increasingly, affirmative action in effect punishes the
stunning academic and economic achievements of many Asians by excluding
them, like whites, from eligibility for preferences. This disadvantage, moreover,
falls more heavily on Asians than on whites. Because the number of Asian ap-
plicants is so much smaller, preferences for blacks reduce the ex ante admission
probability of Asians as a group and as individuals much more than they do for
individual whites.
A third and related complication arises from the growing possibility that,
contrary to my assumption in this scenario, the whites disadvantaged by prefer-
ences may in fact think of themselves not as whites but as members of some
other group-say, New York City public school students, Muslims, whites with
SAT scores of X, outwardly gay women, or any group that they believe is sali-
ent to their applicant-identity. Because these non-preference groups are so
much smaller than the white group, the preference for blacks may create a
much greater disadvantage for them than the 1.5% for whites.
Now suppose that we instead imagine that the white losers think of them-
selves as individual applicants, not as members of the demographic group
"whites." I would expect them to feel a more profound sense of unfairness and
personal loss, if not bitterness. 353 Regardless of how large or small their racial
group disadvantage was, they will think that it may have been the difference,
depriving them of admission on what most will presumably regard as a non-
meritorious, hence illegitimate, basis. In psychological reality, and not just by
cohort would have been admitted to the schools that were studied.
351. E.g., BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING ASIAN AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION
POLICY (1993); CHARLES L. MCCLAN, JR., IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE CHINESE STRUGGLE
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 10-11 (1994); LUCY SALYER, LAW
HARSH As TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995);
RONALD TAKAKI, STRANGERS FROM A DIFFERENT SHORE: A HISTORY OF ASIAN AMERICANS 85 (1989);
John Hayakawa Torok, Reconstruction and Racial Nativism: Chinese Immigration and the Debates on
the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and Civil Rights Laws, 3 ASIAN L.J. 55 (1996).
352. Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Neither case has been overruled; both are occasionally cited by
the Court. E.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 2501 (2001) (citing Chinese Exclusion Case);
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 121 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Korematsu).
353. For experimental evidence on these feelings, see, for example, Frederick R. Lynch, Casualties
and More Casualties: Surviving Affirmative Action (More or Less), in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: SOCIAL
JUSTICE OR REVERSE DISCRIMINATION? 90 (Francis J. Beckwith & Todd E. Jones eds., 1997).
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hypothesis, they will not have thought of themselves as "whites" in this con-
nection, at least until they learn that affirmative action disadvantages whites as
a group. Perceiving their group membership as a reason, if not the reason, for
their rejection is bound to demoralize and anger them in a way that would not
occur to those who conceive of themselves not as unique individuals, but rather
as members of a specific demographic group that has a statistical chance of
admission.
354
In a culture that ardently affirms the principles of individual freedom, merit,
and equality of opportunity, this demoralization and anger must be counted as a
very large social cost. It is no less a cost because it is borne by whites, and of-
ten less privileged whites at that. If these principles make it unfair to impose
this cost, the fact that the unfairness is spread across a large group of people
may not make it any more palatable. In fact, diffusing the unfairness in this way
will simply increase the number of people who feel themselves aggrieved. The
most powerful groups among them may seek protection by seeking new prefer-
ences for themselves. These incentives do not fully explain the politics of af-
firmative action, but they surely are part of the story.
Other costs of affirmative action are also diffuse, invisible, hard to measure,
or ineffable. Here as elsewhere, we do well to remember the laws of unintended
consequences, of inertia, of program politicization, and of reinforcement of ex-
isting advantage-laws that are as implacable and distort affirmative action as
much as other well-intended policies. 355 Black students' much higher drop-out
rates from the selective schools represent a large financial and psychological
cost to the students and to the schools. 356 Shelby Steele, who firmly opposes
354. Bowen and Bok found that graduates rejected by their first-choice schools were as supportive
of diversity efforts as those who were admitted. Supra note 80, at 251-52. On the other hand, almost all
applicants to selective schools apply to a large number of them and presumably do not expect to get into
their first choices (commonly called a "reach") anyway.
355. See generally SCHUCK, supra note 307, at 419-79. Despite methodological and interpretive
difficulties, some researchers have studied the effects, if any, of affirmative action on behaviors in "mi-
cro" policy contexts. Results are mixed. E.g., Brandice J. Canes & Harvey S. Rosen, Following in Her
Footsteps: Women 's Choices of College Majors and Faculty Gender Composition, 48 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REv., 486 (1995) (adding more female role models to three faculties had no effect on gender com-
position of undergraduate majors); Lott, supra note 147 (increasing black and minority police officers
increased crime rates, especially in heavily black neighborhoods, by lower hiring standards for both
minority and non-minority officers; no effect found with female recruits); C.J. Chivers, From Court
Order to Reality: A Diverse Boston Police Force, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2001, at Al (positive effects on
policing); Barbara Whitaker, When California Lights Dim; Utilities' Turmoil also Hits Program that
Aids Concerns Owned by Women and Minorities, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 28, 2001, at Cl (describing
"Women, Minority and Disabled Veterans Business Enterprises Program for Public Utilities" as a "na-
tional model for minority contracting efforts" but also an example of the perils of dependence on par-
ticular revenue sources).
356. See generally BOwEN & BOK, supra note 80, at 258-59; THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM,
BLACK AND WHITE, supra note 138, at 405-12; Sandalow, supra note 85, at 1884-1891. Although the
former Chancellor of the University of California at Berkeley claims that it is a "myth" that students
admitted under affirmative action do not succeed academically, his own figures from his own campus
belie this claim: the five-year graduation rate for blacks was 46%, for Chicanos 56%, for Latinos 59%,
for Filipinos 63%, for whites 76%, and for non-Filipino Asians 78%. Tien, supra note 128, at 245.
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affirmative action, sees it as an "iconographic" policy aimed at enhancing
whites' virtuous self-image and blacks' sense of power--"the precise qualities
that America's long history of racism had denied to each side." '357 The fact that
affirmative action is a feel-good policy for white elites, of course, tells us
nothing about whether or not it is moral, rational, or effective. Many socially
desirable behaviors are actuated by guilt or by the desire to be esteemed by oth-
ers and by oneself as righteous and generous. Indeed, no community can flour-
ish without such motivations.
Some of affirmative action's iconographic elements, however, are less up-
lifting. What signals does society send when it exempts one from the normal
rules of the game, treats one as a kind of ward of the state or of some other in-
stitution, presumes that one needs special help because one cannot make it on
one's own, subjects one to others' lowered expectations for oneself, and segre-
gates one-paradoxically, in the service of the integration ideal? 358 No one
really knows how program beneficiaries decode the subtle semiotics of prefer-
ences; they surely read them in many different ways. Indeed, because these sig-
nals are multiple, intricate, and perhaps internally contradictory, the benefici-
aries may be as confused as the rest of us about what preferences actually
connote.
In any event, one must wonder about the iconographic authenticity of a
policy in which most of the feel-good benefits go to those who bear few if any
of its costs. Most of affirmative action's costs are borne by young people strug-
gling to reach the first rungs of the long ladder to success, while many of its• -. 35936
most influential supporters are elite universities and corporations. 36 In these
institutions, domestic tranquility, good governmental relations, and a public
image of rectitude are paramount considerations. The best-off members of
these institutions, moreover, are the ones least likely to be displaced by it.
357. Shelby Steele, Affirmative Action Must Go, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1995, at A19 (arguing that
opponents of affirmative action can gain moral authority by criminalizing discrimination).
358. E.g., SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER (1990); see also Missouri v. Jen-
kins, 515 U.S. 70, 122 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("'Racial isolation' itself is not a harm; only
state-enforced segregation is. After all, if separation itself is a harm, and if integration therefore is the
only way that blacks can receive a proper education, then there must be something inferior about
blacks. Under this theory, segregation injures blacks because blacks, when left on their own, cannot
achieve. To my way of thinking, that conclusion is the result of a jurisprudence based upon a theory of
black inferiority."); Alex M. Johnson, Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice: Why Integration-
ism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1401 (1993); supra text accompanying notes 122-
125.
359. Even so, many of their front-line shock troops may be having second thoughts. One survey of
professors suggests that they reject group preferences by overwhelming margins. Balch, supra note 32,
at 2. Competitive trends at the elite schools may also reduce the schools' enthusiasm for preferences. As
one economist said in 1997, "if affirmative action raised hackles in the 1980's and 1990's, watch what
happens when a third more students are competing for the same number of places in class." Peter Pas-
sell, Economic Scene, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1997, at D2.
360. On the importance of corporate support for affirmative action, see discussion supra at text
accompanying notes 313-318. See also Judith H. Dobrzynski, Some Action, Little Talk, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 1995, at D l (noting that executives prefer a low-key, behind-the-scenes approach).
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Again, this fact does not mean that they are wrong to defend affirmative action;
it only means that they free-ride on its iconographic journey.
Another subtle aspect of affirmative action is how it reshapes the ways in
which merit is defined, measured, and discussed. An example is the trend for
select institutions of higher education to move away from national testing to-
ward a consideration of "the whole person,"361 something that elite institutions,
of course, always sought and can best afford to do. Which criteria of merit will
take its place, however, remains conspicuously unexplained. This question is
especially important for large institutions. The University of California cannot
362realistically consider 68,000 applicants for about 28,000 freshman places on
any meaningful "whole person" basis. Alternative criteria like personal inter-
views, recommendation letters, high school rank, and extracurricular activities
are likely to have other, perhaps greater, disadvantages for applicant pools
drawn from very diverse, hard-to-compare high schools.363 These questions, of
course, intersect with the robust, politically salient national debate over educa-
tional standards and testing, which became a centerpiece of the 2000 presiden-
tial election. In less rarefied contexts like police departments, the practice of
racial or gender norming of qualifications is now common, breeding cynicism,
resentment, and uncertain effects on the quality of public services.
364
Yet another hard-to-measure effect of affirmative action, especially at select
institutions of higher education, is the pervasive dissimulation and deformation
of thought on all sides due to the felt need to deny or ignore the fact that racial
365preferences play a large, often decisive role in many admissions decisions.
Even more pernicious-and tragic for the individuals involved-is the denial
that the preferentially admitted students, as we have seen, tend to have much
lower academic performances and higher drop-out rates. The current attack on
SAT scores, it seems, is "not because they are uninformative but because they
are all too informative: they consistently gives whites and Asians higher scores
than blacks and Latinos." 366 These evasions in turn create a perverse rhetorical
incentive that encourages double-talk. Below, I discuss a current example of
this-California's constant revision of its admissions criteria in order to get the
361. Supranote25.
362. Lexington, Disabling the National Education Defence System, ECONOMIST, Feb. 24, 2001, at
36.
363. These are tests, after all, that were devised to enable colleges to compare applicants from high
schools with extraordinarily diverse programs, standards, and student bodies. Under pressure by the
many groups that hope for more minority admissions, the tests have often been revised in order to
minimize their supposed cultural and other biases. See generally LEMANN, supra note 113.
364. For examples, see ZELNICK, supra note 235, at 107-18 (police and fire departments).
365. For one participant-observer account of how this dissimulation multiplies, see G. Kindrow,
The Candidate: Inside One Affirmative Action Search, in DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, supra note
128, at 140. For others, see LYNCH, supra note 347, at 51-82; see also Issacharoff, supra note 11, at
675 n. 14 (describing how Attorney General of Texas falsely denied racial preferences' role in the law
school's program even though the law school had admitted it).
366. Lexington, supra note 362.
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"right" ethno-racial mix.
36 7
A cost of preferences that is impossible to measure is the insidious innu-
endo about the deserts of almost all but the most unquestionably superior mem-
bers of the preferred group--and perhaps even of them.368 Ironically, this innu-
endo tends to perpetuate the very stereotypes that affirmative action was
supposed to dispel. That these costs are often invisible and unacknowledged
does not make them any less real and cruel-or hypocritical, given athletic and
other types of preference with even less justification. 369 Fish dismisses this
stigma by saying that a particular beneficiary may prefer to bear that cost in or-
der to gain the preference, and that it would not exist if people just stopped
thinking that way.370 The problem, however, is that even unbigoted people do
think that way-they still believe in merit despite efforts to discredit the ideal,
and they are right to think that preferences often violate it. Moreover, the
stigma attaches to every member of the preferred group whether she is willing
to accept this bargain or not.
More generally, affirmative action has contributed to the relentless raciali-
zation of discourse on a vast range of public and private subjects, some of
which actually have little or nothing to do with race. At least two factors are at
work here. First, the felt need to defend it against strong public opposition has
encouraged many advocates to play the race card at every turn and with a des-
peration that grows with the effectiveness of the critique. When opportunities
are made to turn on race, one is more likely to emphasize one's racial identity
rather than the many other identities that one naturally acquires in a society as
fluid, complex, and individualistic as ours. Orlando Patterson, a proponent of
temporary affirmative action, captures this discursive tic so astutely and suc-
cinctly that I can do no better than to quote him at length:
Any reference to Afro-Americans by Euro-Americans that does not acknowledge
the totality of racism or flatter all things Afro-American risks sneers of contempt or
the charge of racism. Any but the most professionally qualified expression of sym-
pathy is likely to be dismissed as liberal patronage. Any suggestion that an Afro-
American person might be responsible, even in some minor way, for his or her con-
dition invites the knee-jerk response that one is blaming the victim. The result is
that no Euro-American person, except one insensitive to the charge of racism, dares
say what he or she really means .... [s]o much "race" speech has become ritualized
and rhetorical. ... The overwrought nature of ethno-"racial" talk results in curious
forms of self-censorship and privileged speech among ethnic groups in their inter-
actions with each other .... [A]n Afro-American person is privileged to say, "I love
my blackness," or "I take pride in the great cultural achievements of my race," or
any such chauvinistic clap-trap. No Euro-American person dares say the very same
367. Infra text accompanying notes 373-374.
368. Glazer, supra note 85, at 59 (quoting Bowen and Bok's statement that stigmatization helps
explain institutions' reluctance to discuss the degree of preference given black students).
369. For a careful review of the psychological evidence, see Krieger, supra note 13. For more an-
ecdotal evidence, see, for example, Lynch, supra notes 347, 353.
370. Supra text accompanying note 125.
Vol. 20:1, 2002
Affirmative Action
thing, not if she cares about her reputation, even though it is true that nearly all
Euro-Americans cherish their appearance and cultural heritage.... Every Afro-
American is presumed to be an expert on all aspects of the subject of "race"....
When they are not proving that "race" as a concept has no scientific meaning, most
social scientists and even medical researchers are busily controlling away all other
variables in a relentless effort to prove that one, and only one, variable explains the
condition of Afro-Americans: "race." Having abolished the ontological basis of
"race" in biology, American social scientists vie with each other to reestablish its
ontological essence as a social fact.... American social science is either uninter-
ested in, or befuddled by, the fact that the vast majority of Afro-Americans, includ-
ing the majority of those born and brought 3ul poor, overcome their circumstances
and led healthy, happy, 
productive lives....
Patterson's insistence on the reality of black progress brings us to what may
be the most important question of all about affirmative action: What would
happen if it were eliminated? What would workplaces, high schools, legisla-
tures, college campuses, and other purlieus of American life look like without
affirmative action--or at least without the kinds of preferences that are now in
place?
VIII. THE RE-SEGREGATION NIGHTMARE
The prospect of all-white (and Asian) institutions is deeply repellent to eve-
ryone I know. Most Americans who oppose affirmative action in principle, the
evidence suggests, are likewise appalled at the thought of returning to a world
in which whites seldom interact with minorities, and almost never as social
equals. As we have seen, this nightmarish prospect accounts for much of the
support for affirmative action. Do we actually face it?
Knowing precisely what America would look like without government-
mandated ethno-racial affirmative action is probably impossible. The difficulty
is increased by the rhetorical strategy of preference defenders like the Univer-
sity of Michigan, who shift uneasily between arguing that (1) preferences con-
fer only a marginal advantage on minority applicants; and (2) re-segregation
would occur absent those preferences. In making predictions, however, we
must not lose sight of how much American institutions have changed since the
1950s and how strong the non-legal incentives for maintaining and increasing
diversity are today. If diversity depended on racial preferences as much as some
advocates imply, even the levels that now prevail in colleges, workplaces, poli-
tics, and communities would simply be inexplicable. A key question is how the
more selective institutions would react to such a ban. Since private ones often
engage in affirmative action now when they are under no legal mandate to do
so, it is safe to predict that they would continue the practice, and perhaps even
increase it in light of the legal constraints on the public ones. Many private in-
stitutions evidently find the organizational, political, and moral considerations
371. PATrERSON, supra note 3, at 2-4.
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compelling, and there is no reason to believe that their reasons would change.
An across-the-board ban on ethno-racial preferences by public institutions
would surely make a difference, although it is impossible to know how much.
The public universities, most notably in California and Texas, have already
demonstrated their determination to maintain their black and Hispanic enroll-
ments even in the face of legal prohibitions against preferences. They have sub-
stituted other criteria that are not explicitly ethno-racial but effectively maintain
or raise the previous levels of minority admissions. Texas changed its system to
admit the top 10% of graduating high school seniors to the public campus of
the students' choice. A recent study of admission data through 1999 finds that
the program has had "mixed results" at the flagship campuses there and has
372helped Asians as much or more than blacks and Hispanics.
California's approach was more restrictive; it was limited to the top 4%,
excluded students who have not taken certain preparatory courses, and did not
guarantee enrollment at the campus of their choice.373 Even so, using greater
outreach, more individualized review, and "holistic" criteria, 18.6% "under-
represented minorities" were admitted to the California system in 2001, essen-
tially the same as the 18.8% in the last year of affirmative action (1997), al-
though their distribution among the various campuses in the system was differ-
ent.374 Under less political and legal pressure to abandon preferences, Florida
adopted a plan that admits the top 20% from each high school to the state sys-
tem, yielding more than 40% minority incoming students and raising black en-
375rollment at its flagship campuses.
But even if the new "percent plans" (as they are called) succeed in main-
taining or increasing black and Hispanic enrollments, they will not necessarily
be a cause for unequivocal rejoicing. First, they may simply preserve the same
objectionable use of ethno-racial preferences by disguising them and effectu-
ating them indirectly. In addition, these programs enable many students who
graduate from uncompetitive high schools to gain admission to institutions for
which they are ostensibly unqualified, with all the difficulties this entails for
them and the institutions. Those admitted under the programs, moreover, will
still constitute but a very small fraction of their groups' cohorts. After all, only
372. Marta Tienda, College Admission Policies and the Educational Pipeline: Implications for
Medical and Health Professions, in THE RIGHT THING TO Do, THE SMART THING TO Do: ENHANCING
DIVERSITY IN HEALTH PROFESSIONS 117, 128-29 (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2001).
373. James Traub, The Class of Prop. 209, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, May 2, 1999, at 44, 78. Some
argue that this "top X% solution" may not simply increase minority admissions but, by altering parents'
incentives, may also improve the quality of the weaker high schools. David Orentlicher, Affirmative
Action and Texas' Ten Percent Solution: Improving Diversity and Quality, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
181 (1998).
374. University of California, New California Freshman ADMITS, Fall 1997 through 2001,
http://www.ucop.edu/news/factsheets/2001/ethnicity.pdf (accessed June 26, 2001).




6% and 7% of black and Hispanic students, respectively, who graduated from
high school in 1998 scored at least 900 on the SAT and ranked in the top 20%
of their classes, and neither of these groups would qualify for automatic admis-
sion under the plan376
Another dismaying and perverse feature of these plans is that their effec-
tiveness depends on segregated neighborhoods and high schools and on school
districting practices that can be manipulated to qualify students under the
plans. 377 Furthermore, the percent plans disadvantage minority students (espe-
cially those attending good integrated high schools) who fall just below the
new cutoff but could succeed academically at the more selective schools. Also
disadvantaged are those white students who are more qualified than the whites
who, because of their higher class ranking at inferior schools, will be admitted
in their place. Indeed, one can predict that the state university systems, under
great pressure from minority caucuses in the legislature, will lower academic
standards further by raising the percentages specified in the plans and by again
reducing the percentage of students who must be admitted on the basis of aca-
demic criteria. For all these reasons, the new rules seem likely to lower the cre-
dentials of whites as well as minorities in the state system.
378
Manipulation of the new emphasis on class rank and holism rather than
higher standards is already evident, 379 and the California system had counte-
nanced if not conspired with these stratagems even when they violate the prin-
ciple of equal opportunity.38° Consider, for example, one ruse that benefits His-
panic applicants to the disadvantage of blacks and most whites. 381 High school
students who speak Spanish at home are now encouraged to take Spanish as
one of their three SAT II tests, which are designed to measure achievement in a
specific subject matter area. Not surprisingly, they score very well on the
Spanish SAT II as well as on the Spanish advanced placement test (which also
strengthens their applications) without ever having taken a course in the sub-
ject! Students in one low-performing Los Angeles school who took the Spanish
SAT II averaged 715 out of a possible 800 on it compared to an average of 396
on the SAT, far below the national norm. Since the California system now
weighs the SAT II scores more heavily than the SAT scores, many Hispanic
376. Tienda, supra note 372, at 128.
377. Id. at 139.
378. Nate Tabak, Acceptance Policies May See Major Changes, DAILY CALIFORNIAN, July 3,
2001, at 1.
379. E.g., Daniel Golden, College Entry in US. Inspires New Calculation, WALL ST. J. (Euro ed.),
May 16, 2000, at 34 (describing schools' manipulations); see Issacharoff, supra note 11, at 687 (with-
out affirmative action, public universities in Texas will lower standards "as far as necessary to avoid re-
segregation").
380. Citrin, supra note 154 (among students with same credentials and family income and back-
ground, black and Latino students are more likely to receive higher holistic ratings; faculty opponents of
affirmative action excluded from admissions committees).
381. Daniel Golden, Admission: Possible: Language Test Gives Hispanic Students a Leg Up in
California, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2001, at Al.
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students win a guaranteed slot in the system despite extremely low SAT scores.
Other language-minority students, such as Chinese, Koreans, and Japanese, are
doing the same thing where the SAT II offers a test in their language, some-
times after heavy ethnic group lobbying and subsidization of test development.
In California, the end of legally-mandated ethno-racial preferences did not
significantly reduce minority admission to the public university system overall.
This outcome, however, rests on two conditions. First, minority students' dis-
tribution among the system's campuses changed. At Berkeley, for example, the
demise of preferences substantially reduced black enrollment there, especially
382at its law school, but most of the students who no longer could get into Ber-
keley attended other schools in the system instead.383 One would expect this to
happen, and it is not necessarily regrettable. Dropping down a rung on the aca-
demic ladder in the public systems does not necessarily damage a student's
educational and life opportunities. The data presented in Part IV on academic
performance, drop-out and bar passage rates, and the educational and career
paths of black leaders, suggest that the opposite may be true, at least for those
who would have done poorly at the flagship campuses. Less qualified students
are more likely to succeed or excel academically at less demanding schools,
and failing at a more prestigious school is probably worse than succeeding at a
lesser one. 384 In the year before preferences ended at the University of Califor-
nia, only one black freshman at the San Diego campus had a GPA of 3.5 or
better, as compared with 20% of whites. In 1999, after Proposition 209, 20% of
382. For the situation in 1997, the first post-affirmative action year there, see John E. Morris, Boalt
Hall's Affirmative Action Dilemma, AM. LAWYER, November 1997, at 73. For the situation in 2000, see
University of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall), 2000 Annual Admissions Report. The
entering class in 2000 contained only seven blacks (twenty-eight received offers) and ten Chicanos
(thirty-two received offers), constituting 3% and 4% of the class, respectively. Id. at frontspiece (un-
numbered first page). The number of blacks who applied to Boalt declined almost 50% between 1996
and 2000; the Chicano application decline was about 30%. Id. at 5. The share of those who accepted
Boalt's offer dropped only slightly for blacks (26% to 25%) but substantially for Chicanos (42% to
31%). Id. at 9. Those who declined the offer almost certainly went to comparable or higher-ranked law
schools. Morris, supra, at 78 (eleven of the fifteen who received offers in 1997 went "to schools with
more cachet than Boalt"). Boalt's problem was that the pool of blacks and Chicanos who met their
minimum standards was exceedingly small to begin with-only sixteen blacks and forty-five Hispanics
nationwide even came close to the median for whites entering Boalt (id. at 74)-and most of those in
that pool chose to attend other schools.
383. University of California, Distribution of New California Freshman Admit Offers, Fall 1997
through 2001, http://www.ucop.edu/news/factsheets/2001/campus.pdf (accessed June 26, 2001).
384. The evidence on how attending institutions of varying selectivity affects future earnings is
mixed and hard to interpret. Compare BOWEN & BOK, supra note 80, at 128 (without controlling for
pre-college aptitude, finds wage premium for attending selective institution), with Stacy Berg Dale &
Alan B. Krueger, Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More Selective College: An Application of Se-
lection on Observables and Unobservables, Working Paper #409, Industrial Relations Section, Prince-
ton University (July 1999) (controlling for pre-college aptitude, finds no wage premium for attending
selective institution for either whites or blacks, though sample of blacks was small). Recent studies in-
dicate that the returns to additional years of schooling are now about equal for blacks and whites. Alan
Krueger, Michael Boozer, & Shari Wolkon, Race and School Quality Since Brown vs. Board of Educa-
tion, in BROOKtNGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMIcs 269-326 (Martin N. Baily and
Clifford Winston eds., 1992).
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black freshmen at San Diego had GPAs of 3.5 or better, and an internal ad-
ministration study found no substantial GPA differences based on race or eth-
nicity.
385
This outcome, I contend, benefits the minority and white students and the
larger society. Even so, of course, this will no more assuage such students' dis-
appointment in not being admitted to their first choice school than white stu-
dents will be mollified by being told that affirmative action reduces their ex
ante chances by only 1.5%. At the lowest rungs of the ladder, to be sure, the
most marginal minority students, like their white counterparts, may not gain
admission to any of the system's campuses, and some of them may be unable to
afford the tuition at any of the vast number of non-selective private colleges
that admit all applicants. We do not know how many are in this predicament
and what they will do about.
The second reason why California has been able to maintain overall minor-
ity enrollments in its public system without formal preferences is that it has
kept jiggering its admissions criteria in a determined search for a formula that
will produce the numbers it wants. 386 1 have already explained why I think this
well-intentioned tactic will lower academic standards, disserve and stigmatize
those minority students who are unprepared for the schools they attend, engen-
der deep resentment on all sides, encourage subterfuge and dissimulation, have
perverse effects at the high school level, and eventually bring a once-great uni-
versity system into disrepute. My belief that this game is not worth the candle is
fortified by the system's ability to maintain or even expand minority enroll-
ments by appropriately redistributing them among its different campuses while
also trying to improve their pre-college preparation (discussed below). Obvi-
ously, many others disagree.
If past is prologue, the remarkable and hard-won achievements of minori-
ties should lead in the future to greater diversity in higher education, work-
places, and other social institutions-with or without racial preferences. This
diversity will occur despite the imperfections of anti-discrimination reme-
387dies. Those remedies should be strengthened wherever possible. In addition
385. Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Themstrom, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: An As-
sessment of the Evidence, ONE AMERICA? POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, NATIONAL IDENTITY, AND THE
DILEMMAS OF DIVERSITY 206-07 (Stanley A. Renshon ed., 2001).
386. U. of California Alters Admission Policy, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2001, at A12 (starting in fall
2003, top 12.5% of high school class assured eventual place at a university campus; most of those be-
tween 4% and 12.5% must first complete two years at community college); Barbara Whitaker, Univer-
sity of California Moves to Widen Admissions Criteria, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at A26 (replacing
two-tier system with "comprehensive review" system that considers applicant's success in overcoming
disadvantages).
387. For a decidedly less optimistic prediction based on cognitive psychology research, see
Krieger, supra note 13, which leads her to advocate continued affirmative action. Krieger shows that
subtle cognitive biases make discrimination hard to detect and remedy, in part because of the salience
and persistence of intergroup distinctions. The psychological literature she cites is complex; it indicates
that racial preferences may magnify these distinctions in some ways while reducing them in others.
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to the usual law enforcement strategies, for example, the government could de-
ploy many more trained testers disguised as job applicants, homebuyers, bor-
rowers, and so forth to gauge discrimination in various markets, while increas-
ing the penalties for violations.388 Violators could be required to publicize their
violations to suppliers, customers, and communities. Other remedial reform
proposals have been advanced and should be seriously considered.389
IX. ALTERNATIVES
The real choice for America, then, is not between the status quo and a re-
turn to the 1950s-or even the 1980s. The powerful processes of immigration
and social change, augmented by more vigorous enforcement of the anti-
discrimination laws and voluntary private affirmative action, promise to expand
diversity in all areas of American life. By the same token, we need not choose
between existing forms of affirmative action and none at all. Indeed, many pro-
posals to reform affirmative action have been offered by its defenders and crit-
ics alike. I discuss these proposals under six broad rubrics: (1) better targeting
within currently-favored groups; (2) disadvantage-based preferences; (3) lot-
tery; (4) addressing root causes; (5) time-limited programs; and (6) voluntary
programs.
A. Better Targeting Within Favored Groups
Many of the proposals take cognizance of the over-breadth of the coverage
and definition of favored groups-for example, as noted earlier more than 75%
of the post-1965 immigrants to the United States qualified as soon as they ar-
rived-and seek to focus more narrowly on particularly compelling claims for
preference. The most important of these proposals would limit the preferences
to blacks (and, for obvious historical reasons, Native Americans) by virtue of
the disadvantages they have suffered from the legacy of black enslavement and
pervasive race discrimination.390 On this reasoning, one might further limit
preferences to non-immigrant blacks (i.e., those descended from Afro-
American slaves), but programs seldom if ever make this distinction. 39 1 Any
Krieger believes that effective legal remedies can deal with such unconscious biases, but I am not fully
persuaded. E-mail from Linda Hamilton Krieger (Mar. 9, 2001) (on file with author).
388. E.g., A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF TESTING
(Michael Fix & Margery Austin Turner eds., 1998); AYRES, supra note 47, at 396-427.
389. E.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995) (favoring goals
and timetables as well as preferences); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE
L.J. 1683 (1998).
390. Nathan Glazer is most prominently associated with this position. NATHAN GLAZER, WE ARE
ALL MULTICULTURALISTS Now (1997).
391. According to a leading expert on affirmative action, employment preferences do not make
such a distinction. Hugh Davis Graham, Affirmative Action for Immigrants, in COLOR LINES, supra
note 235, at 54 (noting that nineteen percent of the black faculty recruited under the university's af-
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who oppose affirmative action in principle but who also recognize blacks' spe-
cial moral and historical claims might well support this approach as a better
compromise. But the growing political influence of Hispanics, whose leaders
often couch the group's claims for preference in similar terms, 392 makes such a
change less likely. Distinguishing among blacks in this way might also be ad-
ministratively unworkable.
Other proposals illustrate just how fine-grained and also how crude these
targeting efforts might need to be. Orlando Patterson, for example, would ex-
clude "first-generation persons of African ancestry from Africa, the Caribbean
and elsewhere ... [but] [l]ike Mexican-Americans, their children and later gen-
erations should be eligible in light of the persistence of racist discrimination in
America." He would also exclude all Hispanics except for Puerto Ricans of any
generation, and Mexican-Americans of second or later generations, and would
exclude "all Asians except Chinese-Americans descended from pre-1923 im-
",393migrants.... With due respect for Patterson's pathbreaking work on race,
his specification more resembles a tax code provision governing depreciation
expenses than a coherent, workable formula for promoting social justice.
Another recent proposal for an alternative form of affirmative action in le-
gal education would grant admissions preferences on the basis of three criteria:
whether the applicant has experienced the effects of racial discrimination; is
likely to contribute a perspective or viewpoint on racial justice that is currently
not well-represented in the classroom; and is likely to provide legally under-
served communities with services and resources.394 The advantage of these
criteria, according to the author, is that they target qualities for which law
schools have traditionally used race as a proxy, without themselves being racial
classifications and thus constitutionally suspect. This scheme might indeed pass
constitutional muster, although this would depend on how it was administered
and whether it can be shown to be anything more than a transparent disguise
for the kinds of racial preferences that courts have rejected. One wonders, how-
ever, how schools-as a practical matter and without relying on impermissible
racial stereotypes-would determine the answers to the three questions. The
proposal, one suspects, would simply invite institutions, parents, and students
to dissemble, with a resulting increase in demoralization of the participants and
system.
Rather than amending the categories of favored groups, some targeting
proposals would demand more rigorous proof of actual discrimination-based
firmative-action program were foreign-born).
392. E.g., KYMLICKA, supra note 343, at 197-98; PETER SKERRY, MEXICAN AMERICANS: THE
AMBIVALENT MINORITY (1995); see also Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom,
47 STAN. L. REV. 855 (1995) (distinguishing Latino claims from black claims).
393. PATrERSON, supra note 3, at 193.
394. Daria Roithmayr, Direct Measures: An Alternative Form of Affirmative Action, 7 MICH. J. OF
RACE & LAW (forthcoming 2001).
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disadvantage before affirmative action could be upheld,395 a requirement that
the Supreme Court has imposed in any event, especially with regard to race-,- 396
based preferences. President Clinton's proposal to "mend, not end" affirma-
tive action, discussed earlier, took this approach.
B. Disadvantage-Based Preferences
Perhaps the most alluring proposal for targeting would shift the focus from
preferences based on race or ethnicity to race-neutral preferences based on eco-
nomic or other disadvantages (e.g., disability).397 Not only would this limit
preferences to those in the currently-favored groups who most need help; it
would also extend them to low-income whites, the disabled, and others who are
not now favored by affirmative action. Because blacks are disproportionately
poor, the thinking goes, they would disproportionately benefit without incur-
ring the hostility that attaches to race preferences. Most Americans, after all,
are morally more inclined to assist people on the basis of their economic need
than on the basis of their skin color, language, region of origin, or gender.398
Despite these supposed advantages of class-based preferences, however,
they would be neither administrable nor advantageous to many blacks. First, as
others have noted, most poor people are white, not black, so a class-based pro-
gram would disproportionately favor whites. In response to this problem, some
supporters emphasize that poor blacks, unlike poor whites, are separately dis-
advantaged by race and by class, so their predicament should be assessed on a
different scale.399 In itself, of course, this aspect of class-based programs is not
a good argument against them-poor people are poor whatever their color-but
it does reduce the enthusiasm for such programs on the part of many affirma-
tive action proponents who primarily want to benefit blacks.4 °° For example,
Berkeley's law school, Boalt Hall, like the rest of the California university
401system, experimented with a socio-economic disadvantage criterion (among
others) instead of race, but abandoned it after one year when it produced no ad-
ditional black admissions-thereby signaling both the inefficacy of this par-
395. E.g., Days, supra note 300.
396. E.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (explaining "strict
scrutiny" test).
397. E.g., RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
(1996); PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 193.
398. Carol M. Swain, Kyra R. Greene, & Christine Min Wotipka, Understanding Racial Polariza-
tion on Affirmation Action: The View from Focus Groups, in COLOR LINES, supra note 235, at 214.
399. Malamud, supra note 9, at 1707 (agreeing with others on this point).
400. See also Tanya K. Hernandez, An Exploration of the Efficacy of Class-Based Approaches to
Racial Justice: The Cuban Context, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1135 (2000) (arguing that Afro-Cuban dis-
advantage and subordination persists despite class-based redistribution in Cuba).
401. Sarah Kershaw, California 's Universities Confront New Diversity Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
22, 1996, at Al0 (up to half of applicants meeting minimum academic standards to be evaluated on
basis of "special circumstances," including social disadvantage).
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ticular targeting strategy and the institution's determination to find some way to
get the numbers that it wanted.
Second, determining economic need would be a very tricky business, as it
has proved to be in the administration of need-based social welfare programs
more generally.4° 2 For all the arbitrariness and over-breadth of existing af-
firmative action categories, they are far more objective and administrable than a
need-based program would be. After all, it is much easier and less contestable
for a bureaucrat accurately to detect one's skin color, language, ethnicity, and
gender than to make the kinds of empirical and normative judgments necessary
to determine the extent, and even more controversially, the causes of one's
403economic need. Morally, it matters to most people whether another's poverty
is due, for example, to discrimination or to drug abuse. Journalist Michael
Kinsley, who favors some forms of affirmative action, imagines what would
happen:
Is it worse to be a cleaning lady's son or a coal miner's daughter? Two points if
your father didn't go to college, minus one if he finished high school, plus three if
you have no father? (Or will that reward illegitimacy, which we're all trying hard
these days not to do?) Communist societies tried this kind of institutionalized re-
verse discrimination-penalizing children of the middle class-without any envi-
able success. Officially sanctioned affirmative action by "dsadvantage" would turn
today's festival of competitive victimization into an orgy.
Some targeting proposals would focus on "place, not race," allocating gov-
ernment contracts to companies located in economically distressed areas rather
405than their owners' race. Some propose distinguishing between jobs that
merely require an employee to be competent, for which preferences could be
used, and those for which a high level of performance is necessary and merit is
an overriding value. The locational proposal, however, seems suspiciously
similar to an economic development program for distressed areas, which has
little or nothing to do with the rationales for affirmative action and which have
often been shown to be problematic in their own right. The competence-
achievement job distinction, like the class-based program, would be very diffi-
cult to administer. It would also place even more of affirmative action's bur-
dens on low-income workers who happen to be white while leaving well-off
workers unaffected, an outcome that seems distributionally perverse.
402. Some proponents apparently ignore this problem. Patterson, for example, would include those
of "lower class background," without noting that the meanings of both "lower class" and "background"
are highly debatable in this context. PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 193.
403. Richard Kahlenberg has responded to these and other criticisms, unpersuasively in my view.
Supra note 397.
404. Kinsley, supra note 49, at 66.
405. E.g., Paul M. Barrett & Michael K. Frisby, "Place, Not Race " Could Be Next Catch Phrase
in Government's Affirmative-Action Programs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 1995, at B 16.
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C. Lottery
Lani Guinier, noting that affirmative action is a winner-take-all, us-against-
them system, has proposed substituting a lottery to allocate slots in desirable
schools. The school would allow all students scoring above the minimum total
that now secures admission to compete by random selection, with the school
allocating additional lottery tickets to students it thinks possess special talents.
Under this system, Guinier says,
no one would feel "entitled" to admission; nor would anyone feel unjustly ex-
cluded. Such an approach recognizes that claims of "merit" and "diversity" are
equally legitimate. It does not set "us" against "them." It does not assume that only
one group wins. It avoids a zero-sum solution in favor of a positive-sum solution




Although Guinier's proposal does possess the virtue, lacking in some re-
form proposals, of assuring that all admittees would possess at least a minimal
level of merit (as defined by the school), it is objectionable on both practical
and principled grounds. By flooding the applicant pool with whites who are
only minimally qualified and who would not otherwise have applied, it would
reduce the overall quality of admitted students without necessarily increasing
black admissions at all-and perhaps decreasing them. Americans, moreover,
emphatically do not believe that the claims of merit and demographic diversity
are equally legitimate; they value diversity only when it is achieved in ways that
are consistent with deeply-held moral values like merit (however defined).
Guinier offers no moral justification for denying people who excel by dint of
hard work and sacrifice the fruits of their efforts, nor does she consider that her
plan sends the wrong messages and creates the wrong incentives for people to
strive for excellence, not just minimally satisfactory performance.
D. Root Causes
Other alternatives to affirmative action are more attractive on their merits
and may be more politically feasible. One might be called a "root cause" strat-
egy; it begins from the premise that the main reason why affirmative action
seems necessary is the inadequacy of the education and training received by
youngsters in the favored groups, which renders them unable to compete on
equal terms with their counterparts. In this view, affirmative action is simply a
poultice that not only fails to treat the underlying wound, but also conceals its
true dimensions. A root cause strategy would emphasize the desperate need to
improve the schools that low-income children attend, provide remedial assis-
tance to those who cannot progress without it, expand job training for low-skill
406. Lani Guinier, Democracy's Conversation: Beyond Winner Take All, NATION , Jan. 23, 1995,
at 88. For another lottery proposal, see Jack Citrin, Editorial, For True Diversity, Universities Should
Consider a Lottery, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 22, 2001.
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workers who cannot otherwise compete in the labor market, and help minority.... 407
entrepreneurs build stable, competitive businesses.
No one really doubts that these are essential elements of any effective solu-
tion to the inequality problem that affirmative action seeks to remedy, or that
the root causes of this inequality begin to operate very early in a child's life.
Adopting a root cause approach to reforming affirmative action yields the same
difficulties that this approach faces in other social policy areas. Root causes
usually remain root causes for one of three reasons: we do not know how to
eliminate them, or We (think we) know how but consider it too costly to do so
in terms of resources or competing values, or we believe it is worth doing but
simply cannot muster the necessary political will. When these impediments to
attacking root causes exist-with violent crime, for example 408--our best
course may be to focus on managing symptoms until we can figure out how to
remove the more fundamental causes. In such cases, insisting on a root cause
strategy may in effect be a prescription for inaction, futility, rhetorical excess,
and (because root causes are hard to understand) sloppy analysis.
To the extent that the academic performance of low-income children can be
improved by remediation and educational reform, this is clearly the road that
we should travel-and hopefully are traveling 49--even as we search for other
ways to improve their life prospects. But to the extent that we do not under-
stand the causes of their inferior performance, or those causes seem to lie in
more recalcitrant social structures of low-income neighborhoods, or the politics
of educational and social reform impede desired solutions, such measures may
be ineffective-or worse.
E. Time Limits
Another alternative approach to affirmative action is to concede its offense
to liberal values but insist that it is desirable if it is temporary. This, of course,
is hardly a novel proposal. I know of no proponent of affirmative action who
407. E.g., Paul M. Barrett, Birmingham's Plan to Help Black-Owned Firms May Be Alternative to
Racial Set-Aside Programs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1995, at A14; see also LEMANN, supra note 113, at
348-49 (favoring restraints on local schools); Rubenfeld, supra note 126, at 471 (favoring "a massive
capital infusion into inner-city day care and educational facilities").
408. This problem is discussed in JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 51, 73 (1975).
409. States have substantially increased spending on public elementary and secondary education in
recent years; their per pupil expenditures increased almost 50% in constant dollars between 1980 and
the late 1990s. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2000, at 164
tbl.262, available at http://www.census.gov/statab/www/ (last accessed Dec. 3, 2001). Their general
fund spending in fiscal 2002 will increase 3.7% above 2001 levels. Jessica L. Sandham, States Slowing
Spending for Public Schools, EDUC. WEEK, Sept. 5, 2001, available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/
newstory.cfm?slug=Oldowntum.h21 (last accessed Oct. 15,2001). At the same time, federal elementary
and secondary education spending will enjoy its largest rise ever, with a 20% increase in Title I spend-
ing, outstripping Bill Clinton's previous record increase of $3.6 billion for fiscal year 2001. The new
legislation also increases teacher and school accountability. Adam Clymer, Congress Reaches Com-
promise on Education Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at Al.
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does not endorse this objective; the program is always defended as a short-term
remedy, as a temporary expedient to be continued only until the favored groups
can achieve ... what? Very few proponents have specified, even in principle,
which conditions would trigger its termination. They seem disinclined to
speculate, perhaps because they believe that existing inequalities are so large
and intractable that they will not be erased in the foreseeable future. Indeed,
Justice Thurgood Marshall spoke in this spirit when he remarked that it would
410take at least 100 years.
Still, many Americans worry about the indefinite continuation of a policy
that raises the most difficult moral and political questions and that has always
been rationalized as a temporary remedy. They have good reason to ask, and
are entitled to know: what measure of equality would be enough to end af-
firmative action? My point is not that this question is unanswerable-indeed,
one can easily imagine any number of plausible answers-but that almost no
proponent of preferences seriously addresses it.
411
I say "almost" because at least one individual, Orlando Patterson, has done
so-although his fifteen-year termination date is actually a conversion date on
which race-based affirmative action would become a wholly class-based pro-
gram that would continue indefinitely. In light of his conviction that affirmative
action "is a major factor in the rise of the Afro-American middle class, the sin-
gle greatest success story of the past forty years," and that its benefits "far out-
weigh its costs," one is struck by Patterson's failure to explain why he would
412phase it out at all, much less in fifteen years. Is the desired equality now in
view? Or is it simply that he and affirmative action's other defenders can no
longer hold off the incessant attacks by its misguided and gullible assailants? In
short, is his phase-out a principled proposal consistent with his praise of the
policy, or is it instead merely a pragmatic concession to political reality? One
cannot tell.
Whatever the content of Patterson's proposal, the political reality is that
once affirmative action preferences are established, they are almost impossible
to dismantle. So far as one can tell, this has been the universal experience of the
413other countries that have established them. The United States is no different.
410. According to John Jeffries, Lewis Powell's biographer, Justice Stevens speculated during the
Supreme Court's deliberations in Bakke that blacks might not need preferences much longer. Justice
Marshall "broke in to say that it would be another hundred years." JOHN C. JEFFRIES JR., JUSTICE LEWIS
F. POWELL, JR. 487 (2001).
411. The U.S. Supreme Court has confronted this question, but only in the special context of the
dismantling of previously segregated school systems that have been under court order. United States v.
Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992).
412. PAtTERSON, supra note 3, at 192-93.
413. SOWELL, supra note 344; Erik Bleich, The French Model: Color-Blind Integration, in COLOR
LINES, supra note 235, at 270; Parikh, supra note 344; Steven M. Teles, Positive Action or Affirmative




As we saw earlier, when conservative Republican presidents and congresses
have been in power, they have not seriously challenged existing preferences de-
spite their avowed opposition to them. The logic of coalition-building among
groups and don't-rock-the-boat politics dictates that these preferences will re-
main with us for the foreseeable future.
F. Voluntary Programs
Voluntary affirmative action is a final example of another approach that
might meet or minimize some of the objections to current programs, particu-
larly the criticisms that they are coercive, legalistic, inflexible, and insuffi-
ciently sensitive to specific contexts. Strong reasons exist to believe that many,
414though certainly not all, educational institutions and businesses that now
practice mandatory affirmative action would continue to do so without legal
compulsion if the law permitted it. The fact that much affirmative action would
exist without legal compulsion, of course, is not a conclusive argument against
mandating it. For one thing, a program might be quite different depending on
whether it is voluntary or mandatory. For another, as I have been at pains to
show, even voluntary preferences are problematic, especially when they are
used as the basis for allocating valuable social resources whose principle of
distributive justice is and should be merit, properly defined. In addition, man-
dating preferences would address the market failure argument discussed earlier
in Part V, Section E.
Be that as it may, entities often have their own political, ideological, and
self-interested reasons, quite apart from legal considerations, for seeking to di-
versify (as they define the term) their student bodies, faculties, work forces, and
415markets. Corporate leaders, for example, have been expanding their man-
agement desiderata to include diversity of thought, lifestyle, culture, dress, and
other attributes not covered by affirmative action law even as they explicitly
416disassociate themselves from affirmative action mandates. More generally,
elite institutions, as we have seen, are among the most influential groups that
favor affirmative action, along with the Democratic Party even (or especially)
414. It seems unlikely, for example, that banks would voluntarily invest in distressed neighbor-
hoods where it seems unprofitable, nor would many companies regulated by the FCC and other agencies
co-venture with, or give stock to, members of favored groups if that did not help them to obtain gov-
ernment licenses.
415. On corporations, see, for example, THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, BLACK AND WHITE, supra
note 138, at 452-53; Lauren B. Edelman et al., Diversity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law,
106 Am. J. SOCIOL. 1589 (2001); Levinson, supra note 159, at 585-89 (example of Coca-Cola);
Dobrzynski, supra note 360; Alan Wolfe, Affirmative Action, Inc., NEW YORKER, Nov. 25, 1996, at
106, 107 ("[T]he support of business for affirmative action is one of the better-kept secrets of the de-
bate.") On selective educational institutions, see supra discussion in Part V, Section G.
416. Edelman et al., supra note 415 at 1581 (managers and their consultants believe that "diversity
is directly valuable to organizational efficiency and important in its own right rather than because it
might promote legal ideals").
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417in its Clintonian, "New Democrat" make-over. Sociologist Alan Wolfe, who
calls this voluntary approach "prudential affirmative action," notes that it has
the additional advantage of not requiring American society to take a clear-cut
principled position on a policy for which in truth no favorable political consen-
418sus exists or is ever likely to form.
Certain arguments for making affirmative action voluntary are a bit too fac-
ile. I believe that private entities (Stanford University, the Boy Scouts, or the
Catholic Church, for example) should be able, as a legal and a policy matter, to
make many choices that the government may not properly make. Nevertheless,
this cannot explain why as a matter of principle private decisions to allocate
resources and opportunities on the basis of skin color are any less objectionable
than governmental ones. After all, a large body of public law, now more than
three decades old, prohibits not only governmental discrimination but also
much private, voluntary discrimination in areas like employment, public ac-
commodations, some contracting, and government-assisted activities covered
by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The coverage of state anti-discrimination laws
is sometimes even greater. Even if we put the law to one side, why are prefer-
ences that are arbitrary and morally wrong when government employs them not
at least prima facie arbitrary and morally wrong when private entities do so? To
many people private voluntary affirmative action is no less problematic than a
governmental mandate, and there is no satisfying normative basis for distin-
guishing between them.4 19 Finally, mandating preferences would address the
market failure argument discussed earlier in Part V, Section E.
I disagree. A racial preference mandated by public law is much more ob-
jectionable than one that a private entity decides to establish to reflect its own
values and for its own purposes. Let me be clear about why this is so. Govern-
mental preferences are more objectionable, in my view, not because they de-
ploy public funding or authority while private ones do not, and not because
public institutions are invariably more powerful than private ones. In fact, pub-
lic law pervasively shapes private entities, and private influence in society may
match or exceed that of government agencies. Critics often use these facts to
discredit both the public-private distinction and its constitutional analogue, the
"state action" doctrine, under which the Constitution's due process and equal
420
protection guarantees do not limit private conduct. Although the state action
doctrine has a dubious constitutional pedigree, the Court has reaffirmed it so
421
often and recently that its continuing authority cannot really be doubted.
417. E.g., CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND WHITE: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, RACE,
AND AMERICAN VALUES (1996) (written as a defense of the administration's essentially stand-pat posi-
tion on affirmative action).
418. Wolfe, supra note 415, at 114-15.
419. E.g., Kinsley, supra note 49, at 67.
420. Symposium on The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982).
421. E.g., Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n., 121 S. Ct. 924,
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But even if no state action doctrine existed, a liberal polity with a genuine
commitment to diversity would have to invent something very much like it to
permit private associational choices to exclude groups not entitled to height-
ened constitutional protection. Such permission safeguards the autonomy and
freedom that are diversity's lifeblood. Mandatory racial preferences threaten
these values more than otherwise similar private ones do. In part this difference
reflects the nature of all legal regulation. Mandates are more coercive than vol-
untary actions not only by definition but as a quantitative matter; they regulate
more people and more activity than voluntary ones that govern only those who
elect it and apply only to activities they choose. Prima facie, they offend liberal
values more.
Other differences are qualitative. For reasons I have explained elsewhere,
422
legal rules issued from the center tend to be more simplistic, slower to develop
and to correct, and less contextualized than voluntary practices that can be tai-
lored to specific needs and situations. A legal rule reflects interest group poli-
tics or the vagaries of judicial decision, whereas a voluntary practice is the
product of the chooser's own (albeit socially conditioned and economically
constrained) assessment of benefits and costs. When change is desirable, a vol-
untary practice is easier to reform or abandon than a legal rule. One who op-
poses a voluntary practice can avoid its burdens more easily than one who op-
423poses a mandatory rule. Voluntary practices can assume more diverse forms
than mandated ones; this facilitates social learning and problem solving.
424
Most important, public law speaks authoritatively for the entire society,
binding all who are subject to it. Indeed, many legal theorists maintain that
law's expressive and symbolic functions, by signaling community values and
commitments, shape social behavior. It does so quite apart from-and perhaps
425even more powerfully than-the sanctions it may impose. While a public law
preference does express a certain kind of compassion for and commitment to
the preferred groups, other signals dominate its message-among them, that
American society thinks it just to group people by race and ethnicity, to treat
those groups monolithically, and to allocate precious resources and opportuni-
ties accordingly; that it holds equal treatment and individual merit as secondary,
dispensable ideals; that the preferred groups cannot succeed without special
public favors; that such favors do not stigmatize them in the minds of fair-
minded others; that those who oppose preferences thereby oppose the aspira-
tions of the preferred groups; and that society can assuage old injustices by cre-
930 (2001).
422. SCHUCK, supra note 307, at 419-79.
423. The classic exploration of this distinction is ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE AND
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINES IN FIRMs, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
424. See generally SCHUCK, supra note 307, at 434-54.
425. E.g., Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 ORE. L. REv. 339
(2000).
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ating new ones. When public law says such things, it speaks falsely, holds out
vain promises, and brings itself into disrepute.
A private, voluntary preference is very different. Rather than sending a
strong, authoritative signal about what society does and does not value and how
social goals should be pursued, it expresses only the values of those who
choose to engage in it. Because most of my substantive objections to prefer-
ences apply whether to private ones as well, I would probably not choose them
for my own academic institution. But many others who also cherish the non-
discrimination and merit principles and conscientiously weigh the competing
values reach different conclusions.
One who affirms, as I do, the broad freedom of an individual, group, or en-
tity to choose how to order its own affairs cannot simply dismiss such conclu-
sions out of hand. Suppose that a private university chooses to sacrifice some
level of academic performance in order to gain greater racial diversity and
426whatever educational or other values it thinks this diversity will bring. (If the
university perceives no sacrifice, then it follows that there is no problem and no
need for a preference, except perhaps in the rare case of a tie-breaker.) I may
view its choice as profoundly misguided and think it will disserve many of
those it prefers because of their skin color, unjustly harm those rejected for that
reason, diminish its own institutional values, and erode overriding social com-
mitmentr. But I cannot say categorically that its choice is morally indefensible.
More to the point, the law should not categorically say this either.
This distinction between public and private morality, between the values
law should mandate and those it should leave to the disparate choices of a di-
verse civil society, lies at the core of a liberal society. Tamar Jacoby, who
studied affirmative action and race relations in three cities, put it well:
No one who understands what makes America great can quarrel with ethnic pride.
At home, on the weekend, in the family and the neighborhood, Jews will be Jews,
Italians Italian-and there is no reason blacks should be any different. Religion and
ethnicity are essential parts of our lives, and government should not curtail how we
express them in the private sphere. But when it comes to public life, even the be-
nevolent color coding of recent decades has proved a recipe for alienation and re-
sentment .... Society need not be color-blind or color-less, but the law cannot work
unless it is color-neutral, and the government should not be in the business of abet-
ting or paying for the cultivation of group identity.
4 27
Americans, Jacoby suggests, must each find their own ways to reconcile their
ethnicity and their common citizenship. Preferences, many believe, promise to
accelerate this process, but in fact there are no shortcuts.428
A post-affirmative action law, I believe, should harmonize the non-
discrimination principle with the important liberal principle of private ordering
426. For a discussion of what these values might be, see Levinson, supra note 159, at 592-608.




(or autonomy) by preserving a limited space for private, voluntary preferences
that meets minimal conditions of norm compliance and public accountability.
The private ordering principle holds that society must respect a private entity's
decision about how to conduct its own affairs, absent some overriding public
justification for regulating that decision (laws barring racial discrimination, for
example, or First Amendment neutrality requirements in intra-church property
disputes) .4 29
How much private ordering through preferences can the non-discrimination
principle accommodate? So far, the law has answered "very little," allowing a
private entity to use preferences only if they are narrowly tailored to remedying
its own past discrimination. Private ethno-racial preferences have largely es-
caped judicial scrutiny, but it is only a matter of time before they too are chal-
lenged in the courts. Such preferences may be upheld on the basis of the kind
of "expressive association" defense that the Supreme Court recently extended
in Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale,430 but the availability of that defense to large
private universities and other diverse organizations is by no means clear.43' For
example-and perhaps ironically-the diversity of a large private institution
might militate against recognizing an expressive association defense for a pref-
erence rationalized on diversity grounds; the argument would be that the insti-
tution's very diversity precludes the kind of coherent, self-defining point of
view that the expressive association defense is meant to protect.
I want to suggest another exception to the non-discrimination principle for
private preferences, one that depends on their transparency. Private entities that
now use preferences seldom admit this fact to the public, preferring obfuscation
and outright deception to candor. One may argue that silence is golden here,
that opacity about racial preferences minimizes social disputes over abstract,
432irreconcilable principles and sustains desirable social myths. Although this
argument for opacity has force in some contexts, it is notably weak as applied
to affirmative action. There, divisions and suspicions already abound and dis-
simulation serves only to magnify and multiply them, as people who assume
that preferences are even more widespread than they actually are stigmatize
even those who did not receive them. Concealment of the truth about prefer-
ences inflames these social conflicts and injustices.
The relative benignity of private voluntary preferences justifies allowing
429. E.g., Kent Greenawalt, Hands OfJf Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts Over Religious
Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1901 (1998) (rejecting extreme deference to church decisions).
430. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000). For my initial reaction to this decision,
see Peter H. Schuck, Diversity Demands Exclusivity, AM. LAWYER, Sept. 2000, at 67.
43 1. Compare David E. Bernstein, The Right of Expressive Association and Private Universities'
Racial Preferences and Speech Codes, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. L.J. 619 (2001), with Mark Tushnet,
The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 71 (2001) (noting possible limits on de-
fense).
432. For an exploration of considerations sometimes favoring opacity, see GUIDO CALABRESI &
PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
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them as an exception to the non-discrimination principle, but only on two con-
ditions. First, the entity must publicly disclose the preference in advance; it
must describe its criteria and weighting system and state why it thinks the pref-
erence serve its goals. Second, the preference must not disadvantage a group
that enjoys the highest level of constitutional protection against discrimination.
The first condition, transparency, is designed to discipline the granting of
preferences by forcing institutions to be more candid about their value choices
and by triggering reputational, market, and other informal mechanisms that
make the entity bear more of the costs of adopting preferences instead of shift-
ing them to innocent third parties. Customers, students, alumni, investors, jour-
nalists, and other interests to which the entity must be attentive can then hold it
accountable, rewarding, punishing, or ignoring the preferences, as they see fit. I
can only agree with my colleague Jed Rubenfeld, a grudging advocate of pref-
erences, when he writes that "[i]nstitutions with affirmative action plans should
be open about them or scrap them.' '433 The same is true, I believe, of legacies
and other kinds of non-racial preferences, though it is doubtful that federal law
can or should compel disclosure in those situations.
Disclosure, of course, is no panacea for the moral and other problems that
preferences create, and it would entail some problems of its own. Institutions
presumably dissemble for reasons they think are important, perhaps even hu-
mane. Harvard, for example, believes that it would be poor educational policy
to reveal to the public high school students from Boston and Cambridge to
whom it gives admission preferences that they are less academically qualified
than others.434 And someone-a legislature, agency, court, or contracting par-
ties-will have to decide what full and accurate disclosure means. Even so,
challenges would go to the nature of the preference and whether it was fully
disclosed, issues that are simpler and less costly to resolve than the legality is-
sues under the current affirmative action regime. The law might promote trans-
parency in other, possibly less intrusive and litigious ways. Adequate disclo-
sure, for example, might be a defense in a subsequent civil rights challenge or
at least limit damages, much as some retraction statutes do in libel cases.
The second condition, non-discrimination against groups entitled the high-
est level of constitutional protection, underscores the important distinction be-
tween non-discrimination and affirmative action preferences discussed early in
this Article. 435 This will not persuade those who deny this difference and be-
lieve that preferences are as normatively compelling as non-discrimination. But
others like me who view the distinction as fundamental (while conceding that it
can blur at the edges) should favor a strong presumption that the value of non-
discrimination against groups that society believes need special constitutional
433. Rubenfeld, supra 126, at 471.
434. Conversation with Derek Bok, former president of Harvard University (Aug. 11, 2001).
435. Supra Part II, Section A.
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protection must trump the value of private ordering. With this constraint satis-
fied, the law should accommodate fully disclosed voluntary affirmative action
preferences that do not discriminate against those groups entitled to the highest
level of constitutional protection.
Whether voluntary affirmative action can survive under these conditions is
an empirical question. Under this regime, a private educational institution
wishing to prefer ethno-racial minority students or those suffering from dis-
abilities for diversity, anti-caste', or other reasons could presumably satisfy both
conditions, as could a private employer wishing to favor such minorities or the
disabled. But an institution or employer that wanted to favor whites would vio-
late the second condition. Although whites are protected by the same non-
discrimination principle that protects everyone else, they do not enjoy the high-
est level of protection that the Constitution owes ethno-racial minorities and
thus could not qualify for an exception to the presumptive ban on even private
preferences.
I have explained why preferences by public entities differ normatively and
empirically from preferences adopted by private ones, and why the law should
treat them differently. This means barring government-sponsored preferences
except in the relatively narrow remedial situations that the courts now permit,
while permitting private ones that can satisfy the two conditions just discussed.
This distinction places great weight on the "state action" line, and some will
say that the weight is more than it can bear. Nevertheless, the liberal goal of in-
dividual autonomy demands that it be drawn and the courts long ago grew ac-
customed to doing so. The line can be blurry when, as is common, the public
and private spheres converge, and one can certainly argue that courts have
drawn it poorly in particular cases. That, however, is a different question than
whether the line should be drawn at all. I hope I have convinced the reader that
it should.
X. CONCLUSION
It would be comforting if the arguments about preferences on one side or
the other were compelling and conclusive, but in truth they are not. Most advo-
cates of affirmative action, one suspects, feel some discomfort at the tension (if
not contradiction) that the policy creates with the values of individualism and
merit that command such powerful, almost universal allegiance in American
culture. We can see this in much of the dissimulation about affirmative ac-
tion436 and in the support by many advocates for a more targeted and temporary
policy. On the other side, even the vast majority of Americans who oppose af-
firmative action in principle also exhibit some ambivalence about it, seeking to
hedge their bets against the dread possibility that social institutions without af-
436. See supra text accompanying note 365 through paragraph accompanying note 381.
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firmative action would be almost lily-white or would further inflame the sense
of injustice that many blacks already feel and that most whites acknowledge. In
their more candid moments, the opponents may concede that merit is to some
degree in the eye of the beholder and that American society has sometimes
compromised the merit principle when it concluded that one or another group
needed a leg up in order to catch up. Opponents may also acknowledge that the
alternative to existing affirmative action programs, at least in higher education,
may be something worse because of institutions' determination to reshuffle the
deck or dissemble until they get the demographic representation they want. Fi-
nally, opponents may recognize that our system of pluralist, interest-group
politics is just that, a politics of groups--one in which individuals seek politi-
cally-allocated benefits by aligning themselves with others whom they think are
similar in relevant respects.
But to say that the arguments over affirmative action are more evenly bal-
anced than most disputants will admit is not to say that these arguments are
equally persuasive. The debate over affirmative action is not simply about how
the law should allocate scarce resources and opportunities, important as that
allocation decision obviously is. An even greater stake, important in voluntary
programs as well, is how society should encourage us to think of ourselves, or-
ganize ourselves, and present ourselves to others. Viewed this way, the issue is
whether, for example, society should promote policies and norms that encour-
age individuals and groups to compete with one another in comparative vic-
timization, with all of the demoralization, distortion, and dependency that this
kind of competition tends to foster. Shaping and communicating these self-
understandings, incentives, and interactions are among the most vital functions
both of law and of the informal social norms with which law interacts.438
Race is perhaps the worst imaginable category around which to organize
group competition and social relations more generally. At the risk of belaboring
the obvious, racial categories in law have played an utterly pernicious and de-
structive role throughout human history. This incontrovertible fact should
arouse wonder at the logic of those who view racial preferences as no more
troubling than athletic scholarships,439 and at the hubris of those who imagine
that we can distinguish clearly enough between invidious and benign race dis-
crimination to engrave this distinction into our constitutional order.440 Vast
437. E.g., McAdams, supra note 425.
438. For example, Edelman et al., supra note 415, explains how civil rights and affirmative action
law have influenced diversity management in organizations, and vice-versa.
439. Justice Blackmun's opinion in Bakke is an example. Post, supra note 233, at 18 (Blackmun
"fails to engage Powell's central point, which is that when it comes to state action the country's history
has made race and ethnicity special and problematic categories.").
440. Many leading scholars, however, take this view. E.g., Laurence H. Tribe et al., Constitutional
Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J.
1711 (1989) (statement signed by thirty scholars).
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human experience mocks this comforting illusion, as does the fact that most
Americans, including many minorities, think racial preferences are invidious,
not benign. Whether benignly intended or not, using the category of race-
which affirmative action proponents oddly depict as socially constructed and
primordial and immutable-to distribute advantage and disadvantage tends to
ossify the fluid, forward-looking political identities that a robust democratic
spirit inspires and requires. Justice Blackmun's earnest hope that we could get
beyond race by emphasizing it has not been borne out.
Quite the contrary. Today, ironically, the proponents of affirmative action
have the greatest stake in infusing our private and public discourse with a re-
lentlessly racialist rhetoric and sensibility that, in my view, deform the debate
and impede further progress. This vested interest in racialism often deploys the
diversity ideal in a dubious way. Christopher Lasch observed that
.'[d]iversity'-a slogan that looks attractive on the face of it-has come to
mean the opposite of what it appears to mean. In practice, diversity turns out to
legitimate a new dogmatism, in which rival minorities take shelter behind a set
of beliefs impervious to rational discussion.
''4
Let us come at the problem of racial preferences in another way. Suppose
that we stood behind John Rawls' famous veil of ignorance in order to frame
rules of justice for our society. 442 Suppose further that we knew only three
things about the society: that legally-countenanced race consciousness had
caused incalculable suffering and injustice in the past; that the society still
contained many inequalities, some (but not all) of them caused by racism; and
that it was seeking to redress these inequalities through various individual and
collective actions. Finally, suppose (as the veil image and logic invite us to do)
that we were ignorant of our own demographic traits and thus could not frame•. " 443
the rules opportunistically. Under these conditions, how likely is it that we
would adopt a rule permitting the government to use race as the basis for allo-
cating scarce resources and opportunities? I think that we would view such a
rule as terribly misguided,a4 and that almost any other plausibly fair distribu-
tion rule would strike us as both wiser and more just.
Even as traditionally defined, race's correlation with social disadvantage is
441. LASCH, supra note 145, at 17.
442. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
443. Within the Rawlsian logic, of course, one could posit that the framers knew additional things
about the society's inequality that I believe to be true-for example, that the disadvantaged made enor-
mous progress even before preferences were instituted; that the society firmly believed in the principles
of individualism and merit; and so forth. This knowledge, I suggest, would make even more unlikely a
behind-the-veil choice for racial preferences. On the other hand, if one posited that current inequalities
were caused primarily by racism on the part of the society today (which I do not believe), the choice
might be otherwise. But of course such a society would not propose preferences as an option in the first
place.
444. My claim that a society behind the veil would not choose such a rule, while contestable, is not
refuted by the observation that some societies, including the U.S., have in fact done so. The whole point
of the Rawlsian thought experiment, afler all, is to test the justice of that choice.
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weaker than it once was, and there is every sign that it will weaken further in
the future." 5 By almost any measure, and despite frequent denials of this fact,
racism in the United States has declined dramatically in recent decades.446
Those accused (however unfairly) of racism (however innocently) must propiti-
ate public opinion through public rituals of apology and self-abasement-like
the earnest District of Columbia official who felt obliged to resign after a bar-
rage of criticism for having used the word "niggardly" in a correct manner."4
Data from the 2000 Census will likely confirm that this decline in racism,
which has been occurring since at least World War II, is accelerating. The ef-
fects of this decline are apparent everywhere. The income of young, intact
black families already approaches the income of demographically similar white
families. On almost every other social indicator, the black-white gap has nar-
rowed significantly." 8 For young black women, the gaps have largely disap-
peared.4 49
Even these comparisons understate the prospects for closing the black-
white gaps in the future, for several reasons. First, much of racism's cruel leg-
acy is permanently impounded in the low education and income levels of re-
tirement-age blacks who grew up under Jim Crow and who, economically
speaking, bear little resemblance to their better-educated children and grand-
children. Second, blacks are considerably younger than whites on average and
thus are less likely to have reached their peak earning years. Even in residential
housing where black isolation has remained stubbornly high; the long decline
in residential segregation nationally seems to have continued in the 1990s, par-
ticularly in the fastest-growing population areas.a0
My point, emphatically, is not to deny that appalling inequalities persist; no
informed person could possibly do so with a straight face. Rather, it is to insist
that race today is a poor proxy for the conditions affirmative action is supposed
445. The 2000 Census reports sharp improvement in absolute levels of living standards among all
groups. Schmitt, supra note 65.
446. E.g., PATTERSON, supra note 3, passim; SCHUCK, supra note 108, at 441 n. 17 (citing studies).
To choose just one of many indicators of this change, 95% of Americans say they would vote for a
black nominated by their party, up from 38% in 1958 and 79% as recently as 1987. GLOVER-
BLACKWELL ET AL., supra note 143, fig. 2-3.
447. Yolanda Woodlee, Top D.C. Aide Resigns Over Racial Rumor, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1999, at
Bl.
448. PATTERSON, supra note 3, at 17-27.
449. On the virtual equality of black women on many indicators, see, for example, ORLANDO
PATTERSON, RITUALS OF BLOOD: CONSEQUENCES OF SLAVERY IN Two AMERICAN CENTURIES 3-168
(1998). Patterson emphasizes the reasons why it will be difficult to close the black male-black female
and black male-white male gaps. Id.
450. Edward L. Glaeser & Jacob L. Vigdor, Racial Segregation in the 2000 Census: Promising
News, The Brookings Institution, Center on Urban & Metropolitan Policy, Survey Series (April 2001).
Overall migration patterns, however, have increased racial isolation in the public schools since the
1980s. Diana Jean Schemo, U.S. Schools Turn More Segregated, A Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,




to remedy and that it is steadily becoming an ever cruder and more misleading
proxy as multi-racial Americans increase and as intra-group differentiations
proliferate. At some point, the arbitrariness of the traditional race-as-proxy-for-
egregious-disadvantage becomes so unmistakable and insupportable that it
must fail the judicial strict scrutiny test for the constitutionality of race prefer-
ences.
Each of the race-related changes I have just discussed adds to the already
heavy burden of showing that preferences are also "narrowly tailored" to this
end-even assuming, contrary to the earlier analysis, that they can be shown to
implement a compelling governmental interest in diversity.451 In their some-
what different ways and contexts, the Supreme Court in Croson, the Fifth Cir-
cuit in Hopwood (the Texas law school case), and the trial court in Grutter (the
Michigan law school case) have cast serious doubts on whether race prefer-
ences can still meet this demanding constitutional test. As I have tried to show,
those doubts are well-justified.
On a strictly consequentialist view of affirmative action, reasonable people
will surely assess its costs and benefits differently. These differences will re-
flect not only people's diverse values, but also their empirical uncertainty on at
least two important points: first, how much of blacks' progress is due to af-
firmative action, as distinct from migration to better jobs in the north, improved
education, reduced discrimination, and other factors; and second, how segre-
gated would American society be if mandatory affirmative action were now
eliminated. In some cases, the consequentialist verdict seems quite clear-and
clearly negative. For example, affirmative action's benefits in the spectrum li-
censing and minority business set-aside programs discussed earlier seem so
marginal if not irrelevant to any defensible conception of social justice that they
are almost certainly outweighed by the cynicism and abuse (and possible ineffi-
ciency) that have widely discredited such programs. Most racial gerrymander-
ing practices under the Voting Rights Act also fail a consequentialist test, not
just a constitutional one, albeit for quite different reasons. 452 Class-based and
race-based preferences designed to integrate housing also seem to have had
453disappointing, not to say corrupting, effects. One could cite many other ex-
45 1. For a contrary view, see Anderson, supra note 127 (positing that a well-designed program
based on integration rationale could satisfy strict scrutiny).
452. See discussion supra at text accompanying notes 38-41.
453. E.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS
942-43 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing studies of aftermath of Mount Laurel litigation in New Jersey); Robert
C. Ellickson, The Irony of "Inclusionary" Zoning, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1167 (1981). The court decree in
the Yonkers housing litigation requiring that housing units for low-income blacks be constructed in
predominantly white neighborhoods has little to show for its trouble more than 15 years after the decree
was entered. See also, e.g., Raso v. Lago, 135 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 1998) (upholding housing authority's
refusal to honor whites' right of first refusal on new housing because it would upset authority's racial
balancing goal). This issue is discussed in greater detail in SCHUCK, supra note 6.
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amples along the same lines.454
Affirmative action in initial455 hiring and college admissions presents much
closer cases, for it is in these areas that the evidence best supports the view that
blacks as a group gain more from preferences than whites as a group lose. Even
here, as we saw, these are precisely the areas in which considerable internal
pressure, self-interested as well as ideological, would remain to maintain or in-
crease existing levels of diversity, at least if voluntary affirmative action were
456constitutionally permissible. Proponents of affirmative action hope, in
Hollinger's words, that we can avoid "mistaking a tactic for a truth."457 But af-
ter four decades of affirmative action, this understandable hope remains a vain
one. The diversity rationale has transformed a temporary, limited tactic into an
almost theological orthodoxy that skin color per se confers diversity-value, an
orthodoxy affirmed by many elites who should, and do, know better. This is not
the first time that hard cases and wishful thinking made bad law and policy.
I have explained why this comparison of group gains and losses from af-
firmative action, while significant as far as it goes, is both misleading and even
irrelevant when we consider how most Americans (black and white) conceive
of themselves and compete with each other, how the ethnic composition of the
United States is changing so much faster than the law, and how short-term
group benefits can turn out to be long-term group costs. For better and for
worse, and recognizing the complications and ambiguities, American culture
remains highly individualistic and liberal in its values and premises, even at
some sacrifice (where compromise is necessary) to its goal of substantive
equality.458 One need not ignore the illiberal strands in our tangled history,
which enslaved, excluded, and subordinated members of despised groups, 45' in
order to conclude that racial preferences increasingly compromise our deeply
engrained but incompletely realized commitment to legal-formal equality. The
progress of this principle has advanced only through long and heroic struggle.
It has served Americans well-even though, tragically, it has not yet served all
of us equally well.
454. E.g., Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: A Market-Oriented Al-
ternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1561 (1995).
455. I say "initial" because it is much harder to make the case that once minorities are hired or ad-
mitted through preferences, have an equal opportunity to perform, and are treated without discrimina-
tion, they should receive yet another preference in being considered for promotion or graduate school.
This distinction should be especially important to those who favor affirmative action only as a tempo-
rary expedient.
456. See discussion supra notes 309-323 and accompanying text.
457. HOLLINGER, supra note 26, at 187.
458. E.g., SEYMOUR MARTIN UPSET & GARY MARKS, IT DIDN'T HAPPEN HERE: WHY SOCIALISM
FAILED IN THE UNITED STATES 282-83 (2000); Alberto Alesina, Rafael Di Tella, & Robert MacCulloch,
Inequality and Happiness: Are Europeans and Americans Different?, NBER Working Paper No.
W8198 (April 2001) (finding a large, negative effect of inequality on happiness measures in Europe but
not in the U.S.).
459. ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS (1997).
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